In the era where the information flows globally through the Internet, how to ensure the data free flow WITH TRUST is an issue. Similarly, the issue of security by economy is becoming more and more important and one of the issues in the security by economy is the issue of information and communication. This paper will discuss the issue of Chinese Personal Information Protection Act and legal system regarding data management from this view point. Many Japanese companies have business in China and this means that the data collected, stored and managed by Japanese companies inevitably include the China related data and the storing in China also frequently occurs. This would lead to the issue of global data management, as the government access is becoming one of the most critical issues of the data in the security by economy. After summarizing the contents of Chinese Personal Information Protection Act and other legal system regarding data management in comparison with GDPR, this paper will discuss the risk and the measures to such risks of Chinese data related legal system and how management of Japanese companies should tackle with China related data governance risk, using real world examples, including Line case in 2021.

In Japan, there aren’t legal standards for the voluntary provision of user’s information from companies managing online Platforms to law enforcement authorities.

The article examines what legal requirements must have when they put the provision of information into action by comparing the legal situation in Japan with this in Germany.

In Germany, Network Enforcement Act (NetzDG) has put into operation in 2017. The Act has required to enable the receipt of requests by law enforcement authorities in Germany (Art 5(2)). The article has researched and analyzed the discussion during legislation for Art.5, and shows two issues about the voluntary provision of the information from companies to law enforcement authorities.

First, the research reveals that there is a noteworthy issue how should be understood what “companies’ cooperating with the authorities based on their own free will”. Because, though the discussion during legislation for NetzDG had emphasized “companies’ free will”, while the actual Act has had the provision to impose an expensive penalty when someone violates the duty on Art.5.

Second, in the phase of law enforcement or criminal procedure, it’s often difficult to acquire the consent of the person. Could the companies managing online Platforms provide their information to law enforcement authorities without the consent of users? This is an important issue, because users have fundamental rights, for example, freedom of speech, the right to self-determination about information, and the right to personality.

The article shows how it deals with those legal issues. An author insists on a specific solution which to justify companies’ cooperation with law enforcement authorities. The legal framework based on this solution would require regulations for the behavior of both companies and authorities.

The current Japan’s approach to cybersecurity calls for a critical appraisal due to the strong criticism from leading non-governmental Japanese experts.

This study will first examine the backgrounds, strengths/weaknesses, and implications of major analytical concepts in cybersecurity. Then, the analysis will focus on the country’s existing cybersecurity system and strategy that constitute constraints for policy coordination and cooperation with the United States. Last, based on the identification of the constraints , evolving cybersecurity environment, and policy developments, the paper will present a comprehensive policy proposal across cybersecurity and other related policies.

This study has found out that, despite longtime policy efforts, Japan’ cybersecurity system and strategy is consequent on an extremely distorted evolution under the pacifist Japanese state. Notwithstanding substantial strategy and policy documents, the system and strategy remain significantly underdeveloped in terms of bureaucratic stovepipes and the possession and use of deterrence capability. Certainly, making a thorough rectification of the problem would be possible through a big bang such as constitutional amendment, but hardly feasible as in exercising the rights of collective self-defense in military security.

Then Japan’s cybersecurity policy has to incrementally improve the existing system and strategy. More specifically. Japan needs reinforcing deterrence by denial that prevents cyberattacks and limits their damages, while strengthening the NISC’s authority, organization, personnel and capacity toward a Cybersecurity Agency. This necessitates placing Japan under the U.S. cyber umbrella, rather than exercising deterrence by punishment.

Thus, Japan’s cyber strategy henceforth has to draw on all of cybersecurity, law enforcement, diplomatic and other non-cyber measures, while keeping up with the U.S. and other major allies in cybersecurity. In particular, Japan can enhance its power and influence in the field by strengthening material and hardware production as related to semiconductors and IT equipment where the country’s comparative advantage still resides.

The purpose of this study is to summarize the developments of the UK telecommunications law, particularly the regulations for BT as an infrastructure incumbent, and to highlight its characteristics.

In the U.K., Openreach, a wholly owned subsidiary of BT, is engaging telecom infrastructure business. Broadband operators in the U.K. still need to use Openreach's facilities in many geographic areas. Therefore, it is necessary to prevent abuse of a dominant position and preferential treatment of BT by Openreach. The former is an issue of "SMP (Significant Market Power) regulations" and the latter is an issue of "equality of access and operational separation."

Although there have been prior studies on the UK's telecoms law, there are two reasons why we have undertaken this study.

The first reason is to contribute to Japan's telecoms policy by updating the previous studies of UK's initiatives. As a background, the construction of high-capacity communication networks has become a global issue in the context of the demand for digitalization.

The second reason is to summarize the characteristics of the regulation for the British incumbent, with regards to the following factors: Japan's regulation for NTT is in its period of change; and ex-ante regulations for platforms based on the size of companies are being considered worldwide.

With the above in mind, this study focuses on the UK telecoms law since the 1980s. As a result, the following points can be highlighted: regulations for the incumbent operator has shifted its focus from service competition (promoting market entry and hence price competition) to infrastructure competition (encouraging investment by competitors); operational separation is exercised in the UK as "co-regulation" with a focus on organization; and the guiding principles of "competition/investment" and "organization (co-regulation)" can have a more general value, not limited to telecoms market.