Michael W. Doyle offers three main explanations for imperial expansion: the first being a metropolitan model, the second emphasising peripheral problems and the third based on the systemic model. The British Empire was dismantled by the early 1970s, but Britain resumed military engagement from the mid-1970s. Although this is not imperial expansion, the second explanation is appropriate: Britain renewed its commitment to the former imperial area because of its involvement in the local crises.

Some crises in the former imperial area included those in the Indian Ocean, the Middle East, the Caribbean Sea and the South Atlantic. In the Indian Ocean, the Soviet Navy had maintained its presence since 1968, and the Soviet Indian Ocean Squadron was organised in 1974. This squadron and pro-Soviet forces in the littoral states posed a threat to Western interests. In Belize, there was the possibility of an invasion from neighbouring Guatemala in 1975 and 1977, and Britain was obliged to reinforce the garrison; Guatemala was demanding over a third of Belizean territory, and the dispute was not successfully resolved. In the Falkland Islands, the tension between Britain and Argentina increased in the late 1970s, resulting in the British government being unable to withdraw its ice patrol ship, which had merely maintained a token presence, and dispatching a task force during the 1977 crisis. In the Middle East, the Iranian Revolution in 1979 brought a regime change that was no longer pro-Western. Moreover, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 created tension in the Persian Gulf and put both the United States and Britain on alert. Then, the outbreak of the Iran-Iraq War in 1980 endangered the passage of merchant shipping through the Straits of Hormuz or within the Persian Gulf, resulting in the United States, Britain and France starting zonal patrols. All these crises lead to a study of Britain’s priority two commitments (i.e. its commitments outside NATO). However, it was not until the Falklands Conflict in 1982 that the British government decided to maintain its power projection capability, including three aircraft carriers.

Why did Britain resume its commitment? It is difficult to find the cause in the metropolitan model, since the trade between Britain and the Commonwealth dwindled in the 1970s and the British economy was in decline, often cynically called the ‘British sickness’. It is also impossible to explain it using the systemic model, in light of the fall of Britain and rise of the Soviet Union and the Third World. Therefore, the local crises are the most persuasive argument for the reason for British engagement.

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It is widely believed that the United Kingdom had decided to retreat from “East of Suez” in January 1968. It planned to withdraw all its forces stationed in South-Eastern Asia and Middle East by the end of 1971. However, the next Heath government made a small change in this policy, left some forces in the area and maintained military commitment beyond 1971. These forces were finally withdrawn by Harold Wilson who was back in power in March 1974. Few studies, however, mention the British forces in the “East of Suez” after 1968. This thesis clarifies the detail and the logic through the policy of retrenchment from 1974 to 1975.
The Conservative government decided to maintain military commitment in the “East of Suez.” First, there were still lots of British bases in South-Eastern Asia, Indian Ocean and Middle East though the force level was reduced. Second, the United Kingdom retained the general capability which would be available to be deployed outside Europe. Finally, there were regional organisations like CENTO or FPDA (Five Power Defence Arrangements) which enabled the United Kingdom to cooperate with the local countries.
However, the British economy in the 1970s could not support these commitments. Roy Mason, the Secretary of State for Defence in the Labour government, began the Defence Review as soon as he entered office. The principal object of the Review was to reduce defence budget from 5.5% to 4.5% of GNP in the next 10 years. The non-NATO commitments were preferred to be cut since the British government tried to concentrate its defence efforts in the NATO area. In addition, he also decided to abandon the reinforcement capabilities outside NATO.
The Defence Review was so drastic that it needed consultation with allies. However, the negotiations were not easy. Most countries tried to keep the British forces in the “East of Suez” because they recognised the importance of the British presence. The United States was concerned about the abandonment of intervention capability outside NATO and desired the British presence in the Mediterranean. As a result, the British government compromised with some of these demands and decided to stay in some areas. Apart from this concession, the British government could carry out the withdrawal as it originally planned.
This study indicates the British aspect as an “Empire detained”. British departure was regretted not only by the United States but also by the Commonwealth countries. Britain's retreat from the Commonwealth marks the transformation of British external policy from the world to the Atlantic community.

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A series of atomic bomb tests by India in May 1998 was the biggest regional incident that had impact on world affairs in the past five decades. In South Asia there occurred major happenings such as the three Indo-Pakistani wars until 70's and Indo-China border conflict in 1962. But these happenings did not have direct bearings on the international situation at each occasion. Because of their regional characters, US and the Soviet Union did not have any hand in them.
But the tests have been a major international shock. The US was affected severely, as shown by Clinton's remarks that it was the worst event in the 20-century. For the international nuclear control regime which has been promoted by US as the sole super-power in the post cold war period has been challenged and shaken by India, the regional power of South Asia.
The basic objective of this paper is to examine Indo-US relations in the post cold war period. In order to understand the relations between the two countries, it is necessary to check three levels, viz., level of perceptions towards the international system as understood by India and US, level of security and nuclear policy pursued by the two, and level of direct negotiations between the two countries.
The paper will analyze the three levels by turn. Firstly, there is the big divergence between India's “multi-polar system” orientation and US's “unipolar system” preoccupation. Secondly, in the level of policy matters, India has neglected the development of security policy, whereas US has pursued the monopolized nuclear control regime. Thirdly, they have negotiated the main issue, viz., the “credible minimum deterrence, ” from their respective angles. In conclusion, the paper predicts that, though in the post cold war period India and US has dramatically improved their economic relations, the perception gap will persist for a long time, which may jeopardize real improvement in the field of security and political relations.

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