This paper examines the ways in which the human sciences of modern Japan during the Meiji period gave “history” to people. By the end of the 19th century, there was no clear consensus that people had a history. The historical narratives that traced the origins of people, existed only in the form of myths about the Tennō (the Japanese Emperor). However, the fields of comparative linguistics and physical anthropology began to consider history without relying on mythological explanations. Comparative linguistics discovered the “history of language itself” through the process of regular changes in speech sounds, and furthermore, it severed the connection between the concepts of language and race. Comparative linguists attempted to bridge this separation by turning to physical anthropology, which argued for a “history of the body itself” through the anthropometry. This reconnection made it possible to consider the “history” of people without relying on mythical narratives or the subjective authority of figures like monarchs. Michel Foucaults concepts of “dehistoricization” and “historicization” in The Order of Things, as well as Étienne Balibars analysis of how a racial community closed off an essentially open linguistic community, support these analyses. To clarify the relationship between language, race, and history, this paper analyzes the discourses of Meiji period comparative linguists, including Basil Hall Chamberlain1), Kazutoshi Ueda2), and Izuru Shinmura3). It also clarifies how Fuyu Ifa4) gave “history” to the Ryukyuan (Okinawan) people as historical subjects.

This paper traces the transformations in the authors thought from the publication of her first monograph, The Limits of Okinawa to her second, Waiting for the Cool Moon so as to clarify what she believes are the ethical and political obligations of a scholar of modern Okinawan history who writes from within the (settler colonial) North American academia. In particular, the stability of the category of “Okinawa,” narrative form, the colonial gaze embedded in notions of archival mastery, and clarifying what it means to write from the current conjecture are explored in the paper.

For those who study the postwar Okinawan political and social history, Moriteru Arasaki’s texts have long been regarded as a key point of reference. However, despite his unrivalled volume of writings and significant influence, Arasaki’s thoughts, particularly the meaning of “postwar Okinawa”, remain largely unexplored. In this article, I reappraise Arasaki’s political thought by examining his historical texts, especially focusing on his first book, The Okinawan Problems: Twenty Years on (1965). My analysis reveals the following two points. First, by recentering the core historical force from the state to people, Arasaki formulated an alternative historical perspective on “postwar Okinawa”. Second, with the influence of Yoshio Nakano, Arasaki developed the idea of “the Okinawa problem as a node” to recontextualize the politics around Okinawa’s base politics with a global and regional history. By submitting these two points, I argue that Arasaki rearticulated the historical discourse as a means of intervention in the Cold War political order in Asia in terms of the experience of Okinawa’s popular struggle. I conclude this article by suggesting reconsidering Arasaki’s historical discourse as a mode of anti-imperial political thought in post-colonial Cold War in the region.

History does nothing, it “possesses no immense wealth”, it “wages no battles”. It is man, real, living man who does all that, who possesses and fights; “history” is not, as it were, a person apart, using man as a means to achieve its own aims; history is nothing but the activity of man pursuing his aims. (Marx and Engels, 1956)

Discourses portraying Okinawan society as retaining traditional communal structures remain widespread. However, as in other regions, the structure of postwar Okinawan society has undergone significant changes amidst involvement in the Cold War strategies of the United States. The image of Okinawan society as a traditional communal society is nothing more than a projection dole by the mainland Japanese media, imagining a lost “good old Japan” onto Okinawa. This paper attempts to reveal the unique aspects of modernization in postwar Okinawa, while avoiding discussions that portray postwar Okinawa as untouched by modernization. It then elucidates how military bases have contributed to this uniqueness. Although it has been suggested that military bases have distorted Okinawa’s postwar experience, there has been surprisingly little specific examination of how the bases have shaped the modernization of postwar Okinawa. To accurately explain the reality of contemporary Okinawan society, it is essential to elucidate the process of forming economic and social structures based on the assumption of military bases and to reveal the mindset of the residents developed within such structures. This paper draws specifically on social surveys conducted during the occupation period regarding educational attitudes and employment structures to reveal the gradual decline of communal characteristics in Okinawan villages during the 1950s. In doing so, it aims to provide a perspective for understanding the transformation of Okinawan society during the period of rapid economic growth in the 1960s, following the “Island-wide Struggle.”

