“Information law” is a frontier field of legal study, whose content and boundaries cannot easily be deduced from the concept of “information”. One can gain a general image of information law from the contents and topics typically itemized in the textbooks and casebooks of “Information Law”. Basic concepts of information law include freedom of information, free flow of information, and the “right to information”, although the last might be contentious. The “right to information” is a strategic concept, which would enable individuals to engage autonomously and actively in improving “universal services” and forming information environments.

Through an overview of the contents and topics commonly discussed in information law, three characteristics can be extracted. The first is the “tough and naïve” nature of information. This encourages the discussion of ethics and particular regulatory methods, such as self-regulation and regulations based not on contents but on computer architecture. The second is the concept of “autonomy”. Besides being useful in discussing issues of data protection, autonomy is essential to the establishment of informational ecosystems and the theoretical foundations of the right to information. The third is “speed”. Law must catch up with rapid changes caused by the so-called “informatization” of society. This kind of speediness brings the study of information law into close proximity with policy studies and interdisciplinary research.

“Information law” is still an evolving frontier. It is required to cope with newly emerging technologies, environments, and phenomena related to information. The study of information needs to be flexible and creative. In addition to heavily debated issues under the framework of freedoms vs. regulations, the scope of information law must be widened to envision design features for future governance. Definitions, basic concepts, and regulatory methods of information law remain open for future discussion.

This paper aims to clarify the legal protections for performances via avatars.

Under the Copyright Act of Japan, the rights of performers are subject to protection for "the performance" (Articles 90-2 to 92-2). In this case, there is an issue as to whether a "performance" (Article 2(1)(ii)), or an act equivalent to a performance on the Metaverse (hereinafter referred to as "MV") constitutes "the performance."

As a result of examining that issue, there is a conflict between the quasi-creative act protection theory and the transmission act protection (investment act protection) theory regarding the purpose of the performer protection system.

In modern times, the cost of transmission has fallen, so the expression of individuality in performances should be protected, and the theory of protection of quasi-creative acts was shown to be appropriate.

Next, as a result of examining the conditions under which the avatar performance on the MV can be evaluated as a performance by a real performer, we concluded that the following two points should be considered.

(1) As a criterion for being able to say that it is "the performance" even in the MV, it is judged from the viewpoint of whether the performer's individuality is expressed in the expression. It should be considered a performance.

(2) When an avatar performs a performance on a MV, in order for it to be said that “that performance” is covered by the rights of the performer, it must be a mechanical reproduction, and the individuality of the original performance must be considered from the performance performed by the avatar. to be able to perceive the expression of the art, and to be able to perceive its identity based on a person skilled in the art (a person with ordinary knowledge in realm of art.