This report was written with the intention which tried to clarify the realities of the oligarchies (the financial cliques)in Russia.
The Russian economic oligarchy research has just started in Japan. Even in Russia, so far it seems to be insufficient. A real research is the future task.
It can be said that economic oligarchy exactly symbolizes the Yeltsin age by the phenomenon which appears by the process of conversion to capitalism in Russia during about past ten years.
The Russian oligarchies skillfully accumulated the capital in the first stage of Russian capitalism with economic confusion and incompleteness of the law. That is, the monopoly (oligopoly) of wealth in Russia of the present age was achieved by small number of oligarchies. The numbers of the groups were from 7 to 10 only.
Privatization of government-owned properties was the splendid chance for the oligarchies. They approached the senior officials of the Yeltsin regime and build a special intimate relation with a Yeltsin family (“semiya” in Russian) to win by the public bidding for privatization. It was adhesion with the regime, by which the oligarchies have increased the property. On of the model is Berezovsky's case. The tycoon was often called even the safe keeper of the “semiya”.
First of all, I look back to the time when small number of Russian financial capitalists gained power and enumerate the groups concretely. In addition, I point out their shady relationships with the regime while introducing the examples of their action behind the scene of the process of the war between banks and privatization of the government-run oil companies.
Secondly, I verify when Russian words “oligarxhy” or “oligarxhiya” came to appear to the mass communication in Russia.
Thirdly, I enumerate names of the oligarchies' groups and each representative's names, and classify them into some categories according to some current reports. Moreover, I elucidate the reason why they became rich after the Soviet Union was dismantled.
Finally, I somewhat refer the movement of the old and new oligarchies in the Putin's regime.

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ウクライナ・ロシア危機を解明するための新たな分析視角として，両国の基幹産業である鉄鋼業を取り上げ，図表を駆使し比較検討する．世界の鉄鋼業界では，中国発の生産過剰・価格軟化が生じている．近代化が遅れ，コスト面での優位も失いつつあるロシア・ウクライナ鉄鋼業の立ち位置は，困難となっている．とりわけ，技術力が世界最低水準の上に，集積地ドンバスで内戦が起きたウクライナ鉄鋼業の行く末は，悲観せざるをえない．

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Although the political processes in specific regions of Russia have attracted much scholarly attention since the collapse of the USSR, the number of case studies involving the North-Caucasian ethnic republics has been quite limited. Consequently, a rather shallow and stereotypical understanding emphasizing only limited aspects of the politics in these republics has been represented in the academic discussion. Building on information from local news-sources and interviews in Dagestan, this study highlights three overlooked but important aspects: (1) the consociational nature and instability between the regional and municipal governments in Dagestan politics, (2) the uniqueness of electoral mobilization in Dagestan, and (3) the struggle to consolidate the power vertical following Ramazan Abdulatipov’s appointment as the governor.

The consociational nature of Dagestan politics, particularly in the 1990s, has been discussed by several specialists. While this uniqueness was guaranteed by the legal and constitutional framework of Dagestan, the Kremlin’s initiative to force regional governments to revise regional laws to comply with federal laws removed these constraints. However, by scrutinizing the composition of the regional assembly, this study shows that the balance of power among ethnic groups has been maintained informally in contemporary Dagestan. Moreover, an analysis of municipal level elites reveals the independence of diverse actors in Dagestan’s politics, which has resulted in an unstable regime.

This study also highlights the difficulty of aligning our understanding of electoral mobilization in Dagestan with the general conception of political machines in the non-Russian ethnic republics. Although, as the literature on Russian electoral politics points out, turnout and support for incumbent candidates and parties in federal-level elections are extremely high in Dagestan, mayoral elections have proved highly competitive, implying that electoral mobilization in Dagestan is not controlled by the regional government but rather by clan groups whose activities are rampant at the municipal level. This finding demonstrates the need to modify the prevailing concept of Russian political machines, which has been based mainly on case studies of ethnic republics such as Tatarstan, to explain Dagastanʼs uniqueness.

Finally, governors recently sent from the center have begun to establish the power vertical in Dagestan in order to enforce stable rule by the federal government. The fourth governor of Dagestan, Ramazan Abdulatipov, was the first outsider governor in Dagestan since WWII. His close relationship with the Kremlin enabled him to neutralize several local clans that were firmly rooted in specific municipalities, although this attempt was left incomplete. His successor, Vladimir Vas’liev, had had no ties whatsoever to Dagestan prior to his inauguration as governor. Given his efforts to thoroughly transform Dagestan’s politics, there is an urgent need to observe whether this transformation, with support from the Kremlin, will succeed.

Whereas the main focus is on the contemporary political process in Dagestan, the implications of this case study offer a deeper understanding of Russian federalism during Putin’s presidency. Study findings also show the importance of case studies focused on specific regions, even in centralized Russia, in order to expand our understanding of federalism and electoral politics in Russia.

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This essay traces on the evolvements of Russian political class over the issue of Ukraine from the demise of the USSR to 2014 crisis, culminating in the annexation of the Crimea peninsula. Russian attitudes towards the rebirth of Ukraine nationalism were ambiguous, especially among elite level.

The August coup against the Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev took place in Ukraine, where its nationalistic elements were independent oriented, while the conservatives, including the military industrial complex were negative. After the December 1991 referendum, where opinions were in favor for independence, Leonid Kravchuk, once ideological secretary of the Ukraine communist party could rely on the support of the West oriented voice of western Ukraine, where European and Catholic influence was vocal. From the Russian point of view, this region was alien from the Orthodox tradition and was never been part of the Russian Empire. Thus, Ukraine as the nation state was weak and far from united as political identity was concerned. Economy was also divided between agrarian west and the east, where Soviet type of military industrial complex was dominant. This east-west divide caused political instability in Ukraine, that was revealed when Kravchuk was replaced by Kuchima who first relied on the support of Russian speaking east, though he eventually turned to the west.

Moscow was particularly concerned the fate of the Black Sea fleet and Crimea, where Russians were dominant and never belonged to Ukraine until 1954, when Nikita Khrushchev, Ukrainian oriented Soviet leader changed the status of Crimea from Russia to Ukraine. Though Russian President Boris Yel’tsin was in favor for the Ukraine status quo, his nationalistic minded semi-oppositionists like Moscow Mayor Luzhkov were against the Ukraine position overt the fleet and Crimea. It was only pragmatism of Yevgeny Primakov, Foreign Minister, who could pass the bill on the partnership in 1997.

New President Vladimir Putin was more oriented Russian nationalism, and was particularly against the color revolution, when western oriented President Yushchenko won over the East oriented Yanukovich in a 2004 election. East-West divide, coupled with the corruption and ungovernavility, became Kremlins worry on Ukraine. Still they succeeded in winning Yanukovich victory in the following election and could deal over the 25 years continuation of the Black Sea Fleet, in turn for cheaper gas supply in 2010.

Ukraine thus became a grand over which domestic East-West divide was coupled by the influence of the NATO-EU and Moscow contested. The Maidan revolution was thus seen from Kremlins nationalists oriented policy makers to be an attempt to cut the influence of Russia over Ukraine. The Izborskii club or another religious-Orthodox oriented politicians were thus backing sudden policy changes of the President Putin, who took Maidan revolution as another attempt of regime change by the West, and eventually annexed the Crimea Peninsula. Thus, in turn, brought about the civil war situation, particularly in the east Ukraine, that was already uncontrolled by neither Moscow nor Kiev authority.

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