The U.S. withdrew the troops from South Vietnam and the ROK on the basis of the Nixon Doctrine, implemented détente that supported relaxing international tension by U.S.-China reconciliation, and pursued peaceful coexistence on the premise of the status quo in Asia. This is the reason why I focus on the Vietnam War which had been the background that caused structural changes of the Cold War in East Asia. And, the Vietnam War was the first test case that the U.S. and South Korea cooperated in the actual combat since the formation of the alliance. The experience in Vietnam was the opportunity for the ROK government to know the possibility and the degree of the support from the U. S. in times of emergency.

However, few previous studies have ever been done on the Vietnam War from South Korean viewpoints of the U.S.-ROK alliance. In that sense, the questions caused by the foreign policy of the U.S. must be demonstrated as follows; first, as a divided country like South Vietnam, what did the ROK government think about the U.S. support in combat? Secondly, while peace negotiations went on, what was considered necessary by the South Koreans? Thirdly, after Paris Peace Accords, what were South Korean views on it and how did the ROK government respond to the problem by its policy? Lastly, how did Koreans feel about the fall of Saigon and what was the difference between the U.S. and South Korea on the Korean Peninsula issues of post-Vietnam War?

The purpose of this paper is to explore further into the Vietnam War, associated with the ROK and the U.S.-ROK alliance, based on the diplomatic archives. Especially, I would like to focus attention on the question of how the ROK government dealt with Vietnam’s situation in the process of US withdrawal and what happened to its way between self-defense and the alliance since then.

Through the whole analysis, the following conclusions were obtained; the first is South Korea became aware of partnership from the patron-client relationship and the transferring of operational control of South Korean forces because of the Vietnam War. The second is unilateral US withdrawal plan and the end of the war by negotiations decreased reliability of US military commitment in ROK. Nevertheless, South Korea also reconfirmed that the alliance was indispensable to the national security. The third is the U. S. reduced the possibility of direct intervention in conflict on the Korean peninsula after the Vietnam War. One final point is the Vietnam War was a factor to accelerate self-defense policy in Seoul.

抄録全体を表示

In early 1977, U. S. President Jimmy Carter announced that U. S. ground combat forces would be carefully withdrawn from South Korea within a few years. His decision, however, was soon faced with strong resistance from the military and Congress. Officially because of a new intelligence estimate on North Korea's military capability, in June 1979, President Carter postponed immplementing his withdrawal plan till after the next presidential election in which he was severely defeated by Ronald Reagan.
This failed attempt has been often regarded as a typical example of Carter's amateurish diplomacy. History tells us, however, that U. S. defense commitment towards South Korea has frequently fluctuated between the two extremes of intervention and withdrawal. This fluctuation seems to result from a dilemma in U. S. defense commitment towards South Korea: the United States has to provide enough credibility to maintain a favorable military balance in Northeast Asia without being too deeply involved in the defense of South Korea, which is not necessarily of vital interest for the United States.
It is far from an easy task for Washington to escape from this dilemma. First of all, it is extremely hard to evaluate the strategic value of the Korean Peninsula in the context of U. S. global, regional and local strategies. Secondly, given the relatively decreasing U. S. economic capability and the diversified public opinion on foreign policy, a domestic consensus on a desirable degree of U. S. defense commitment towards South Korea cannot be easily obtained. Thirdly, regardless of changes in international and domestic situations, due to their vested interest in maintaining the U. S. presence in South Korea, the Army and the State Department bureaucracies tend to be opposed to reducing the defense commitment.
After briefly reviewing the history of U. S. defense commitment towards South Korea, this paper intends to analyze how the Carter Administration tried to overcome the dilemma in U. S. defense commitment toward South Korea but was unsuccessful through the examination of the policy process of its withdrawal plan with available written materials and interviews with key participants.

抄録全体を表示