With China’s economic power on the rise, “China and the world order” has become a key topic of discussion for academics and policymakers. To analyze China’s evolving grand strategy, this paper addresses such questions as: What are China’s strategic intensions? And how has the Xi Jinping administration employed diplomacy in the pursuit of these objectives from 2013? This paper contends that Western international relations theories have had a significant impact on the development of China’s foreign policy in the post-Cold War era, and there are four major factors that shape China’s calculative rising strategy under the umbrella of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI): Seeking structural power, economic statecraft, ideological hegemony and military buildup. Nowadays, BRI is largely driven by state capitalism as a consequence of government reorganization and the remodeling of Chinese policy-making.

President Kim Dae Jung’ diplomacy is characteristic in the sense that it attempted to go beyond the traditional ‘four power” diplomacy, and to take initiatives for East Asian regionalism. He led the discussions on the East Asian Community by proposing to establish a series of preparatory meetings such as East Asia Vision Group in 1998, and East Asia Study Group in 2000. The final report of EAVG, “Towards an East Asian Community” is still considered an important milestone in the process of East Asian regional cooperation.

The motives behind his call for East Asian regional unity were not restricted to economic ones, although the financial crisis was the immediate and foremost challenge. By advancing regional and sub-regional cooperation in the form of ASEAN plus Three and Korea–Japan–China Trilateral Summits, President Kim tried to mobilize international support for inter-Korean rapprochement, and to alleviate emerging rivalry between regional powers such as Japan and China. This article aims to analyze the views and strategies of Kim Dae Jung administration toward East Asian regionalism in general, and the trilateral cooperation among Japan, China, and South Korea.

Final disposal site selection of High-Level Radioactive Waste (HLW), one of the processes of the back-end of the nuclear fuel cycle, is often called the Backend Problem in Japanese. In 2000, enactment of the “Specified Radioactive Waste Final Disposal Act” and the establishment of the Nuclear Waste Management Organization of Japan (NUMO) marked the beginning of the Backend Problem at the institutional level in Japan. Despite institutional arrangements set up, however, no such dramatic progress has made to derive a social solution to deal with the Backend Problem since 2000. Except Finland and Sweden, in which selected the site for a deep geological repository, many OECD/NEA member countries are facing a similar situation the same as Japan. In this situation, an approach based on a concept of reversibility can be a key to finding a breakthrough of the issue. Notably, the French debate on Reversibility Approach presents many useful materials and lessons to find possible solutions to the Backend Problem. This paper analyses international research on Reversibility Approach in Finland and France. Finally, Reversibility Approach in France brings the Backend Problem to the more ethical issue of the intergenerational equity.

Nabeshima Kihachirō (1859–1922) was born into the ruling family of the Saga Domain towards the end of the Tokugawa period, but came to Tokyo immediately following the Meiji Restoration, and studied at the Futsugaku-juku (French school) founded by Nakae Chōmin. Nabeshima subsequently entered the business world during the first boom in nanshin-ron, the political discourse on southward advance, founding the Tōhō-gumi in Nihonbashi. In 1891, he traveled to the Ogasawara Islands (Bonin Islands), which had just become a part of Japanese territory, aiming to pursue their development. The aim of this article is to describe Nabeshima’s experiences from childhood to adolescence, to examine various aspects of his business efforts in the Ogasawara Islands, and finally to explore a fragment of the socio-economic context of these islands during the Meiji period.

Nabeshima’s business interests were very broad, including the founding of the Ogasawara sea line, as well as trading, fishery and plantation management, especially sugar. Not every business was successful, however as an entrepreneur from a samurai-clan (shizoku), Nabeshima’s role in the economic development of the Ogasawara Islands from the Meiji to Taisho periods is a critical part of their modern history. Though Nabeshima Kihachirō passed away in 1922, he was one of the 11 individuals awarded a “Pioneers with Distinctive Service Prize” during the “50^th Anniversary of the Frontier Development” memorial ceremony which was held during the Emperor’s visit to the Ogasawara Islands in 1927. For the writing of this article, besides monographs and documents held in the Tokyo Metropolitan Archives and the Saga Prefectural Library, I relied upon the “Nabeshima Kihachirō Archives,” which were donated by the Nabeshima’s family to the Hosei University Institute for Okinawan Studies.

This research explores how the young Chinese intellectuals confronted and gradually accepted the official ideology during the early 1950s by focusing on one college student’s psychological trajectory. During the 1950s, the newly established CCP government launched a series of ideological propaganda campaigns including the propaganda on Sino–Soviet friendship. Such propaganda exerted significant influences on the remaking of the people’s mind and the legitimation of socialist ideas. Young intellectuals were also greatly impacted by the ideological propaganda. Yet, their acceptance of the ideological propaganda revealed more complexity in terms of the factors such as education background, cultural status, and personal values. The investigation on such complexity and its causes can inform how the Chinese people maintain their psychological independence in front of the powerful ideological propaganda.

