In the classical Islamic jurisprudence the Jihad is defined as ‘to expend one's life, wealth, and words in the war or the defence against infidels’. But after the collapse of the Ottoman Caliphate, the political situations of the Islamic world drastically changed, which called various responses among Muslim intellectuals. Faraj, the ideologue of the Egyptian ‘Jihad’ group demonstrates that contemporary rulers apostatize from Islam because they do not rule according to the shari'a. So it turns to be individual obligation for Muslims to go jihad against the apostate rulers, for the jihad against apostates is to precede that against native infidels and the near enemy is more dangerous than the distant. But the jihad against the rulers has now no hope to succeed, so Shaikh 'Abdulgadir, a member of the ‘Jihad’, argues that the military training for the jihad is incumbent on every sane adult Muslim who has the necessary equipments and that Muslims should elect a qualified commander by lack of the caliph.
Dr. 'Umar 'Abdurrahman, the mentor of the ‘Jama'a Isldmiya’, who classifies the rulers of the Muslim states into six categories, distinguishes the contemporary ruler from the traditional types of rulers and coins the word mustabdil for that. He concludes that the mustabdil is infidel and consequently has no legitimacy to rule and that Muslims must rise against him. Abu Ithar, Dr. 'Umar's disciple refines the conception of mustabdil and proves that the war against a mustabdil is not the rebellion which is one of the hudud crimes, but Muslim's duty.
Thus the fight against evil rulers is justified both in the framework of the jihad theory by Faraj and 'Abdulgadir, and in the discussion about the legitimacy of the caliph by Dr.' Umar and Abu Ithar.
The ‘revolutionary jihad theories’ radically differ from the classical theory of the jihad and the caliphate. In the classical Islamic jurisprudence the jihad is defined as the war against infidels and strictly separated from the notion of apostasy which is one of the hudud crimes. The caliphate theory is inserted in the chapter of the rebellion in the Islamic jurisprudence, so that it serves mainly for the justification of the temporal ruler and excludes the possibility of discussing the caliph's apostasy.

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Jihad is one of the most controversial concepts in the Islamic political thought. This paper shed light on two dominant trends in the theories of Jihad in Modern Islamic World. Modernist thinkers, on the one hand, were concerned with political consequences of waging Jihad against the Western Powers and devised a theory intended to avoid the implementation of Jihad doctrine in the modern international arena. This “avoidance theorists” conducted meticulous research on the history of early Islam and forcefully concluded each and every wars and conflicts fought by the prophet Muhammad and his disciples were acts of selfdefense. By doing so, modernist thinkers presented Islam as an entity reconcilable with international laws and norms. Fundamentalist thinkers, on the other hand, criticized the modernist thinkers and its “subservient” style. Fundamentalists are not opposed to the “defensive” nature of Islam but expanded the concept of “defense” beyond the ordinary bound and redefined it to encompass fighting to root out the un-Islamic political and social institutions and entities from the earth. Although political implications of the two trends are diametrically opposed to each other, theoretically they are mutually supporting, at least in part. Modernists have paved the way to supremacist notion of Jihad by definitively approving the historical acts of war by the early Muslim nation as totally defensive and righteous. Fundamentalists rode on this theory and expanded the realm of the “defense” to such an extent that even most of the offensive warfare can be legitimized as “defense” in the context of eternal struggle for the sake of the cause of spreading Islam.

