The paper points out the main advances in the research program associated to "regulation" theory during the last decade. First the five institutional forms have been reinterpreted in terms of elementary coordinating arrangements respectively based on market, private hierarchy, community, State, association and networks. Second, the relative and transitory coherence of a given architecture can now be explained by a series of mechanisms including coevolution, institutional complementarity, institutional hierarchy or the existence of a common paradigm. Third, it is argued that constitutional orders, institutions, organizations, routines, conventions and habits should be carefully distinguished in the analysis of institutional change. Fourth, a new political economy of institutional change is emerging out of a research that analyzes the mutual links between the economic and political sphere. Finally, the concept of "regulation" is generalized by an interdisciplinary approach combining political economy, sociology, symbolic analysis with economics. Thus, the fordism regime can be reinterpreted accordingly and generalized.

View full abstract

The article aims at giving a general survey of the regulationist analyses on the Japanese capitalism. The analyses have fifteen years' history in Japan. During these years, we have three main issues: (1) Was Japan in the high economic growth (1950-60's) Fordist model?, (2) How Japan in the economic power (1970-80's) was coordinated?, and (3) By what kind of crisis is Japan in the long term stagnation (1990's-)) characterized? (1) In the first half of 1990's, we had some discussions: Can we consider Japanese high economic growth as Fordist one? In fact, "Fordism" was a key concept for the French regulationists to explain the post-war development of OECD countries. Uni [1992], finding out in Japan in 1962-73 a mechanization of consumption-goods sector and augmentation of real wages, concludes the existence of consumption-led growth regime. On the other hand, confirming the absence of Fordist capital-labour compromise, he defines Japan in this period as "Fordism without Fordist compromise." Hirano [1993] also detects Fordist consumption-led growth in the medium-long term. Contrary, Tohyama [1990a, b] adopts non-Fordist hypothesis by emphasizing investment-led growth and an extensive survival of rural non-capitalist environments. The debate gives some theoretical reflections on the definition of "Fordism." (2) Our analyses of Japanese capitalism experienced full development starting from the second half of 1990's, with many results such as Inoue [1996], Hirano [1996], Uni [1998], Yamada and Boyer eds. [1999], and Boyer and Yamada eds. [2000]. Almost all regulationists consent that Japan in the 1970-80's (especially 1975-1985) had high economic performances by export-led growth regime. Uni [1995] and Uemura [2000] explained the mechanism of this regime. But, what was the "regulation" mode that had piloted this regime? We have two hypotheses: those of "companyist regulation" by Yamada [1999, 2000] and of "hierarchical market-firm nexus (HMFN)" by Isogai, Uemura and Ebizuka [1999, 2000]. The former stresses that postwar Japanese compromise between capital and labour was not a Fordist one (acceptance of Taylorism by labour vs. offering of productivity-indexed wages by management), but a companyist one, i. e. employment-centered compromise (acceptance of unlimited jobs by labour vs. offering of employment stability by management). The latter focuses a nexus of complementary institutions: firm organization, labour market and inter-firm relations. According to Isogai et al., Japan is characterized and coordinated by a hierarchical constitution of HMFN: rank hierarchy in the large-scale firms, segmented labour market and sub-contract system. And it is these companyism or HMFN that has stimulated the productivity regimes and growth regimes in post-war Japan. (3) From the 1990's to nowadays, Japan is in a long term stagnation. How can we characterize this durable crisis from the regulationist's point of view? Of course it is a structural crisis, but what kind of structural crisis? The first analysis of present crisis was given by Boyer/Juillard [1999, 2000]. Their diagnosis was "a crisis of the whole regulation mode, not so much the archaism of the wage labour nexus." The companyist wage labour nexus is, they say, now challenged by the marketoriented international financial system. On the other hand, Uni [2002, 2003] detects the causes of crisis in the withering-up of structural change in the demand-side. Furthermore, in the Japanese economy there is no mechanism which transfers capital and labour from declining to growing industries. It is just the limit of firm-centered mode of "regulation" in post-war Japan. Anyhow, we must further elucidate the nature and way out of the actual crisis.

