This essay discusses Yoshino Sakuzo's arguments on Japan's diplomatic policy during the Manchurian crisis (1929–1933, culminating in 1931 when the Manchurian Incident broke out). Scholars disagree on whether this champion of democracy during the Taisho era was an imperialist or an internationalist, making it difficult to comprehend Yoshino's arguments on the Manchurian crisis.
This essay gives a clearer picture of Yoshino by (1) examining his realistic arguments for an equal partnership between Japan and China and (2) comparing realism with arguments for a regional order in East Asia put forward by Yoshino's contemporary, Royama Masamichi, a political analyst and journalist Yoshino was an idealist in foreign policy, who based his views on internationalism on the ideas of Woodrow Wilson. He also supported the League of Nations temporarily. His “Asianism” led him to apply the internationalist principle of world brotherhood to East Asia. Therefore, he defended the Korean independence movement and the May Fourth Movement in China in 1919. More importantly, he thought of entering into an alliance with China once it achieved nationhood. But China did not completely become independent until the Chinese Nationalist revolution (1924–1927).
While willing to defend the pursuit of national interest at any cost, Yoshino advocated an international order based on equality among nations. Although China remained disunited, he argued that Japan should protect its interests in China even resorting to force. At the same time, he insisted that a China integrated under the leadership of the Nationalists would be desirable because it would be cooperative and reliable in maintaining and even expanding Japan's interests in China. The paper concludes that Yoshino's arguments for Sino-Japanese partnership stemmed not from idealism but from realism.
Royama, on the other hand, argued that Japan should cooperate with the Great Powers in order to control China. Although regarded as a pioneer of cooperative regionalism, Royama actually envisaged Japan including China in its sphere of influence, with the approval of the Great Powers. It was thus that the so-called cooperative Royama hailed the recognition of Manchukuo while the realistic Yoshino strenuously opposed it.
In 1932, Yoshino wrote the foreword to the December issue of the Chuokoron magazine. While superficially appearing to hail the impending new order in East Asia, Yoshino warned that Japan's pursuit of a Monroe Doctrine in East Asia would come to a standstill, which turned out to be his will. Japan's aftermath proved how profound was Yoshino's insight.

抄録全体を表示

本稿は、一九〇〇年代から満洲事変期を対象に、「倫理的帝国主義論」を中心とする浮田の国際秩序認識を分析することで、日本の帝国主義の論理の展開とそれにより形成される国際秩序構想を探ることを目的とする。 そこで、本稿では浮田和民に注目し、上記の問題を明らかにするものである。浮田和民は明治・大正期にかけて活躍した政治学者・ジャーナリストである。 筆者は、浮田の唱えた「倫理的帝国主義」論について、「倫理」という言葉が持つ普遍的な価値が帝国主義に付与されることによって、国内外に日本のとるべ き帝国主義のあり方を示そうとした思想であると考える。浮田は第一次大戦後、自身の思想を「新亜細亜主義」と名付ける。この倫理的帝国主義から新亜細亜 主義への思想の変遷を考察することにより、第一次大戦によって変化した国際秩序観と帝国主義をいかに統合しようとしたのかを探ることができると考える。

抄録全体を表示

The idea of present collective security system in the Western Hemisphere was originally conceived in the late 1920s as a substitute for U. S. intervention policy in the Caribbean. The principles of this idea was defined and embodied through the Inter-American Conferences in the 1930s and during World War II. The Rio de janeiro Conference of 1947 produced the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance, reaffirming the various wartime principles. It outlines the principles and procedures of inter-American collective security, clearly in some respects and ambiguously in others.
Since 1948, the inter-American collective security system has functioned, through the cases of Guatemaran and Cuban affairs, as an anti-communist alliance of which initiative was taken by the United States. The rising nationalism in Latin America in the late 1960s and early 1970s, however, led to a proposal of fundamental reforms to the Rio Treaty.
A Protocol of Amendment to the Rio Treaty was approved in an Inter-American Conference in 1975. Rio Treaty Amendments, though not come into effect yet, are to bring substantial change to the present inter-American collective security system.

