This study aims to provide a proposal for the disclosure of information necessary for expanding the existing housing market. The study uses a theoretical model of information disclosure for housing quality and equilibrium prices in the existing housing market in which there is information asymmetry. The theoretical model is compared to the data from an experimental economics method and this study analyzes the offering price, contract price, and contract rate.

In theory, a perfect Bayesian equilibrium becomes a separating equilibrium when there is information disclosure. However, if any part of the information remains undisclosed, a pooling equilibrium forms. A similar outcome was observed in this experiment. On the other hand, the contract price in the experiment was lower than the theoretical price, which means that the seller does not necessarily maximize profits. The amount of information disclosure positively correlates with the number of contracts, and influences the contract price and the seller's offering price. This study finds that normative information disclosure that provides fair profits to both the seller and buyer is perfect information not only in theory, but also in an experiment.

When do consumers decide to use the points they have accumulated in loyalty programs for making purchases? A hypothesis was developed, which stated that the major determinant of using points is the number of points that customers possess. Experiments were conducted on the use of points at electronic retail stores and grocery stores to examine the validity of this hypothesis. The results indicated that the number of points that customers possess affected their intention to use the points, the choice of payment method, and perceived cost of payment. Different from findings of previous studies, the value of the payment was not a major factor in making these decisions. These results suggest that asking customers with a few accumulated points to use these points might increase the perceived cost of a payment.

This study examines the momentum effect in Japanese stock returns on the basis of market conditions. Although previous studies did not find a momentum effect in Japanese stock returns, this study provides evidence that significant momentum profits exist for a particular market condition. When the market is divided into UP and DOWN states, momentum profits are found in the UP market states. A further classification of UP and DOWN market states on the basis of subsequent continuation and reversion (UP-UP, UP-DOWN, DOWN-UP, and DOWN-DOWN) indicates that momentum profits are evident only in the reverting UP states (UP-DOWN). I argue that investors' under-reaction to information causes momentum profits in the reverting UP states in Japan.

In the speedboat racing in Japan, women racers can participate and compete in the race in the same condition as the men racer do. This paper used the individual level panel data of records of the racing during the period April 2014–October 2015 to examine how the men's dominated circumstance influence women's performance in the race. The data allows us to control for various factors such as unobservable individual fixed effect, one's lean in the race, popularity, her conditions in the race, and weather condition. After controlling these factors, based on the women's race sample, we observe that the women's time of mixed race loses by approximately 0.3% in compared with that of the women's race.

This study examines whether short-sales constraint is really significant in the presence of a centralized lendable stock market. We hypothesize that a centralized lendable stock market reduces search frictions considerably that reduces cost of borrowing stocks and make short-sales less constrained. Using six-month daily data, we provide evidence that cost of borrowing stocks is not generally significant in the centralized lendable stock market in Japan. Costs of comparable borrowing stocks are also found to be lower in Japan than that in the USA. Our results also show that conventional recall risk is not observed under a centralized lending market. We also examine future return behavior of short-sales constrained stocks to test Miller's (1977) overvaluation hypothesis but have not found any evidence in support of the hypothesis. Overall, our results support the prediction of Kolasinski et al. (2013) that a centralized lending market reduces short-sales constraints and improves the efficiency of the market.

This paper investigates preferences over menus, i.e., sets of alternatives, to analyze a decision maker who randomizes alternatives in a menu. We identify preferences for randomization, by studying anticipated utility from the viewpoint of subjective uncertainty. The effect of randomization in one's mind stems from several cognitive or psychological effects ranging from complements between alternatives to aversion to timing of earlier decision-making. The main axiom in our analysis is a monotonic condition for preferences for randomization, named as Randomization. We show that Randomization, along with other standard axioms, axiomatically characterizes the main result, that is, a random anticipated utility representation. In the model, the decision maker's subjective belief for the effect of randomization is uniquely identified. In addition, we characterize preferences for a desire to randomization, and an aversion to randomization, respectively.