Linkage: Studies in Applied Philosophy of Science
Online ISSN : 2435-9084
Volume 2
Displaying 1-3 of 3 articles from this issue
  • Masahiro Matsuo
    2022 Volume 2 Pages 1-6
    Published: April 22, 2022
    Released on J-STAGE: April 28, 2022
    RESEARCH REPORT / TECHNICAL REPORT OPEN ACCESS
    It has been long debated in philosophy of science whether value judgments in scientific process should be (or can be appropriately) made by scientists ever since controversy between Richard Rudner and Richard Jeffery in 1950s. Although the debates have been conducted over some important theoretical respects, most of them have focused on science as it should be in general, and left behind (at least put not so much emphasis on) the actually controversial cases in each science, deviating from real issues. In this short essay, I examine how Rudner’s original statement about value judgments, which is now regarded as a little too demanding for scientists, could revive as a hot issue in a recent case of seismology, L’Aquila earthquake trial, and show what is needed now in the boundary face between science and society as well as in the value judgment argument in philosophy of science.
    Download PDF (388K)
  • Tomokatsu Kono
    2022 Volume 2 Pages 7-14
    Published: April 22, 2022
    Released on J-STAGE: April 28, 2022
    RESEARCH REPORT / TECHNICAL REPORT OPEN ACCESS
    Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder (ADHD) is one of the neurodevelopmental disorders that is characterized by two types of cognitive symptoms, namely: inattention and hyperactivity-impulsivity, in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, Fifth Edition (DSM-5). Also, there are non-cognitive symptoms of ADHD that are not listed in ADHD such as excessive daytime sleepiness and fatigue. Most of the existing causal models of ADHD are cognitive, brain-centric, non-embodied models. Among these, the triple-pathway model introduced by Sonuga-Barke et al. (2010) is currently one of the most widely accepted hypothetical models of ADHD. However, this model has a weak explanatory power because it can at most explain the above-mentioned two cognitive symptom types and cannot explain non-cognitive symptoms of excessive daytime sleepiness and fatigue. Another existing model, the State Regulation Deficit (SRD) Model, is a non-cognitive model of ADHD that explains ADHD symptoms including a non-cognitive symptom of excessive daytime sleepiness in terms of arousal dysregulation. However, the SRD model does not offer the explanation of why arousal dysregulation occurs in ADHD patients and why they tend to feel fatigued in everyday life. To overcome these weak points of the SRD model, in this paper, I will offer a new, non-cognitive, non-brain-centric, embodied model, which I call the “restless model”, of ADHD. This model explains that ADHD patients tend to be “restless”, i.e., bad at taking rest and therefore they often feel sleepy and fatigued. Behind this tendency of restlessness in ADHD patients, the restless model posits dysfunction of the autonomic nervous system, and in that sense, is non-brain-centric (embodied). If this embodied model is valid, it will not only have implications for understanding of ADHD but also for treatments of the disorder.
    Download PDF (244K)
  • Kaoru Kurogi
    2022 Volume 2 Pages 15-22
    Published: April 22, 2022
    Released on J-STAGE: April 28, 2022
    RESEARCH REPORT / TECHNICAL REPORT OPEN ACCESS
feedback
Top