The years between 1921 and 1928 marked an important decade in the history of Japanese-Canadian relations. Following the policy expressed by Canada at the 1921 Imperial Conference, the Anglo-Japanese Alliance was abrogated at the Washington Conference in 1922. Subsequently, upon opening legations in the United States and France, Canada established formal diplomatic relations with Japan in 1928. The intent of this paper is to reveal, through the representative opinions of John Wesley Dafoe, an influential journalist at the Manitoba Free Press, the views of Canadian opinion leaders vis à vis Japan in the 1920's. In 1935, Professor John B. Brebner was the first to acknowledge the importance of Dafoe's views on the future of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, although he, and later others, did not clarify why Dafoe had opposed this alliance. However, in his editorials in the Manitoba Free Press, Dafoe clearly explained his opposition to the Alliance based on the following:
1. The structure of international relations, which had originally necessitated the formation of the Alliance in 1902, had completely changed following the First World War.
2. The existence of the Alliance became redundant with the formation of the League of Nations in 1920.
3. The American people were opposed to the Alliance.
4. The renewal of the Alliance must have meant that Japanese imperialistic invasion of China would have been approved by Britain.
5. Because Canada was the only North American and Pacific member of the British Empire, she had the obligation to initiate policies toward the Pacific region.
6. English-speaking countries around the Pacific region desired reductions in immigration from Asia, but the Alliance posed an obstacle to the implementation of such a policy.
In other words, Dafoe took a unique position for the time in judging the Alliance as having prohibited Canada as a Pacific nation from pursuing her own policy vis à vis Japan and China.
After the termination of the Alliance, Canadians were content with their relationship with Japan which was developed mainly in terms of trade and immigration considerations. During the 1920's, Canadian intellectuals concerned with Asia, especially Japan and China, found a focus for their activities in the Institute of Pacific Relations (IPR) which began as part of the Canadian Institute of International Affairs in 1928. The driving force in the Canadian IPR was John Nelson, a resident of British Columbia and a supporter of the anti-Asian movement. Indeed, Nelson's exclusivism seemed the main reason for him joining the international IPR in 1925. A zealous Methodist interested in China since the beginning of the 20th century, Newton W. Rowell was also an influential member of the Canadian IPR. Although a member of the Canadian IPR also from its formation, Dafoe's interest in Japan and Asia was limited prior to September, 1931, the Japanese invasion of Manchuria.
In conclusion, judging from the prevailing opinions of Canadian spokes-people on Asian affairs, Canadian initiative to establish diplomatic relations with Japan was not based on a realistic image, but rather on illusions: a Canadian sentiment that regarded Japan's importance in the Pacific region merely in terms of Japanese immigration to Canada and a base of Canadian advance into China. In this respect, John W. Dafoe can be seen as representing the majority of Canadian opinion at the time and herein lies the significance of analyzing Dafoe's views vis à vis Japan during the 1920's.
It should be noted, however, that the exchange of ministers between Japan and Canada marked the beginning of a real development of relationship between the two countries. Participation in diplomatic services and the activities of opinion leaders in the Canadian IPR enabled a few Canadians, such as Hugh L. Keenleyside and Henry F. Angus, to contribute to presenting

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Cold war historians researched the Polish question, which was diplomatic question over Polish government and borders after the Second World War, as one of the origins of the Cold War. The Polish question became the subject of heated debates of the Yalta conference, whereas the question was not resolved completely during the conference. Nevertheless almost all of the cold war historians, which are classified into three groups: the orthodox, the revisionist and the post-revisionist, did not pay attention to British diplomatic policy vis-à-vis Poland after the Second World War. In order to clarify the British foreign policy towards sovietising Poland, this paper analyse the negotiation process of the Anglo-Polish Financial Agreement, which dealt with the settlement of Polish debts to the UK. Regarding documents, this paper utilised mainly records of the British Foreign Office, which are kept in the National Archives (TNA), Kew.

British Foreign Office and Ernest Bevin, British Foreign Secretary, aimed at forcing the Polish Provisional Government of National Unity to hold ‘free and unfettered elections as soon as possible on the basis of universal suffrage and secret ballot’ in order to establish liberal democratic Poland without communist influence. For this object, Britain utilised two questions as levers. The questions were the financial questions between the UK and Poland, which this paper focused on, and the repatriation of the Polish Armed Forces under British command. The British diplomacy towards Poland, however, did not work well for two reasons. The first reason is that Poland used financial questions as propaganda that Britain hindered Polish reconstruction. Secondly, the British Foreign Office failed to act in cooperation with the United States and Canada when they resolved Polish financial questions. Moreover, Cavendish-Bentinck, who was then British Ambassador to Poland and led British foreign policy towards Poland, was involved in the trouble caused by Polish Worker’s Party. Eventually, Stanisław Mikołajczyk, who was supported by Britain, lost in the general election of January 1947. Although Britain failed to establish liberal democratic Poland, she did not abandon her purpose even after the election.

In spite of the background of the conflict between the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union, Britain did not forsake Poland and intended to diminish Polish communist influence just after the end of World War II. As a result of the unavoidable diplomatic failure, however, the relation between Britain and Poland deteriorated gradually.

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