Byzantine emperor Leon III (717-741) is well known as the emperor who introduced the official policy of Iconoclasm, and who was successful in repulsing the Arab raids which had started since the first half of the seventh century. At the fact that he was a Strategos (Chief General) of the theme (Byzantine land army) of the Anatolikon before he became an emperor, modern scholars have often regarded him as a soldier emperor.
Once we examine his career in detail, however, we notice that his experience as a soldier or general is quite limited. Nevertheless, it can be pointed out that Leon III had a close relation with the fleet. For when he commanded the Byzantine army during the second Arab siege of Constantinople (717-718), he took a direct command over the fleet, not the land army. Therefore, in this paper, I will analyze the relation between Leon III and the Byzantine fleet.
The Byzantine fleet was strengthened in the middle of the seventh century in order to counter the Arab fleet, which became offensive in the Mediterranean Sea at that time. During the seventh century, there were two Byzantine fleets in the Mediterranean Sea: one was the Carabisianoi, which had a control of the eastern Mediterranean, and the other was the Sicilian fleet controlling the central Mediterranean.
During the reign of the Leon III, the Carabisianoi were divided. One reason for the division was that the Carabisianoi, as well as the theme of the Opsikion, raised a number of rebellions against the emperors. Although it had posed more serious threat to the Byzantine throne, the theme of Opsikion was not divided during the reign of the Leon III. So the question arises why Leon III divided only the Carabisianoi.
The reason can be traced in the situation of the war against the Arabs. In his time, the Arab army was raiding the Asia Minor almost every year. Under such a situation, it was impossible to divide the Opsikion. However, the action of the Arab fleet was stagnant in the eastern Mediterranean. This is why Leon III was able to divide the Carabisianoi.
In the central Mediterranean, the Sicilian fleet fought against the Arab fleet, which was based in North Africa (Ifriqiyah), which was conquered by the Arabs at the end of seventh century. The Arab fleet of Ifriqiyah barraged Sicily and Sardinia during the reign of Leon III, though this attack was far from successful and received a counterattack by the Byzantine fleet of Sicily, for the Sicilian fleet was strengthened especially in the 730s. Toward the end of his reign, the Sicilian fleet came to overwhelm the Arab fleet in the central Mediterranean.
In this way, the time of Leon III saw the Byzantine fleet gain a notable victory over the Arab fleet. Leon III himself had a great interest in the Byzantine fleet. It was one of the main policies of the Byzantine emperors in the seventh century to put more importance on the role of the fleet. Taking in consideration that he was the last emperor who took over that policy, we can call appropriately Leon III the last “soldier emperor of the sea.”

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The Jochid Ulus (the Golden Horde) and the Mamluks were dispatching envoys to each other in the Black Sea-Eastern Mediterranean region in the late 13th century. Diplomatic relations between the Jochid Ulus and the Mamluks have been well studied by modern scholars, but in these previous studies, it was often stated that the relationship between them originated in their mutual understanding that they shared a common enemy in the Ilkhanids. However, considering the importance of the Byzantine Empire through which the envoys had to pass, it is impossible to dispense with a discussion on the role of the Byzantine Empire in this relationship.
This article aims at a reexamination of the dispatch of envoys between the Jochid Ulus and the Mamluks by analyzing the Mamluk chronicles. In addition, in order to understand the purpose of the envoys between the Jochid Ulus and the Mamluks the Mamluk-Byzantine envoys will also be examined.
My conclusions are that the Jochid Ulus and the Mamluks were sending envoys not just because of mutual hostility towards the Ilkhanids, but also for trading mamluks between their two countries. In other words, these envoys had commercial purposes, such as trading mamluks, as well as political ones, such as cooperating against the Ilkhanids. For these two countries, dispatching envoys was important policy affecting the basis of their existence.

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Some historical sources refer to many dars on the al-Tugur al-Šamiya or Abbasid Syrian frontiers (Cilicia), especially in Tarsus from the late 2/8th century until the Byzantine reconquest of it in 354/965. These dars were a kind of military establishment built to accommodate the warriors who participated in holy wars on behalf of the founders of the dars.
The dar founded by Qabiha, mother of the Caliph al-Mu'tazz, contained an armory and a residence for soldiers; it housed 150 slave warriors and their leader who were selected from among the mawlas or retainers of al-Mu'tazz. The warriors were well known because while marched they shouted out the name of the caliph. There were also 150 military slaves in the dar of Sayyida, mother of the Caliph al-Muqtadir. Some Tarsus armorers were appointed to repair their weapons. The dar of Zuhayr b. al-Harit was a smaller one but had similar features; seven war horses which were stabled there with their equipment were allotted to seven commanders, and veterinarians and grooms for these horses were employed.
It should be noted that the dars were financed by waqfs or religious donations and that the spread of the dars along the Syrian frontiers was promoted by the intensity of the spirit of holy war.

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