This paper critically explores the US military’s economic development policies in Okinawa during the post-WWII occupation (1945 to 1972), situating Okinawa’s modernization within Cold War-era imperial ambitions. While previous studies often highlight the peak of Okinawan modernization during this period, this analysis reframes modernization by examining the colonial and imperial entanglements inherent in US economic policies. Central to this analysis is the role of military base work, promoted by the US military as a core industry alongside agriculture, to achieve a “self-sustaining economy.” By positioning military base work as essential to Okinawa’s economic and social modernization, the US military created a dependent economic structure, casting military base work as a symbol of progress. This paper highlights how US-led economic initiatives were not solely focused on reconstruction but intertwined with Cold War objectives, enlisting Okinawans into the US’s broader empire-building agenda under the guise of development. The author argues that the accelerated modernization in Okinawa was driven by the US’s strategic interests in securing influence across Asia, with the modernization policies implemented by the military integrating Okinawa into its Cold War geopolitical framework. Ultimately, this paper contributes to a postcolonial understanding of modernization, revealing how occupation-driven policies in Okinawa served both local economic ends and broader imperial objectives, thus reshaping the region’s socio-economic landscape in ways that resonate beyond the immediate postwar context.

This study examines the policymaking process of child poverty measures in Okinawa Prefecture from the perspective of the constructionist approach to social problems. In Okinawa, the government’s financial support for child poverty measures, the Okinawa Child Poverty Emergency Project (OCPEM), has stimulated the activities of NPOs and is therefore regarded as the “Okinawa Model,” which represents a pioneering example of the positive impact of government financial support on the activities of NPOs. Nevertheless, while the “Okinawa Model” acknowledges the interconnection between the OCPEM and the US military base, it is contended that an examination of these two issues should be conducted separately. As a result, it was not possible to provide a detailed and systematic clarification of the policy formation process or to examine the reasons behind the emergence of child poverty measures in Okinawa Prefecture in a manner that differed from that observed in other regions. Thus, this paper elucidates the diachronic formation of OCPEM policy through document analysis. The analysis is based on Best’s (2017) perspective on the social problem process, which suggests that OCPEM was shaped by the convergence of three policy streams: problem recognition, policy advocacy, and policy proposal. This will demonstrate that it is not feasible to examine the government’s financial support policy isolated from the issue of the US military base and poverty measures. This paper then highlights the need to consider the impact of citizens’ participation in NPOs when addressing child poverty in Okinawa Prefecture.

In Okinawa, after the 1972 reversion to Japan, two movements existed concurrently: the Kin Bay Struggle and the Kisenbaru Struggle. The former opposed the landfill of Kin Bay on the eastern coast of Okinawa and the construction of oil storage tanks. The latter protested the U.S. military live-fire exercises in the mountains of northern-central Okinawa. Both struggles began in 1973 and highlighted the Japanese government’s newfound power as an administrator of the newly incorporated prefecture, as the latter was strengthening its Self-Defense Forces, with structural dependence on U.S. military “deterrence,” and increasing the national oil reserves in response to two global oil crises. While the Kin Bay Struggle emerged as a local people’s movement and the Kisenbaru Struggle originated as a labor movement, they both expanded with popular support, addressing broader island-wide issues and questioning national policies on economic development and military defense. However, in the end, these struggles that stood up to protect local livelihood faced police and legal repression and lost their momentum. As Okinawan people’s lives were threatened by state power, these two movements attempted to establish a foothold to continue their activities. The Kin Bay struggle constructed the people’s commons that would protect the sea from pollution and destruction even in such a moment of defeat, connecting with analogous struggles across the Pacific, while the Kisenbaru struggle helped build support and solidarity for the defendants prosecuted for committing direct action in violation of the Special Criminal Law.