The purpose of this study is to explain how border issues affect the fundamental nature of Gulf countries. Two-thirds of the world's oil reserves are found in the Gulf region. Therefore, questions regarding borders take on extra significance. Not only are they important in their traditional role of demarcating nation-state boundaries, but their drawing directly affects a state's resources. Many previous studies of border issues in the Gulf have been based primarily from the viewpoints of history and international law. However, it is equally important to pay attention to how borders, via their role in allotting the size of a state's oil or gas reserves, affect a state's structure. This paper will focus on two examples from the United Arab Emirates (UAE).
First, I provide a general review of the border issues and their historical background in Gulf countries. In addition, I examine the state structure of the UAE and how border issues and the federal system are related to resource allocation and foreign affairs. Second, I focus on border issues between the UAE and Iran over three islands (i.e., the Greater and Lesser Tunbs and Abu Musa). This issue, dating back from 1971, is arguably the biggest ongoing border issue in the Gulf, a blot on generally good political and economic Iranian-Emirati relations. Third, I discuss the border issue between the UAE and Saudi Arabia in the 2000s. Originally settled by negotiation in 1974, the issue flared up again in 2005 when the UAE claimed a different border line (and therefore a different oil field) after Sheikh Zayed, the first president of the UAE, passed away.
While many border issues have been settled in the Gulf, the outstanding two cases of the UAE suggest that border issues remain a key issue. Today, political, economic, and regional integration is progressing apace in the Gulf, thus, these cohesive forces are, to some degree, papering over fissures created by border issues. In the case of the UAE, the federal government is only the negotiator on border issues by constitution; however, the emirate of Abu Dhabi has much more control over such matters whereas the smaller emirates, even if they are more directly affected, lack suitable diplomatic channels. Overall, these issues must be handled on an individual basis, as circumstances, reactions, goals, measures and countermeasures are often specific to each case, even if the underlying dynamic of border issues is mostly the same.

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