Despite opposition in Greenland of joining the EC, this was accomplished with Denmark in January 1, 1973 as Greenland is a province of Denmark. However, Greenland later negotiated “withdrawal, udtræden” from EC because of the unbridgeable gulf between the EC's fishery policy and Greenland's attitude toward fishery. Thus, for Greenland “Self-decision, medbestemmelse/selvbestemmelse” has improved with EC joining. It is connected with the discourse of “Autonomy, Hjemmestyre/Selvstyre” and “Independence, Selvstændighed” after-wards. Greenland consequently decided “withdrawal” advantageous, and this was effected February 1, 1985. This is the first case of “withdrawal” in the history of EC/EU, and it is located as an extremely special issue in a European integration process.
Thus, the tendency to exclude the power of influence from EC was seen in Greenland in the 1970's and 80's. However, especially after 1990's, this movement has shifted from “anti-EC/EU” to “pro-EC/EU”. Greenland after the 1990's differs from 1970's and 80's, and Greenland is engaged in positive negotiations with the EC/EU. However, when the status “withdrawal” is maintained, and at the same time “Amiably” relations are built in not only the fishery side but also in wider areas between Greenland and EU, e. g. -Greenland begins to make wider agreements as a more “autonomous actor” though Greenland is still a “province” of Denmark, this reflects a self-denial of “Withdrawal” from EC that stems from the 1970's to 80's.
The purpose of this article is in the assumption of “Autonomy” and “Independence” in Greenland, and the basic consideration of relations with EC/EU. This article argues that the case of Greenland illustrates the tendency to exclude the power of influence from EC in the 1970's (EC joining negotiation period of Denmark) and 80's, but since the 1990's a process of “Conversion” has been visible. This article seeks to clarify the areas where this “Conversion” is unfolding.
The key to this question is how the discourse of “Autonomy” and “Independence” in Greenland commit to the EC/EU relations in first place. Second, how Greenland and EC/EU provide for each others' interests of merits and demerits. That is, how “Conversion” after 1990's is not only a concern of Greenland for EC/EU, but also the concern of EC/EU for Greenland. Greenland of recent years is a product of the result of intertwining and also parties of EC/EU interests. Therefore, Greenland has constructed “Amiably” relations with EC/EU in different areas. It can be said that Greenland after the 1990's will grope for their own position to the concerns from EC/EU and will parade their own discourse of “Autonomy” and “Independence”.

抄録全体を表示

On December 17, 2002, the United States sent an official request to urge the Denmark government to improve the U.S. Thule Air Base in Greenland so that Thule could be part of the Missile Defense Project. Before any decision was made, discussions in Greenland and Denmark were conducted, during which Denmark took an inactive, non-progressive stance on the proposed matter. Though Greenland had shown strong opposition to the construction of a Missile Defense within her territory, she came up with a compromised decision called “Igaliku Agreement”. In a nutshell - it was an agreement which allowed Missile Defense facilities on the Thule Air Base. This article aimed to clarify the reversal of Greenland’s initial decision of refusing the U.S.'s official request in upgrading the Missile Defense facilities in 2002, but which was subsequently agreed to in 2004.
 The key question articulated in this paper is how the relationship known as “Center-Periphery” was established, interpreted, and used for acquisition of needed areas within Greenland by the United States for its Missile Defense strategy. “Center-Periphery relationship” refers to the relationship that resulted through a predominantly political decision made by the United States in its relationship with Greenland, and a “predominantly” political decision made by Greenland in its relationship with Denmark. This was necessary to address Denmark's definition of its“mastery” over Greenland; as it impeded Greenland’s ability to independently establish its own role as a participant in the Missile Defense strategy.
 Prior to the establishment of a “Center-Periphery” status, the problem to any agreement was due largely to the definition of the United States as the “Center”of the security area in its relationship with Denmark and Greenland, whereas Denmark considered itself to be the “Center” based on its relationship with Greenland. As a result of Itilleq Agreement in 2003 and Igaliku Agreement in 2004, wherein Denmark took on the status of a “Semi-Periphery” relationship among the members of the Missile Defense strategy, Greenland was able to use the “Semi-Periphery” status that was applied to Denmark, to move itself to an independent negotiating position with the United States regarding the use of its territories for the Missile Defense strategy.

抄録全体を表示