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The aim of this article is to examine the argument for jihad made by Hasan al-Banna (1906-49), the founder-leader of the Muslim Brotherhood (Jam'iya al-Ikhwan al-Muslimin). Al-Banna is widely regarded as one of the most important Islamic thinkers of the twentieth century. With his theories of jihad, he further developed the Islamic revivalist thought propagated in the journal al-Manar by another great thinker, Rashid Rida, especially concerning its practical application for a mass movement. In concrete terms, al-Banna provided his mass movement with the theoretical underpinnings for certain of its activities.
Jihad has been one of the most important issues in contemporary Islamic politics, and al-Banna did not fail to address it. He made the following statement the slogan of the Muslim Brotherhood: “God is our goal; the Prophet is our leader; the Qur'an is our constitution; jihad is our way; death for the sake of God is our loftiest wish.” Facing the West's “invasion” of Muslim land, al-Banna concluded that jihad had become an individual duty obligatory on all Muslims. Thus, for the purpose of liberating the Muslim land, he constructed a theory of jihad in which the masses could fulfill this obligation by participating in the activities of the Muslim Brotherhood. An examination of his theory makes it clear that the Muslim Brotherhood's activities, which allowed its members to fulfill the obligation of jihad, involved not only armed struggle, but also social activities such as athletic clubs or business enterprises. Accordingly, I analyze his theory of jihad from two perspectives: “jihad as armed struggle” and “jihad as social activism.” Furthermore, I examine how al-Banna argued about jihad, which bears many shades of meaning in Islam, in the context of the Muslim Brotherhood.

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This article discusses how Pakistani society has clearly distanced itself from terrorism. On 6^th January 2015, the 21^st Amendment Bill passed by the National Assembly of Pakistan has officially changed the constitutional definition of “Muslim terrorist(s)” into “terrorist(s) using the name of religion”. Pakistan has been called a hub of terrorists ever since several active terrorist groups are known to be based in Pakistan – such as the Sunni extremists Tahrik-e Taliban Pakistan (Pakistan Taliban Movement, TTP) or Sipah-e Sahaba Pakistan (SSP). Some of these groups are said to be supported by the Pakistani military and claim they will establish an Islamic order in society. However, Pakistani society itself has been suffering from terror and has been mobilized in the war on terror. This paper shows the transformation of Pakistani society concerning the concept of “Islamic-ness”.

Pakistan has been a frontline state in conflicts such as, the anti-Soviet war in Afghanistan in the 1980s, or the war on terror after 9/11. During the anti-Soviet war, Pakistan received huge financial and military assistance from both Western and Islamic countries. The Western countries supported Pakistan in the Cold War proxy war against the USSR, and Islamic countries provided assistance in the name of jihad against the Communists. In the 1980s, Muhammad Zia ul-Haq’s military regime promoted Islamization of society, a process which was never criticized by the international community which needed the Pakistani military regime’s cooperation in the war.

Needless to say, Islam is the national religion of Pakistan and 95% of the total population of Pakistan belongs to Islam. Although the peoples of Pakistan may have different religious practices in their everyday life, all of them are attached to a firmly based monotheistic faith, and regard Muhammad as the last Prophet. However, there has generally been widespread reluctance to criticize Islamization or even Islamic extremists who kill in the name of religion. Also, terrorists often expressed their disapproval of the Pakistani government as not being “Islamic” or being a “puppet of the US”. As a result, Pakistani society has often been confused concerning the “Islamic-ness” of its own governments. This may be one of the reasons why there was not much criticism of the extremists even if they killed in the name of Allah.

Since the tragic attack on a Peshawar school in December 2014, Pakistani society has evolved radically on that issue. Even Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif, who originally supported the idea of negotiating with the terrorists, has now approved an amendment to the Constitution establishing special military courts which are to be active for a two-year period only and designed to be rapidly dealing with crimes related to terrorism. The amendment states that Pakistan is willing to permanently wipe out and eradicate terrorism from the country. This decision shows not only the firm intention of the government on its war on terror, but also the decisive break with the terrorists who monopolize the cause of religion in Pakistani society. For Pakistan, it could be said that the consequence of voting such an amendment represents the greatest social transformation ever experimented since the Islamization of the 1980s.