View full abstract

Neglected for a long time the firm's behaviors even though its five institutional forms include the form of competition, the French theory of "regulation" has begun to analyze the competitive edges of firms under the notion of "productive model." Different from the One-best-way thinking, and based on the GERPISA's empirical studies on the carmakers' evolution, R. Boyer and M. Freyssenet show, in their recent work, the variety of productive models as well as macroeconomic conditions for their viability and profitability. The most important fact-findings reside in the fact that there exist three productive models, profitable and viable for a long run, and not the only one best-way model such as the "Lean production", in the world automobile industry, and that several productive models are observed in the same country. These fact-findings give rise to a theoretical challenge for the institutional schools such as the comparative institutional analysis, the "varieties of capitalism" school, and the "regulation" school. So, this paper presents the essential of their discussions: the notion of productive model, the profit strategies, the corporate governance compromise, and the macroeconomic conditions that are the growth and distribution mode. It discusses also a possible way to construct the "regulationist" or institutionalist theory of firms, which has to take in consideration the so-called micro-macro loop. In fact, their discussions give only a start point for this difficult work

View full abstract

This article is a survey of regulationists' contribution to the subject of money and finance. In section 1, we specify the lines of this article: we will deal with only conceptual implications of their works; we won't refer to their regulation research as such. In section 2, we examine how regulationists have treated problems of money and finance in the study of Fordist growth model, and find that their concept of monetary constraint is referred to the dimension of social connection of labor and that the money-form as an institutional form, in the regulation theory, has a function of transposing monetary constraint. In section 3, we examine regulationists' concept of monetary social cohesion, which consists of two parts: one is the function of money as satisfying individual's demand for protection and being, another the function of money as means to perform debt of life. Such an aspect of money is called money as a social tie. In section 4, we examine how regulationists have formulated stability conditions of modern monetary regime, making use of various concepts: sovereignty of money, contradictory dual nature of money and three forms of confidence in money. In section 5, we introduce two recent arguments on the so-called financialized capitalism: one is on the crises of financial globalization, another on the transformation of wagelaborer society. There we find that regulationists are interested in the problems of social cohesion posed by financialization. In (last) section 6, we notify merits and insufficiencies in the arguments on money and finance among regulationists. As a result, we see merits as follows. 1) In their analysis of Fordist growth model, regulationists could place the problem of monetary constraint and money-form in the context of the dynamic and structural evolution of capitalist economy. 2) By elaborating the concept of monetary social cohesion, they have succeeded in revealing some implicit dimensions of market system and stimulating our interest in money or finance. 3) On the basis of the concept of monetary social cohesion, they have expressed a unique, so-called societal, viewpoint on the topics of financialized capitalism. On the other hand, we see insufficiencies as follows. 1) Regulationists referred to two social dimensions in consideration of money: social connection of labor and monetary social cohesion. The articulation between the two dimensions isn't so clear in their arguments. In that, further theoretical elaboration seems necessary. 2) It's not clear how they articulate the constituents of monetary social cohesion. As for this point, we expect their effort to construct more precise formulations. 3) As far as their image of the future of wage-laborer society is concerned, further complementary discussions are needed concerning the nature of human desire or culture.

