Public debt increased in most developed countries even before COVID-19. One explanation is the theory of “fiscal illusion,” where people favor higher government spending due to misperceptions about the cost of public goods. These misperceptions stem from factors such as revenue complexity and debt financing. Empirical studies often measure fiscal illusion using indices like the Herfindahl index for revenue complexity, examining its relationship with government spending. However, clear evidence remains elusive. While some studies suggest a link between illusion indices and spending, it is uncertain whether fiscal illusion moderates this relationship. Existing research skips the process of how illusion affects people’s preferences. This paper directly investigates fiscal illusion using data on government expenditures and life satisfaction. By analyzing the interaction between expenditure and an illusion index, I examine whether higher index levels amplify the marginal effect of spending on life satisfaction. The findings offer new empirical insights into fiscal illusion.

Swallowing function declines with aging, leading to dysphagia. Dysphagia is a risk factor for malnutrition, aspiration pneumonia, and even death. Therefore, to maintain the health of older adults, it is important to predict and prevent the decline in swallowing function as early as possible. Previous studies have shown that behavioral economic characteristics, such as time preference and risk preference, influence individual decision-making. It has been reported that individuals with a tendency to procrastinate are less likely to engage in health-related behaviors. Such individuals may also experience a decline in swallowing function; however, the association between procrastination tendency and swallowing function remains unclear. Therefore, the aim of this study was to clarify the association between procrastination tendency and swallowing function among community-dwelling older adults. The results of the cross-sectional survey indicated that individuals with a stronger tendency to procrastinate had lower jaw opening force, which is one of the swallowing-related muscle strengths. These findings suggest that procrastination tendency may serve as an indicator of swallowing function, highlighting the potential usefulness of assessing behavioral economic traits in clinical settings.

This study explored whether norm-nudges induce excessive pro-social behavior and severe punishment by conducting a laboratory experiment based on an asymmetric public goods game with punishment. The results indicated that a moral message induces both excessive contribution (those over the social optimal) and severe punishment, whereas a social comparison nudge does not induce excessive contribution but induces severe punishment. Consequently, both nudge messages deteriorated social welfare.

This study uses uncertainty in the payoff function of a public goods game to distinguish between different motivations for imposing costly punishments in social dilemma situations, specifically highlighting the coexistence of these motivations. There are two possible motivations: reciprocity and inequality aversion. By introducing uncertainty, participants are prevented from predicting others’ contributions based solely on their payoffs. In this situation, participants must choose between others’ contributions and others’ payoffs as the criteria for punishment. Our results reveal heterogeneity in punishment motivations, leading to the identification of different types of punishers: the self-interested type, the reciprocal type, the inequality-averse type, and the“other”type, who exhibits inconsistency. Additionally, the reciprocal type strongly punishes free-riding behaviors while also imposing some punishment for payoff inequality. These findings highlight that inequality aversion is a critical motivation for punishment―some individuals rely solely on inequality aversion, while others incorporate it into their punishment based on reciprocity. Notably, payoff inequality appears to play a crucial role in motivating punishment under uncertainty, regardless of the norm of cooperation.