Annals of the Society for Industrial Studies, Japan
Online ISSN : 1884-1015
Print ISSN : 0918-7162
ISSN-L : 0918-7162
Volume 2006, Issue 21
Displaying 1-13 of 13 articles from this issue
  • Teruhiko Ishizaki
    2006Volume 2006Issue 21 Pages 1-19,171
    Published: March 31, 2006
    Released on J-STAGE: October 08, 2009
    JOURNAL FREE ACCESS
    Labor Productivity Growth in the United States economy has rapidly accelerated from the middle of 1990s. The average annual growth rate is higher than in the Japanese industry over the 1990-2004, especially the 1995-2004.
    This article examines the productivity performance of the manufacturing and other industries in the two countries over the above periods. The higher productivity growth rate in the U. S. industries is due to the development of information technology innovation and expansion of IT investment. The lower growth rate in the Japanese industries is owing to the delay of business restructuring and IT investment.
    In spite of the higher productivity growth rate in the U. S. economy and the lower rate in the Japan's economy, the two countries have its own comparative advantage and disadvantage industries. In conclusion, U. S. economy has the strong competitive power in the industries producing IT and using intensively IT, briefly “New Economy” industries, in the global market. In contrast with the U. S. advantage, the Japan's economy has the strong competitive power in the industries producing materials such as steel and chemicals, and machinery such as automobile and machine tool, in short “Old Economy” industries.
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  • Mitsuo Fujii
    2006Volume 2006Issue 21 Pages 21-34,172
    Published: March 31, 2006
    Released on J-STAGE: October 08, 2009
    JOURNAL FREE ACCESS
    Now modern China, “the production centre of the world” shows high rate economic growth. Chinese GDP is very high level every year. However as negative aspects of Chinese high economic growth, there are rapidly increasing social disparities including large gap in income between the coastal urban area and the inland rural area. Therefore the rural migrant workers “mingong” which is replaced from workers of state owned enterprises “gongren” suffer from hard life and heavy labor. This paper focuses on hard conditions of these rural migrant workers and tries to investigate the causes of these problems.
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  • Steady and Conservative
    Nozomu Kawabata
    2006Volume 2006Issue 21 Pages 35-47,173
    Published: March 31, 2006
    Released on J-STAGE: October 08, 2009
    JOURNAL FREE ACCESS
    In recent years, Japanese integrated steel producers are developing the strategy of concentrating their product mix on high grade steel. “High grade steel” is composed chiefly of high value-added steel products for manufacturing and energy/resource development industries.
    The features of this high grade steel strategy can be described as follows:
    Regarding product development, high value-added is not a goal in itself. Integrated producers are developing high-grade steel while cutting development and production costs. This is clear from the example of galvannealing sheets (GA) for the body panels of automobiles.
    Regarding production process, Japanese integrated producers are investing abroad in rolling and secondary fabricating processes, while keeping and renovating ironmaking and steelmaking processes within Japan's borders. This pattern of international division of labor makes it easy to maintain the current characteristics of the production system for high-grade steel, which can be referred to as “Through Process Management” and “Process Linkage”.
    Regarding the prospect of demand-supply relations in the middle term, integrated producers in Japan do not aim at rapid expansion of market share of high-grade steel globally. They are not going to take the high risk posed by the construction of new blast furnaces or acquisition of other integrated producers.
    For all of these reasons, the high-grade steel strategy in Japan should be evaluated as steady and conservative, at least from the perspective of the middle term. Investment plans in the long term are not clear.
    The steady and conservative behavior of Japanese integrated steel producers is a result of their status as global front runners. It is an open question what will be the long-term consequence of such corporate behavior. Much depends on the investment policies of the integrated producers. One possible policy is to make only investments that make immediate profit. The other is to make not only investments that make immediate profit but also investments for long-term improvement of technological capability. Their selection of long-term policy should be watched.
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  • Toshihiro Iwatake
    2006Volume 2006Issue 21 Pages 49-57,174
    Published: March 31, 2006
    Released on J-STAGE: October 08, 2009
    JOURNAL FREE ACCESS
    The makeup of the world automobile industry, against the dynamic backdrop of the emergence of new markets, has shifted from the past tone of trade friction to one of liberalization under the GATT framework, hand in hand with protection of regional interests through Free Trade Agreement (FTA) networks. In a very real sense, the past few years have brought a genuine turning point for the structure of global automotive trade.
    For the Japanese auto industry, a sector characterized by extremely strong overseas ties, the conditions point to great difficulties for any prospects of surviving the international competition on its own. In view of this reality, there is a vital need to respect the spirit of the World Trade Organization to the greatest possible degree, while at the same time advancing economic partnerships on an ASEAN-wide basis to begin, while concurrently searching out means of fruitful alliance with China, South Korea and other key trading partners.
