Most of us would accept that Rudolf von Jhering converted his methodology of law from the Begriffsjurisprudenz to the Zwecksjurisprudenz around 1860. It seems reasonable to say that something changed in his mind because Jhering himself said he had made a wrong way in his method of Roman jurisprudence. However, there must be considerable doubt that his change from the Begriffsjurisprudenz to the Zwecksjurisprudenz was a complete about-face.
The purpose of this paper is to point out a consistent concept of the jurisprudence that Jhering had accepted throughout his life in spite of some change in his mind.
It is important to summarize the concepts of the Begriffsjurisprudenz because it has some different concepts, one of which Jhering was said to have criticized after his “conversion.”
We may say that jurisprudence should deduce a conclusion from a text even if it is strange to approaches. One is a ‘global justice’ approach which applies principles of liberal justice directly to an international society. The other is a particularist approach which restricts the domain of justice to nations or societies.
If strict cosmopolitanism, which claims that duties to provide aid applied to all without distinction of nationality is right, then global justice command us to help the poor. Even if it is false, moderate cosmopolitanism is compatible with the global justice. And even if particularist approach is right, particularist approch is compatible with Pogge's theory of global justice.
He suggests what he calls an institutional understanding of human right. According to this understanding, having human right means any society ought to be organized that all members have secure access to the objects of their human rights. Responsibility for a person's human rights falls on all and only those who participate with person in the same social system.
He also suggests that present global order imposes severe poverty on the poor who cannot resist this order. According to Pogge this imposition deprives them of the objects of their most basic rights and it is human rights violation. Then what we must do is to diminish the injustice of the global order through institutional reforms. We must stop thinking about world poverty in terms of helping the poor.

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　本稿の目的は，社会現象としての法が数理モデルのなかでどのように表現されうるかについて，社会規範研究と対比させる形で検討することである．まず，社会規範と法をめぐる近年の議論を概観しながら法の位置づけを整理し，経済モデルを含む数理モデルにおける法の捉え方の問題点を指摘する．そこでは，公的機関は法が成立するための必要条件ではなく，実際の法制度は多数のアクターの行動が調整されてはじめて作動する，という点が強調される．次いで，集合的なサンクションによって規範が実効化される様子を描写した簡単なモデルを提示し，社会規範と法の違いを表す方法について述べる．社会規範と法はどちらも，他者の行為に関するプレーヤーの信念を形成してサンクションという集合的行動を容易にするという機能をもっており，その点で連続性を有する．この連続性を考慮した法の定式化を示すとともに，人々の信念の変更によってのみ法は行動に影響を及ぼしうるということを論じる．

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This paper deals with an issue, why did Bernhard Windscheid write the literature on the actio of the roman civil law. He asserted that the actio of the roman civil law was not the right of bringing an action into court (Klagerecht), but the right of requesting an act against the another party (Anspruch). Through this assertion, he intended to reconstruct the system of the german material private law. The system which he made an attemt to establish took over a system, that Friedrich Carl von Savigny had asserted for bringing the new perspective into the german common law (gemeines Recht) in the 19th century. The actio-system of the roman civil law was replaced in the german common law by the new system of Savigny and Windscheid, which is called "the system of rights" by Professor Yasuhiro Ikadatsu.

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