In this essay, I examine the American tradition of Hegelianism that had a significant influence on pragmatism and the early Dewey’s philosophical development.

At the early nineteenth century, American intellectuals had two philosophical alternatives available to them; British empiricism and Scotland common sense realism. However, British empiricism was increasingly suspect because of its materialistic tendencies. Scotland common sense realism was also in decline by mid-century because it was committed to a static reality that was difficult to defend against Darwinian biology. Gradually, a growing number of American intellectuals looked to German idealism as a distinct philosophical alternative.

German idealism was initially introduced to the broader community of American intellectuals through J. Marsh, F. H. Hedge and others. Hedge was the first translator of Hegel in America; his Prose Writers of Germany, which included translations of works by Kant, Fichte, Shelling, and Hegel, had a strong influence on Emerson and other American transcendentalists. The American Hegelians with whom Dewey and others associated emphasized Hegel’s place within the German neo-humanist tradition. Although these philosophers have been traditionally characterized as right wing, they are more accurately labeled center Hegelians.

After discussing the process of forming the core of the St. Louis movement and the Philosophical Society, I explored the common themes in the St, Louis philosophy. First, since all members of the philosophical society were profoundly affected by the Civil War, issues of national and cultural unification are prominent in their thoughts. During and after the war, they appropriated Hegel’s thought to make their experience and to promote cultural and national unification through measured reform of social institutions. Second, the common theme of the St. Louis philosophers was their opposition to Spencerism. They deemed the thought of H. Spencer as materialistic, relativistic and hedonistic. Spencer’s agnostic materialism could not account for essential elements of human experience such as the experience of free will. They advocated an expansive view of experience that included the ideal and the material as moments within the dialectical movement of Spirit. They also defended a Hegelian ethic of self-realization that relied upon an organic model of society, according to which humans find individual fulfillment when they work to advance the common good.

Third, although the St. Louis Hegelians have been described as amateurs left behind by the professionalization of philosophy, their high standards of scholarship, including philological work, The Journal of Speculative Philosophy, actually promoted the professionalization of American philosophy. Unlike the academic philosophers, the St. Louis Hegelians believed their involvement in politics and social reform was as important as their scholarly work. Their conception of the role of the philosopher is revealed in their work as scholars and in their social action; it is revealed in Howison’s commitment in the Philosophical Union, Snider’s public lectures and publications, Harris’s work in the public schools, Davidson’s work at the Educational Alliance and his establishment of Glenmore. For the St. Louis Hegelians, philosophers must address both the world of scholarship and the world at large.