    Looking to the future, it will be essential to establish an economic bloc spanning all of Asia, and mobilize the Asian automobile industry as the policy hub for further strengthening of the partnerships built up by the Japanese auto industry with North America and Europe to date. In more specific terms, this refers to the forging of a tri-polar policy axis bringing together Europe, North America and Asia, while realizing global governance that embraces the WTO, the environment, safety, standards harmonization and other aspects of the automobile field. For its part, the Japanese auto industry must do everything in its power to raise the international presence of Asia as a whole, while working hard to maintain economic interests and achieve international cooperation and prosperity for the automotive trade worldwide.
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  • Under increasing interdependence among ASEAN, China and India
    Toshimasa Asaka
    2006Volume 2006Issue 21 Pages 59-72,175
    Published: March 31, 2006
    Released on J-STAGE: October 08, 2009
    JOURNAL FREE ACCESS
    Among the growing and emerging markets of the world, Asia has been a region of constant interest for the past half century, starting with Japan, which achieved high growth after the end of the last world war, up to the present day China and India.
    Asia has been attracting the world's attention. At the beginning of the 21st century, Asia has a greater influence than ever before on Japanese companies. By all yardsticks used to measure corporate global consolidated performance, including sales, profits and cash flow, the proportion contributed by Asia, centering on China and member nations of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), has been rising sharply.
    21st century Asia has three main features from the standpoint of business operations-Asia as a market, Asia as a production base, and Asia as a base for research and development. For companies, it has become increasingly important to develop strategies to achieve growth and profitability in Asia which incorporate these three interactive functions in a highly competitive business environment.
    Because of the increasing interdependence of trade and FDI between ASEAN and China, companies have been required to establish a “Greater Asia Strategy” to integrate ASEAN and China into a single corporate strategy and single corporate organization. An independent “ASEAN strategy” separate from “the China strategy”, popular in the 1990s, is no longer a workable strategy in the early 21st century and thereafter.
    This dramatic change in corporate strategy is now resulting in the restructuring of existing Asian plants, marketing, logistics, even research and development because this region has already been incorporated into the borderless world economy.
    Furthermore, amid the dynamic changes in Asia, it should be a medium to long-term management strategy to incorporate isolated Indian operations into the interdependent markets and operations in ASEAN and China. India is relaxing restrictions on foreign capital and shifting its foreign policy focus to Asia, and away from Europe and the United States. It is also making progress in FTA talks with ASEAN members such as Singapore, Malaysia and Thailand, as well as with ASEAN itself. As a result of FTAs, India's import tariffs, which were lowered from 150% to 20%, could be almost removed. India's trade with the core ASEAN members and China has been showing double-digit annual growth in recent years.
    Japan, China and ASEAN countries comprise a triangle for the “Greater Asia Strategy”. China, ASEAN countries and India form another triangle. At the center of both triangles is the economic zone of China and ASEAN nations, which will be covered by the “Extended Greater Asia Strategy”.
    In conclusion, Japanese companies must rely even more on Asia for their growth and profitability as their operations continue to be further globalized in the early part of the 21st century.
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  • Masayuki Yamada
    2006Volume 2006Issue 21 Pages 73-83,177
    Published: March 31, 2006
    Released on J-STAGE: October 08, 2009
    JOURNAL FREE ACCESS
    According to Dr. A. D. Chandler, “industry age” was replaced by “information age” in the 1990's. How did software business, which is a leading part of such “information age”, develop in Japanese electronic industry? What features does Japanese software business have? What are current key issues to be solved for future development in such Japanese software business?
    Firstly, development of software business in Japanese electronic industry is overviewed and key issues for business strategies are analyzed in three aspects, namely (1) monopolization of operating software, (2) placing too much emphasis on software customization, (3) competition with Chinese and Indian software venders. To narrow the subject of study, focus is made on the software related with PC, TV and cellular phone, which are familiar to our everyday lives.
    Secondary, future trend of “information appliances” is analyzed and possible software applications are examined. “Integration of hardware and software” would be a key concept to consider future development of Japanese software business.
    Thirdly, role of industrial policy for the development of software technology is discussed in order to consider “future images of Japanese enterprises”, which is the main theme of this year's meeting. Focus is made on lobbying activities by companies to formulate an effective industrial policy.
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  • Syuji Yamazaki
    2006Volume 2006Issue 21 Pages 85-94,178
    Published: March 31, 2006
    Released on J-STAGE: October 08, 2009
    JOURNAL FREE ACCESS
    Mazda has announced a mid-term business plan called “Millennium and Momentum”. In this well-publicized plan, the company aims to build a new brand image. This is a focal point in Mazda's hopes for recovery. But it is not the only plan. This paper explains about the some of the less well-known business strategies being implemented now and in recent time within Mazda Group.
