The security of biometric authentication systems against impersonation attack is usually evaluated by the
false accept rate,
FAR. The false accept rate
FAR is a metric for zero-effort impersonation attack assuming that the attacker attempts to impersonate a user by presenting his own biometric sample to the system. However, when the attacker has some information about algorithms in the biometric authentication system, he might be able to find a “strange” sample (called a
wolf) which shows high similarity to many templates and attempt to impersonate a user by presenting a wolf. Une, Otsuka, Imai[22], [23] formulated such a stronger impersonation attack (called it
wolf attack), defined a new security metric (called
wolf attack probability,
WAP), and showed that
WAP is extremely higher than
FAR in a fingerprint-minutiae matching algorithm proposed by Ratha et al.[19]and in a finger-vein-patterns matching algorithm proposed by Miura et al.[15]. Previously, we constructed secure matching algorithms based on a feature-dependent threshold approach[8] and showed that if the score distribution is perfectly estimated for each input feature data, then the proposed algorithms can lower
WAP to a small value almost the same as
FAR. In this paper, in addition to reintroducing the results of our previous work[8], we show that the proposed matching algorithm can keep the
false reject rate (
FRR) low enough without degrading security, if the score distribution is normal for each feature data.
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