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This paper examines the sectarian conflicts in the modern Middle East as the ideological conflicts of ternary rivalry; Shiite Revolutionalism, Sunni Conservatism and Sunni Salafi-Jihadism. And also this paper clarifies how Jordan formulates its religious strategies in such situation. Jordan, as the representation of Sunni Conservatism, is attacked by both of Shiite ideology and Sunni Salafi-Jihadi ideology. Therefore, Jordan is under pressure of necessity to redefine its Sunni ideology. The Amman Message issued in 2004 shows representatively the religious strategy of Jordan. The message has significance to redefine Jordan’s Sunni ideology based on the modern situation and to revive the Sunni moderate thought. Because this Sunni ideology is supported by sacredness of the Jordan Hashemite Royal Family, descendent of Prophet Muhammad, this ideology is very characteristic compared with the other Sunni countries such as Saudi Arabia. It means that there is also rivalry within Sunni Conservatism. The Amman Message is designed not only to advocate the need for peaceful unity but also to very aggressively seize the initiative in the Islamic world in religious way. Naming this aggressive act as the Religious-Rapprochement Strategy, this paper investigates the Sunni moderate thought of Jordan in the 21^st century.

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In the first half of the 12th century, Syrian cities entered into various kinds of agreements with the Crusaders who had secured their settlements in Syria, thus regarding these westerners as one of the local powers. Many economic agreements were concluded in the from of the appendix to a truce and were mainly in terms of an offer of money and horses, tribute, division of produce and public security on the main roads. Both the Syrian cities and the Crusaders considered these agreements as a economic policy in order to secure the produce from limited farm land and obtain commercial rights. Most of the agreemetns were renewed by occasional negotiation and bargaining, though we find abrogations and changes in conditions reflecting the balance of power. Military alliances were sometimes formed during the jihads, which were fundamentally the opposite of military alliances. Syrian cities merely used the jihad as a poicy to protect their own territory and even to weaken an opposing city. It was the same with the Saljuqid Sultan. They used military alliances and the jihads to ensure their own political stability and keep other powers from expanding. Syria was politically fragmented and had no dominant power. All the Syrian cities, including the Crusader States, maintained power by the economic agreements and conserved the balance of power through military alliances and the jihads. However, Aleppo in Northern Syria had been in a state of war for a long time, and its arable land had been reduced. Moreover, its balance of power policy, mostly agreements on division of produce, led to the financial crisis in Aleppo. To overcome these difficulties, the citizens of Aleppo tried to introduce a strong power from al-Jazira, but two of the three new al-Jazira rulers employed the same balance of power policy using both agreements and jihads, which caused distress in Aleppo to continue. It was the third ruler, Zangi, who began to break this balance of co-existence and confrontation. He aimed at the farm land of Southern Syria asa source of compensating the increase in war expenditure caused by his refusal to maintain the balance of power policy. He was a common enemy to both Damascus and the Crusaders, who had coexisted based on the agreements on division of produce from the farm land lying between them. They formed the military alliances to oppose Zangi.

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This study aims to reveal the current status of inter-religious marriage in India through analysis of the life histories of couples and interviews with voluntary organizations. Inter-religious marriage has hitherto been analyzed primarily from two points of view: the antagonism couples face in dealing with the social norms, especially vis-a-vis their families and relatives; and the opportunity inter-religious marriage affords couples to transform themselves and intimate others through their everyday interactions and relationships with the people around them. However, actors outside of family and relatives have not been taken into consideration as agents that mediate and collaborate in the process of their struggle. Such actors include voluntary organizations, which are treated in this article.

This paper first discusses the various problems that inter-religious couples have faced since the 1970s. It then describes the background that allowed them to marry and the process of antagonization, negotiation, and collaboration, focusing on the interaction and relationships between the inter-religious couples and various actors who protect and support them. Finally, it reveals that although inter-religious marriage involves various problems in everyday life, such as family strife and isolation, couples have attempted to manage the situation by continuing to negotiate with the actors around them. Voluntary organizations play a key role in this process of negotiation and construction of new social relationships by mediating between the couples and other social actors.

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