    For example, Mazda is putting great efforts into improving quality while reducing costs of automobile parts. Since 2000, purchasing strategies have revolved around the concepts of Full Service Supplier (FSS) and Achieve Best Cost (ABC). FSS has failed. But ABC has succeeded. ABC's key components have entailed Value Analysis, Value Engineering, reduction of parts count and work steps, and reduction in distribution costs. ABC has achieved 25% reduction in costs, saving about \300 billion during the last three years.
    Modularization efforts by Mazda since 2002 have included improvements in ergonomics and reductions in parts and work steps. Mazda has also consolidated local suppliers since 2004.
    Toyukai Affiliated Corporation is the association which supplies parts and equipment tools to Mazda. Toyukai supports its members through improvements in member's economic positions and technologies, joint enterprise projects, education, and providing information. Toyukai supports Class 1 affiliated companies in their efforts to become independent from Mazda, and Classes 2 and 3 affiliated companies which try to improve their production technologies. Recently, local suppliers have invested in new dealings overseas.
    Finally, this paper introduces two small companies within Mazda Group which have achieved technical innovations. Ohmori Technos Corporation was founded in 1932. Its capital is \60 million, and its annual sales are \4.8 billion (in fiscal 2002). Its Research Development Department conducts wide-ranging research that builds on expertise cultivated through auto parts development. Mamoru Kobayashi (Ohmori's head of research development) is willing to put forth development costs in advance. He guides the company with a good business performance and a long-term business plan. Meanwhile, Kubota Iron Works Corporation, founded in 1938, has capital of \12 million and annual sales totaling \5.1 billion (in fiscal 2004). Nariaki Yamanaka is the head of its research development, and directs the company with joint research projects and a long-term business plan. There are two things in common between the two companies-a strong leadership for independence and long-term business plans.
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  • Toshihiro Kodama
    2006Volume 2006Issue 21 Pages 95-107,179
    Published: March 31, 2006
    Released on J-STAGE: October 08, 2009
    JOURNAL FREE ACCESS
    This paper examines what types of small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) can be expected to promote the formation of industrial clusters in various regions. Since university-industry linkages and inter-firm linkages leading toward new product development are the most essential element of industrial clusters, only SMEs that have “absorptive capacity” of external technologies would be interested in participating and act as promoters of industrial cluster projects.
    This paper proposes “product-developing SMEs, ” which are defined as SMEs that can develop and sell their original, internally designed products, as typical of the type of SMEs with absorptive capacity. A number of this type of SME can be seen in TAMA (Technology Advanced Metropolitan Area), located in the western part of the Tokyo metropolitan area. Many product-developing SMEs participate and act as strong promoters of the TAMA Association, an industrial cluster-promoting organization, which is known as the most advanced case of projects encouraged by the “Industrial Cluster Project, ” a policy program of the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (METI).
    The paper makes empirical analysis based on data from questionnaires distributed to firms in the TAMA region, and examines the absorptive capacity of product-developing SMEs, specifically in terms of whether they are more actively linked with universities and whether they can more effectively utilize these linkages for research and development outcomes than other SMEs.
    The paper concludes that product-developing SMEs are the model type of firm that can be expected to actively participate in industrial cluster projects, however there are conditions enabling the emergence of this type of SMEs in the TAMA region such as that the design and development divisions of large firms in the metropolitan area function as a market for their products.
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  • In the case of the Kasama Earthenware Industry in Ibaraki Prefecture
    Toshihiko Kumasaka
    2006Volume 2006Issue 21 Pages 109-120,180
    Published: March 31, 2006
    Released on J-STAGE: October 08, 2009
    JOURNAL FREE ACCESS
    Recessions in 1990s after the bubbled economy in Japan not only damaged the local industries and small-scale businesses, but also weakened those infrastructures to sustain. However there still exist the powerful local industries as the case of the Kasama Earthenware Industry in Ibaraki Prefecture.
    The Kasama Industry Area is small in its size, though it is rather unique better than others. Its distinctive things are as below:
    1. small amounts but many kinds of products
    2. artists oriented industry
    3. capacity to accept the variety and freedom
    4. gotten out of its traditional arts and methods
    Potentials of the industry were developed by the three decades innovations since 1950s till 1970s. The innovations are consisted of:
    1. products shift from kitchen items like bottles and bowls to various pottery items such as daily goods and artists' works such as objects and decorations
    2. innovations of soils and other materials and marketing
    3. inviting artists to Kasama
    4. infrastructure improvement to invite them
    These include the general idea of Schumpeter's saying ‘innovation’. The innovations to distinguish and add value made Kasama the national famous and competitive place of the products.