抄録全体を表示

The question of whether intervention in another state is ever justified is one of the most important and fundamental questions that IR (international relations) scholars and foreign policy practitioners have attempted to answer. Today, an increasing number of people seem to admit that morally scandalous acts, such as ethnic cleansing or systematic massacre, may justify humanitarian interventions. However, intervention itself is nothing new; it has long been part of international relations. Many previous interventions have been carried out in the name of civilization, humanity, or the international community.
This paper focuses on American interventionism in the Central America and Caribbean states in the early twentieth century and its consequences—specifically, the Good Neighbor policy of the 1930’s; it analyzes American justification for its interventions and the reactions of Latin American countries to them. Although realism argues that the content of justice is defined unilaterally by the great power, this paper shows that this view is not necessarily the case. Of course, it is true that the United States intervened mainly in the pursuit of its self-interest and sometimes out of a sense of self-righteous legitimacy. However, these motives were only one aspect of U.S. interventionism.
Although at that time neither the use of force nor intervention had been outlawed or completely prohibited, the United States attempted to differentiate between “just” and “unjust” interventions in the social context of the Americas. For this reason, the United States was very eager to arrive at bilateral agreements that granted it “the right to intervene” in another contracting party and to advocate the Roosevelt Corollary, which sanctioned such involvements, as opposed to those of the European states.
This paper especially emphasizes the role of the Latin American countries in the legitimation processes as a “constituency” or “audience” that recognized and challenged the legitimacy of interventions. In other words, it highlights the dynamics of “social interaction” between the United States and Latin America over the validity of interventions in the first third of the twentieth century. Looking at this social interaction, we can clearly understand the paradox of U.S. interventionism: while the mechanism to “justify” intervention developed until the second decade of the century, the mechanism—the multilateral treaty—to “condemn” or “outlaw” (any) intervention was established in the Americas in 1930s as a result of social interaction. Thus, “non-intervention” became the legitimate and just policy of the region. This paper argues that this paradox would not have arisen without the social interaction among the states of the western hemisphere.

抄録全体を表示

This paper clarifies the decisive role played by Latin-American “legal” regionalism in the 19th century in relativizing European international law and dismantling the European monopoly of the power to set international principles.

Simon Bolivar’s pan-Americanism in 1820’s is widely known as unsuccessful project for a political union of Latin American states. Actually, however, his project had two main pillars, the creation of a political union and that of “American public law,” and what was more important to the future world was the later. When Americas achieved their independence in 1810–20’s, the governing international principles were that of Vienna, agreed among European Powers and whose basic features were dynastic legitimacy and balance of power between monarchs. These principles were not compatible with the sovereign statehood of most of newly independent American states born in decolonial revolution and declared independence without recognition by ex-monarch. Nevertheless, those rules were considered as “European public law” or “European international law,” which was at that time mere synonym of “international law” governs the general relations between civilized nations. In this situation, Bolivar begun to pursue not only a union of Latin American states but also “American public law” which should be constituted by rules and principles that are different from that of Europe and suitable for America. Bolivar’s ideal American public law contains, e. g., popular legitimacy principle, denial of forcible intervention, obligatory peaceful settlement of disputes, sovereign equality, etc.

The efforts of Latin American states to realize these ideal new norms continued throughout centuries. Certain of these norms have acquired universal approval, taking the place of old European originated norms. In the late 19th century, some Latin American scholars started to argue that the assumption of identity between “European international law” and “international law” was not appropriate any more asserting the existence of American international law and possible existence of other regional international laws. In the beginning of the 20th century, the existence of American international law was accepted in Europe with rise of social or objectivist legal thoughts and European regionalism. The modern academic assumption of the identity of “European international law” and “international law as the law of civilized nations” had disappeared in 30 years from 1880’s to 1910’s. Latin American legal pan-Americanism triggered this fundamental change of the conception of international law.

抄録全体を表示

There was a remarkable power shift in international politics from the end of the 19th century to the first half of the 20th century. The rising states in different regions—Japan in East Asia, the Unites States in the Americas, and Germany in Europe—began to displace in various ways British hegemony worldwide. Following the basic logic of the power transition theory, the world at the time was in an unstable condition in which Japan, the United States, and Germany, as a dissatisfied and non-status quo rising power, sought to change the existing international and especially regional order.

The purpose of this paper, which focuses on Japan and the United States as emerging powers in this era, is to make it clear how the orders of two regions, East Asia and the Americas, although geographically separated, evolved by interacting with each other through the Monroe Doctrine’s functions.

The Monroe Doctrine was originally pronounced in 1823 by U.S. President James Monroe, who declared the principle of mutual non-intervention between the Americas and Europe, eventually becoming a longstanding tenet of U.S. foreign policy. In particular, around the turn of the century, the doctrine, by functioning as an ideational mechanism that legitimized American leadership in the Americas, contributed to a “peaceful” power or hegemonic transition in the region between Great Britain and the U.S. On the other hand, this American doctrine was applied beyond the Asia-Pacific to East Asia, as an idea that could sanction Japanese domination over the region symbolized by the proposal of a “Japanese” Monroe Doctrine by President Theodore Roosevelt in 1905. However, the efforts of seeking the Japanese Monroe Doctrine ultimately resulted in the failure of a peaceful power transition in East Asia, despite or because of the use of the Monroe Doctrine.