View full abstract

From the theoretical point of view, the Regulation theory seems to be faced with the problem that it is loosing its own theoretical advantage, which it had in the beginning, in the course of adaptation to the request for microfoundation in almost all domains of economics, although we have achieved many results by making use of that theory. This paper aims at introducing arguments of B. Amable, F. Lordon and S. Palombarini, who belong to the second generation of regulationists. They attempt to reconstruct the Regulation theory as a theory of institutions by returning to original perceptions as follows: 1) the theory allows us to understand a capitalist society as a structure, 2) based on the theory, there are always conflicts in a society and it is an institution that settles one of them temporarily and imperfectly. The energetic structuralism proposed by Lordon presupposes that each social actor has the (essential) conatus as the generator of action. Such a fundamental energy creating actions is realized by habitus and becomes the actualized conatus. The concept of conatus has double characteristics, structuring and structured, because a present action (generated by conatus) is constrained by accumulated results of past actions, and at the same time, will constrain the actions in the future. Therefore the reproduction of a social structure will be driven by the fundamental energy. The energy might lead to structural change. Amable and Palombarini propose Neo-realist approach to understand positively the state of conflict in itself and the process which mediates conflicts without postulating the existence of a general interest or a common good. So, the process of the regulation of conflict is executed by the political exchange which implies the interaction among ideology, institutions and political mediation. In addition to the basic mechanism, some concepts are introduced to grasp institutional change: complementarity, compatibility, coherence and hierarchy. These two attempts have some common implications in spite of different starting point which they took. We could expect that they have influence reciprocally in the process of their development.

View full abstract

The Regulation approach (hereinafter abbreviated as RA), which was born as an innovative approach in political economy in France, has been considered to have its theoretical base on the structuralism. However, it seems that, with a growing awareness of "microeconomics basis of institutional economics," the structuralist methodology has lost its importance in RA in recent years. Furthermore, it has become necessary, in its theoretical "grapple" with the strategic game theory, that the definition and proper aspects of RA should be reexamined fundamentally, although it has been said that many concepts of this approach will overcome the concept of equilibrium. From the view mentioned above, this paper examines the following themes. First, it surveys how the structuralist approach has been incorporated in economics and shifted to an institutional approach. Secondly, it briefly shows the history of the RA theory, and explores how and with what incidents RA drew near to the equilibrium theory, by referring to the latest investigation of Bruno Amable. Lastly, the paper shows that RA still has its superiority in political economy, and is made more significant by Bruno Theret, who proposes an original construction of the Regulation concept. The conclusion drawn from the above considerations is as follows. First, if the structuralist approach is adopted, an "institution" will be regarded not only as an element which stabilizes the system, but also as an element that reproduces the system, as well as an element that structures the system. Secondly, according to Theret, the Mode of Regulation which consists of institutional forms is defined as "symbolic mediation." An actual institution as a practical norm of all behavior is always an "symbolic," relative and ambiguous mediation. Institutions introduced into the system of social economy according to about the same grand design bring about different consequences under different conditions because institutions cannot avoid "polysemic" interpretation in practical level. This polysemy suggests that an institution may be corrected and transformed, depending on the social conditions in which it finds itself. Such a quality of an institution also creates the possibility that the system of social economy may overcome its structural limitations. An institution, which exists as a "structural reflection," so to speak, in real society, functions not only as a "closed entity" in practical level, but also as an "open entity," open to economy, politics and other systems in practical order. This gives a chance that a system of social economy may transform in institutional forms. Such "mediating" institutional forms that may, in an ensemble, bring convergence and divergence to a practical order constitute the Mode of Reguration. By using such a definition for the Mode of Regulation, it is possible to analyze the dynamic state of the whole social economy including political and cultural aspects. This definition is particularly useful in discussing the effective range of an economic policy.

View full abstract

The purpose of this paper is to examine the relationship between macroeconomic stability/instability and the "structural reform" by Kim DaeJung after the financial crisis, by constructing a novel theoretical framework. As far as the theoretical framework is concerned, we try to combine, on one hand, "Transformational Growth Theory" by E. J. Nell on the pattern of business cycle and macroeconomic stability, and, on the other hand, "Regulation Theory" on the institutional forms like wage-labour nexus. The empirical part of this paper explores the impact of institutional change in Korean economy after 1997 in relation to the macroeconomic stability. Especially, we show that, by analyzing the change in the pattern of the business cycle, the change in the patterns of price and wage-coordination enhances the real macroeconomic instability. The stagnant consumption demand since the "structural reform" can be interpreted as an expression of this instability.