    Kasama Area is changing to ‘the artist oriented art and culture industry’. It enhances the marketing and the sales in Japan and Asia. The Industry Innovation in Kasama shows the way of industrial district of Japan in 21st Century.
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  • Shwu-Jen Wang
    2006Volume 2006Issue 21 Pages 121-133,181
    Published: March 31, 2006
    Released on J-STAGE: October 08, 2009
    JOURNAL FREE ACCESS
    The characteristic of Taiwan's semiconductor industry is that it is operated under a corporative and contract system, in which the chips are manufactured and finished by several companies. In this article I will explore the type of inter-firm structure the system has and the type of working system that stimulated the development of the semiconductor industry.
    After entering the 1980s, along with technology progress, the capital intensity of semiconductor increased. However, at the same time, the number of design house was increasing, as well the reason for the design house to continue to increase even under high entry cost can be explained with the capital structure. In the five stages of making a chip, the foundry stage and the packaging stage requires the most capital, and the design house stage requires the lowest capital. This capital structure of the manufacture process of chips is the factor that allows design house to use the lowest cost to enter the industry while other companies may be involved in other stages that requires higher capital. Due to this factor, after the 1990s, the ratio of capital expenditure to sales of design house had a dramatic decrease. This shows that the design house has not been influenced by the increase of semiconductor capital intensity caused by technology progress mentioned earlier.
    Because the contract system lowers the entry cost of the design houses, this lowered entry line created intensive competition. Not only does competition exists among design houses, but companies within different stage are also in competition with each other. This competition brought effective results, as shown by the increase of number of companies and sales within the companies in each stage. For example, the number of design house increased from 8 houses in 1987 to 250 houses in 2003; at the same time, the sales growth increased 237 times, by the rate of 112 percent each year. As the result of this increase in design houses and sales, by 2003, the total sale of Taiwan's design house dominated 28 percent of total sale of the world's design houses. In addition to this, in terms of revenue, from 1995 to 2003, the net revenue rate of design house was kept within 10 to 20 percent each year.
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  • Administration and Coordination of Firms in a Network
    Yutaka Hada
    2006Volume 2006Issue 21 Pages 135-144,182
    Published: March 31, 2006
    Released on J-STAGE: October 08, 2009
    JOURNAL FREE ACCESS
    From the 20th century to the 21st century, industry is facing a paradigm conversion. In the 21st century, “environment” and “economics” are expected to coexist in industry. In this atmosphere, the Recycling of Electric Appliances has been the first recycling-oriented system to emerge in all the industrial area. The system is affected greatly by the Extended Producer Responsibility (EPR) and therefore it is a natural point of interest for research.
    This research focuses on the Appliance industry, primarily analyzing what the Administrative Coordination in the network should be.
    There are three patterns in the Administrative Coordination in the Recycling system of Electric Appliances. (1) Total system, (2) Groups, (3) Research and Development function (R & D).
    The results show that the Administrative Coordination in Recycling system performs effectively. Especially, it functions effectively in R & D. So, it is important for manufacturers to construct Administrative Coordination functions to base R & D in the future. In other words, it becomes the source of the inter-enterprise competition.
    Therefore, it is thought that Administrative Coordination functions construct in total including the process of the product and the process of the vein in the future.
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  • Kazushi Nakamichi
    2006Volume 2006Issue 21 Pages 145-156,183
    Published: March 31, 2006
    Released on J-STAGE: October 08, 2009
    JOURNAL FREE ACCESS
    This article analyzes why Japanese Digital Still Camera (DSC) industry continues maintaining competition in the international market. The article pays attention to an industrial characteristic and analyzes it.
    In conclusion, (1) The industrial characteristic of DSC industry caused upgrading of competition phase (2) The Japanese companies were able to fit upgrading of competition phase (3) The almost foreign companies were not able to fit, because they did not have “capability of picture making” (4) The foreign companies had little learning opportunities about “capability of picture making” (5) They continued playing second fiddle to Japanese companies, because they were not able to catch up with Japanese companies in product evolution.
    I set three research problems to lead a conclusion in this article. (A) What kind of thing is the industrial characteristic of DSC industry? (B) What kind of thing is “capability of picture making”? (C) Why were not many foreign companies able to get “capability of picture making”?
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  • [in Japanese], [in Japanese], [in Japanese], [in Japanese], [in Japane ...
    2006Volume 2006Issue 21 Pages 157-169
    Published: March 31, 2006
    Released on J-STAGE: October 08, 2009
    JOURNAL FREE ACCESS
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