This paper clarifies the interaction between journalism and social authorities through commemoration to construct the war memory, focusing on the “memorial visit” conducted by Heisei Tennō and the social remembrance of the Battle of Manila. Heisei Tennō visited the Philippines in January 2016 as a final overseas destination in his lifelong journey to console the spirits of war victims.

In conventional journalism theory, social authorities are perceived as powers enforcing the dominant memory frameworks through commemoration, while “forgotten” memories are invisible. Journalism stands on the same side as social authority and either reinforces these frameworks or opposes the authority’s stance and criticizes them.

During the “memorial visit,” however, Heisei Tennō attempted to unearth the “forgotten” memory （the Battle of Manila）, and his trip triggered a debate about Asian-Pacific war memory in Japanese society. Journalists also noticed the importance of this memory and reported it on a much larger extent than before. This situation shows that social authorities and journalism can interact with each other, and these interactions can excavate “forgotten” memories.

In this paper, I analyze articles from the Asahi Shimbun, Yomiuri Shimbun, Nikkei Shimbun, and Manila Shimbun （local newspaper in Manila）, and clarify the structure in which Japanese journalism became aware of the memory of the Battle of Manila through reports on the “memorial visit.” It becomes clear that the three Japanese newspapers had hardly reported on the Battle of Manila before the “memorial visit.” Moreover, the number of reports increased dramatically during the journey. In addition, I discuss the difficulty of the continuous recall of memories led by a one-time event （“memorial visit”） from the viewpoint of journalism routine theory （news value theory and August journalism in Japan）.

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This article examines how Japan and the Philippines dealt with the historical memories of war in their reparations problem by focusing on humanitarian consideration for symbolic cash reparations. After the Pacific War, which made the Philippines a main battlefield, Japan paid the largest amount of reparations to the Philippines than other victim countries. While Japan wanted to restrict reparations to be economically acceptable, the people of the Philippines felt that they have suffered so much pain that material compensation would never be enough. How to deal with their memories of war experiences became the essential problem for the two nations to reach reparations agreements.

Regarding how Japan and the Philippines compromised the amount of reparations and reached the agreements, I emphasize the importance of their agreement on symbolic compensation for victims’ losses based on the negotiators’ consideration of humanitarian norms. Since the human cognitive framework is more sensitive to the losses than to the gains, victims tend to feel that compensation for losses is small, while perpetrators tend to feel that victims undervalue gains from compensation. These tendencies require negotiators to make some manipulations. In the case of reparations negotiations between Japan and the Philippines, Japan was unable to accept the amount of reparations which surpassed Japan’s ability for payment. While the Philippines at first strongly demanded compensation for the past losses, they sought to acquire the benefits of future development soon in the process of negotiations. It was Japan’s consideration for cash reparations to war widows and orphans that provided a normative basis for the Philippines to compromise with Japan. Cash reparations to the war widows and orphans, who were the significant symbol of the war victims, became the main issue of the negotiations. In the result, Japan substantially accepted cash reparations, while it nominally sidestepped them. Expecting that the psychological effect of humanitarian consideration might mitigate anti-Japanese feelings in the Philippines, Japan established a loophole system which applied the part of export gains to reparations. Introducing the system should have promoted the conclusion of reparation agreements and the establishment of diplomatic relationship between Japan and the Philippines.

An analysis of reparations negotiations between Japan and the Philippines supports that it is important for perpetrators to acknowledge the responsibility of past wrongdoings and accept the victims’ historical memories of damages and agonies. Therefore, the analysis suggests that, while reparations are not problems that can be solved just by material compensation for damages, reparations can promote conflict resolution if the handling of historical memories gains high reputation for being appropriate compensation for the past.

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In 1946, a disagreement over collaboration during the Japanese occupation emerged within the Nacionalista party in the Philippines. As a result of this disagreement, the Nacionalista party, which had maintained a dominant position in the party system for more than 30 years under US colonial rule, divided into the Liberal Party and the Nacionalista Party. The two major parties thereafter opposed each other over various issues and competed for the presidency and control of Congress until the declaration of martial law in 1972.
How did the change from a predominantly single-party system to a two-major-party system occur, what changes appeared in the party system in the 1940s and 1950s, and what was the difference in the two parties’ policy orientation? Previous literature on Philippine politics has failed even to pose these questions because of the emphasis on socioeconomic structure, social cleavage, or electoral institutions which tend to stress domestic structural factors and continuity of the politics.
This paper focuses on how the political cleavage emerged and its relationship to policy processes when national debates occurred. It also explores how this political cleavage transformed under the two-major-party system. The policy processes in two cases deserve close examination. The first case is the policy process over the Bell Trade Act that would determine Philippine–US economic relations, and about which the two major parties clashed. The ruling Liberal Party contended that the Bell Trade Act was beneficial, because the Act would guarantee economic benefits derived from the special relationship with the US, while the opposition Nacionalista Party favored economic nationalism and claimed the Act infringed political independence. The second case concerns the development of policy for restoration of social order in the Central Luzon area. The two major parties understood the social disorder in the context of the Cold War and therefore agreed that resolution was essential, but each condemned the other’s strategy: the Liberal party blamed the Nacionalista Party for its presumed link with the militant left, while the Nacionalista Party denounced the Liberal Party for not bringing peace to the area. By focusing on political cleavage, this paper sheds new light on the significance of policy process in understanding Philippine politics.

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