There are a number of preceding studies, mostly using a historical approach, on the Monroe Doctrine. Nevertheless, few studies explore the synchronic developments of the Monroe Doctrine and the Japanese Monroe Doctrine, which interconnected the regional order already in process in East Asia and the Americas,from the viewpoint conceptualizing the doctrines as ideas of legitimizing regional hegemony. Furthermore, this paper, highlighting the workings of an ideational factor, the (Japanese) Monroe Doctrine, in the rise of Japan and the rise of the United States, provides a perspective different from the traditional power transition theory that focuses on material power. It can also be said that revisiting the past of the Japanese Monroe Doctrine offers an implication for contemporary international politics in East Asia, which face a new power shift and the possibility of a “Chinese” Monroe Doctrine.

This paper examines (1) the rise of the U.S. and the Monroe Doctrine in the Americas from the late 19th century to the early 20th century; (2) the rise of Japan and the Japanese Monroe Doctrine in East Asia from 1900 to the 1910s; and (3) the development of the Monroe Doctrine and the Japanese Monroe Doctrine in the Americas and East Asia from the 1920s to the 1930s.

抄録全体を表示

The Institute of Pacific Relations (IPR), originating from the YMCA movement, was established in July 1925 in Honolulu, Hawaii. This period suffered from bitter and growing frictions between the East and the West. These frictions were caused not only by incompatible political and economic interests, but also by racial antagonisms and cultural conflicts. For instance, the United States Congress had passed the Oriental Exclusion Act in 1924, which wounded Asian sensibilities and aroused anti-American feelings, especially in Japan. The Chinese Nationalist revolution led by Sun Yatsen was powerfully growing and anti-foreignism directed against the Western powers, especially against Great Britain, was widespread in China.
Aware of the gulf between the East and the West, and eager to throw a bridge across it, a group of men and women devised the idea of holding a non-official conference of leaders personally based from Pacific countries to discuss problems of mutual concern, and to promote deeper mutual understanding and peace.
The first IPR Conference was held in Honolulu in July 1925. Its 150 members came from Australia, Canada, China, Hawaii, Japan, Korea, New Zealand and the Philippines. The men and women of different national backgrounds worked together and cooperated to share intellectual and cultural knowledge. They had a common belief or visionary goal that if they could get together for friendly, frank discussion of the problems of the Pacific, these problems might prove to be less difficult than they seemed.
In case of the second Hawaii IPR Conference in July 1927, in addition to the orignal members, a newly formed British group attended, two members from the League of Nations and a member from International Labor Office attended with the qualification of observer. Afterwards, IPR continued its activities until 1961 under the drastically changed international environments.
This paper focuses on the problems of the Peace Machinery in the Pacific area at the first and second Hawaii IPR Conferences. This is one of the most important subjects for IPR.
In the first Hawaii IPR Conference, the Peace Machinery Problem was discussed rather abstractly and optimistically. It is indicated in the public address presented by H. Duncan Hall.
In the Pacific we must not make the mistake of subordinating the development of peace to the prevention of war. What is required in the Pacific is some sort of loose conference machinery which would bring governments together at regular intervals to promote international co-operation.
from “POLITICAL AND LEAGAL CO-OPERATION BY H. DUNCAN HALL” INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS, 1st CONFERENCE PROCEEDINGS 1925, (Honolulu, 1925) pp. 136-138.
This kind of abstract and optimistic attitude reflected the trends of liberalism and pacifism after World War I.
Coming to the second Hawaii IPR Conference, the discussions on the Peace Machinery materialized and were realized. This change was brought on by James T. Shotwell, professor of History at Columbia University, who was well known as the central figure for drafting the so-called Paris Peace Treaty. Shotwell presented “Draft Treaty of Peace between the United States of America and …”.
Shotwell drafted it keeping in mind that it should be accepted between Japan and the United States. Japanese IPR members criticized Part I, Article 2. a. It was an exception which was made of the Monroe Doctrine. But Japanese members and liberal intellectuals knew well that the draft treaty was the attempt to state a compromise between American history and precedent and the new experiments by Shotwell; they supported his draft treaty in principle.
Nevertheless, they could not exert influence against the Japanese government to accept the draft treaty when the Paris Peace Treaty was politicalized as a domestic political issue. Since most Japanese IPR members were liberal intellectuals, and Japanese

抄録全体を表示