View full abstract

"Service labor/value of labor power-creating theory" insists that human abilities are produced in the sector of "personal service" such as education, healthcare, welfare, and entertainment, and that those are not material goods but commodity products that ought to be produced in a production sector applicable to labor value theory. They have always criticized our viewpoint of comprehending human abilities as a concept of product and of regarding a service sector as a process of producing. In fact, they have criticized that it needs to present an original Reproduction Diagram as long as "service labor/value of labor power-creating theory" manifest a commodity production theory. The purpose of this paper is to make an original Reproduction Diagram while illustrating my basic point of view on"Service labor/value of labor power-creating theory." We concluded the following; Labor power possessed by Wageworkers (including family members) and capitalists constantly repeats a series of exhaustion and the recovery as one part fades out and the other part reforms itself. The numerical values for service sector in the diagram represents an amount of commodity values and the whole body of service products produced per year by social labors such as education, healthcare, welfare, and entertainment in order to maintain and develop value in use of labor power. An introduction of service sector into Reproduction Diagram demonstrates that the service sector (education, healthcare, welfare, and entertainment) stays essential as a social labor sector or a social production sector to carry on social reproduction in a given production level, while for working laborer (commodity of labor power) and un working laborer (fulltime housewives, children, seniors, and capitalists) sustaining and developing the quality level of labor power. For an extension of service sector, it is inevitable that wageworkers and capitalists expend increasingly their income on services. Since real wage level doesn't change hugely in the short term, the rise of productivity in the entire goods production, which may cause a value decline on consumer goods, is the premise for an extension of service sector. Introducing service sector into Reproduction Diagram as a value creation sector is barely consistent with the comprehension which reproduction proceeds in a balanced proportion directed by "regulation rolls of goods production sector." It is because an extension of service sector depends on a value decline in consumer goods, and furthermore the extensive reproduction indispensably requires redundant production goods from the first sector. Nevertheless, "regulation rolls of goods production sector" can protest in only this context so that in the aspect of productivity we will never deny the interregulative relation between goods and service.

View full abstract

After the collapse of Soviet Socialism together with globalization of capitalist market economy, academic interest has rather been re-intensified all over the world how to reconsider the controversial issue on market and socialism. This paper attempts to clarify the significance and some problems in contemporary theories of market socialism, especially focusing on John Roemer's socialist model in view of his ideas and methodological foundation. Roemer recognized the loss of incentives (principal-agent problems) and innovative competition as a main reason of the failure of Soviet Systems. To solve this problem, in contrast to Lange and Brus model, he incorporates the coupon stock market which provides the same discipline over firm management as a capitalist stock market does. The coupon share's price of a firm functions as a signal that banks monitor closely the management. In Roemer's model, because money cannot be used on the coupon stock market, the small class of wealthy citizens will not end up owning the majority of shares. Thus, concentration of ownership of firms into a small-sized class of people is prevented. Furthermore, the definition of socialism is modified as realization of egalitarianism concerning opportunities for self-realization, welfare, political influence and social status. However, this paper argues that Roemer's model lacks clear explanation on ownership structures of banks, as well as on historical and practical relevance of the social change and systemic transformation. This paper also emphasizes Roemer's methodological constraints in the neoclassical general equilibrium theory which copes with technology and knowledge (information) as given. Roemer's model is in this sense regarded as a mere analytical expansion of Lange model, just adding to it incentive compatibility plus a functional unbundling in property rights. Critical arguments for socialism by Austrians such as Hayek may still remain appropriate for Roemer's market socialist model. In order to deepen and broaden further the theoretical significance of the continuous socialist economic calculation debate or the controversy on market socialism, we need, not only to make socialist visions more clearly, but also to reconsider possibilities of alternative theoretical frameworks besides neo-classical price thories, such as Sraffian price theory and Marxian value theory, which are unfortunately almost forgotten in the whole debates.

View full abstract