Historical challenges between Japan and China, and between Japan and South Korea have been caused by a confluence of factors. Broadly speaking, these include the management of historical education in Japan as well as Japanese politicians’ historical recognition of their country’s imperialism and of the Asia-Pacific War. More specific problems can be identified: the description of the Asia-Pacific War in Japanese history textbooks, the Japanese prime ministers’ visits to Yasukuni Shrine, and the comfort women controversy. Worthy of note, it was not only in China and South Korea that the Japanese military inflicted oppressions and cruelty during the “Greater East Asia War” but also in Southeast Asian countries and Pacific Islands (former Nan’yo Gunto or South Pacific Mandate). It is understandable that the peoples in these regions support anti-Japanese movements observed in China and in South Korea. Surprisingly, the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs website reports that people from Southeast Asian countries and Pacific Islands view Japan favorably, stating that these countries perceive their wartime sufferings differently from China and South Korea. This paper explores why reactions that emerged in China and South Korea differ from those in Southeast Asian countries.

Small countries avoid direct confrontation with great powers. Like fisherfolk in troubled waters, they play at the conflict among the larger countries, dancing to it so as to avoid falling into the mercy of any one of these competing powers. Nevertheless, latent frustrations sometimes surface. Southeast Asian countries criticize not only Japan, but also China, South Korea, the US, and countries in Western Europe for failing to respect them. Small countries might have hidden disputes against larger ones. In order to address these issues or to mitigate their escalation, it is imperative for powerful countries to pay close attention to covert yet significant disputes with less powerful states.

Tân Á (New Asia) was the Japanese propaganda magazine written in Vietnamese and published in Saigon-Cholon during the Second World War. The first issue was dated 20 October 1942. From the start, it was published twice a month (basically on 5^th and 20^th of each month). And from March to August 1945, it was published weekly (basically on Fridays).

This paper introduces the profile and major contents of the magazine. The first part published in this issue of the Journal includes the profile of Tân Á (such as the publishers, agents and prices of the magazin), and the overview of some contents such as the front covers, main writers, current news and commentaries, Japanese lessons and other series, and the description on Japanese movies.

The second part to be published in the next issue of the Journal will refer to the advertisements, readers’ voices and special features of Tân Á.

Mexican immigrants who move to the US exert great influence on the reproduction of tradition in regional Mexican cities. This study examined the “changes in vistas” that appear due to the frequent migration that connects global cities with sending societies. The emphasis here is on the realities in which residents upgrade their living spaces using traditionality with their own unique strategies (posttraditional vistas), despite social and financial restrictions. Employing ethnographic methods and measurement surveys of housing, this study focused on Jalostotitlán, Jalisco, Mexico. It was found that changes in the vista of Jalostotitlán have not resulted from the unidirectional impact of people, goods, and money flowing from global cities; rather, they have arisen from the bidirectional relationship between immigrants and their hometowns. This research helps to depict another factor for discussions of the global migration narrative by placing regional cities at the core.

By focusing on cross-border shopping services and gender stratification among overseas residents in Japan, this study investigates whether and how Daigou—overseas shopping services—has helped newly arrived Chinese housewives overcome social isolation and achieve better economic status in Japan. Employing in-depth interviews with 32 newly arrived Chinese housewives in Tokyo, this study explores the experiences of disjuncture from previous lives of Chinese women who entered Japan with dependent visa status. Those Chinese women who have entered Japan as dependents have difficulties participating in the Japanese labor market, such as lacking both Japanese language ability and social connections. Such difficulties have resulted in their living in relative isolation. However, with the rapid growth of the middle class in China, the demand for quality products from other countries has increased, giving overseas Chinese housewives opportunities to be engaged in transnational businesses. They accomplished this because of their flexible schedules, knowledge of Japanese products, and a shrewd sense of the market. By using the Taobao website or Weidian as a platform to display Japanese products and sell them to customers in China, newly arrived Chinese housewives have opened their own businesses in the international market. Since they have more free time than other Chinese residents in Japan (i.e., skilled professionals and students), they can easily establish their own business and manage it. Therefore, many Chinese dependents can earn money in the Chinese market instead of washing dishes and cleaning restrooms in Japan. It can then greatly improve their socio-economic status, hence improve their satisfaction with their life as foreign residents in Japan.