Indirect reciprocity is a mechanism where a positive reputation, derived from altruistic behavior, leads to reciprocation from third parties. However, not all third parties evaluate altruistic behavior positively. As the group size increases, people become more sensitive to third-party evaluations and, consequently, lower their expectations of reciprocity. To test this possibility, we conducted a laboratory experiment (N=111) that considered the influences of evaluative concern and expected indirect benefits. Participants first donated to a fictional non-profit organization and, later, played a trust game with a randomly selected fictional participant from a group comprising one, five, or nine people. Before donating, participants were informed that the fictional participants would evaluate their donations. Although no significant difference was found in evaluative concern for donations, expected indirect benefits in the game, donation amounts according to group size, and evaluative concern decreased donation amounts as group size increased. These findings suggest that people may adjust their awareness of evaluation and regulate their altruistic behavior based on the number of individuals evaluating their actions.
View full abstract