記号活字やリノカットを駆使して視覚性を強調した萩原恭次郎の『死刑宣告』（長隆舎、一九二五年）は、これまで詩的言語の言語（symbol）から図像（icon）への移行を示す記念碑的詩集として捉えられてきた。だが、表現規範の革新を目指す前衛的な芸術運動を後押しした関東大震災という出来事に密着して考えるならば、『死刑宣告』は表象の秩序を根柢から揺るがす、より本質的な言語の変容を記録していたことが見えてくる。震災による活字不足と新聞紙面の混乱、震災を契機に普及した素材リノリウムとリノカットという表現手法、これらを取り巻く文化史的な背景を検証することで、その表現の独自性と詩の新たな読解可能性を開示する。

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This article aims to analyze KATO Takaaki's diplomatic vision in connection with his political leadership. As is well known, KATO took the initiative as foreign minister when Japan entered World War I and submitted the Twenty-One Demands, and tried to actively expand Japanese interests in China. But after World War I, he accepted the results of the Washington Conference and as a prime minister promoted a moderate diplomacy, the so-called “Shidehara Diplomacy”. What vision had KATO had in this period? How did he or did he not change his vision? I will attempt to answer this question, which has thus far not been clearly answered.
KATO regretted his poor dealings with the controversial negotiations of the Twenty-One Demands. However, he tried to convince himself that he hadn't failed in the Twenty-One Demands securing Japanese interests in Manchuria and Shandong, and he continued to make an excuse even after the end of the Washington Conference. He also insisted that the return of Shandong to China should be done only in accordance with the Twenty-One Demands Treaty and Japan should make no concessions at all to China at the Washington Conference. Kato's attitude led the diplomatic policy of Kenseikai party to a hard line on the matter of the Twenty-One Demands, as well as attacking the government. Elder Statesman Saionji Kinmochi was worried about this, so KATO was not appointed as prime minister and the Kenseikai party was kept away from government for a long time.
On the other hand, at the same time, KATO continued to try to make the diplomatic policy of Kenseikai party more moderate. KATO's excuse for the Twenty-One Demands gradually toned down. He expressed his sympathy for Wilsonianism and the new trend in diplomacy after World War I. He was strongly opposed to the intervention in Siberia and China carried out by the Terauchi Cabinet, so he controlled the hard-liners on these matters within the Kenseikai party and refrained from making partisan attacks toward the HARA Cabinet with which he shared a fundamental diplomatic vision.
It was at about the end of 1923 that KATO stopped clinging to his excuse about the Twenty-One Demands and made the diplomatic policy of Kenseikai party more moderate and coherent. He decided to do this because he had realized his excuse was too emotional and nonsensical. Also, Saionji's anxiety was preventing the Kenseikai party from returning to government. This change of diplomatic policy was the foundation of the Shidehara diplomacy in the KATO Cabinet. I conclude that although KATO's clinging to the excuse for the Twenty-One Demands was a manifest failure, his effort to make the diplomatic policy of Kenseikai party moderate should be duly evaluated.

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