Japan declared her principal policy, called three principles of foreign policy, after entering into the United Nations in 1956. These were United Nations Centralism, Cooperation with the Free World and Maintenance of the Position of Asian Countries.
Contradictions of these three principles have been pointed out from time to time, and the United Nations centralism concept has almost been forgotten. Yet, in spite of the changes which have occurred in the United Nations since Japan's entry, Japan has rather effectively adhered to these principles in her actual diplomacy.
There are, of course, several resulting questions but it might be worthwhile to consider Japan's United Nations Centeralism diplomacy as one of the fundamental attitudes of diplomacy as a small country.

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There seem to be quite a few angles to the analysis of neutralism, and this article takes the one which is based on the relationship between neutralism and its external conditions. A neutral policy, as a general rule, has as its prerequisite the balance of power in international politics. It cannot be denied that a global equilibrium—established in both the East and West blocs—is a basic factor for neutralism at present.
However, “positive neutralism, ” which exists in many Afro-Asian states, represents not only a non-alignment meaning isolation or separation from both blocs but it also represents their efforts towards the relaxation of international tensions. Assuredly neutralism will be the foreign policy most suitable for the national interests of these states whose supreme proposition is both the maintenance of independence and the assurance of international cooperation to their economic development.
We must pay attention to the fact that the East-West relationship itself is increasing, at the present moment, the so-called smaller nations' right to speak.
The concept of neutralism by Afro-Asian states is very moralistic and it excludes, notions about either bloc. However, the feeling of anti-colonialism may act as a reversal force against non-alignment. It is to be expected, therefore, that maintenance of cooperation among Afro-Asian countries would be an important problem in accordance with establishment of “Russo-US order.”

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Whatever approaches one may take to peace research, the North-South problem is no doubt high on the agenda for this new-found land of inter-disciplinary exploration.
But it should be noted that the concept of North-South problem has its origin in the West, indivisibly interwound with policies interests and perceptions of the elite in the industrialized countries of the North. A critical approach to the too-much-popularized concept and a redifinition of the North-South problem should be the first prerequisite for peace researchers to develop any theory on it with the goal of eliminating violence, both physical and structural, in their mind.
The present article criticizes two types of conventional views on North-South problem. One is the “Catching up-race theory” which reduces the whole problem essentially to a question of development economics of how GNP per capita can be maximized in the developing countries. It has been argued that if it grew faster in the South than in the North gaps and conflicts between them would be lessened.
In fact, it was this type of view which have led the international development strategy in 1960s. This fallacy of both the philosophy and strategy however, has become evident as soon as the decade passed in the growing frustration and disappointment on the part of the developing countries.
Another type of conventional views long maintained by opinion leaders in the West/North is “Poverty-makes-conflicts-theory” which argues that poverty in the South is primarily responsible for conflicts and tensions in and/or among the developing countries. It tends to overlook or underestimate both the hangover of the colonial past and global rivalries among world major powers as the causes of conflicts in the South. Raising the standard of living for the population in the South in itself would not make a permanent peace as long as the fundamental structre of the international political and economic systems based on power is not changed.
Peace Researchers should contribute to adequately redifining the North-South problem in the context of building a new, post-colonialism world order. While the horizon of the peace research has been significantly enlarged by the insight into the North-South problem, the horizon of the North-South problem must also be enlarged by peace research approaches beyond the conventional views.

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Some argue that the Iranian Revolution is a reaction to the rapid modernization carried out by the Shah. According to others it is an “Islamic” revolution. The perceptions in part stem from the dominant role played by the traditional religious establishment in Iran. The former views it as a negative reactionary force, while the latter views it as a positive progressive one.
Reality, however, lacks the neatness of these hypotheses. If the former is correct, then why was there no reaction in the period 1974-77 when the “modernization” drive was proceeding at full speed? Why did it come only in 1978 when the Iranian economy had already slowed down? On the other hand, if one attributes the cause of the revolution to the doctrine of Islam, particulary to its Shi'ite version, then one is again hard pressed to explain why the Shi'ite establishment could coexist with several Iranian monarchies for longer than four centuries since Safavid times. Why has the allegedly “revolutionary” ideology of Islam remained dormant for so long, only to be awakened in the late 1970s?
This paper rejects both of the above hypotheses and argues instead that the particular set of economic, political and social conditions in Iran during the late 1970s is responsible for the revolution. The existence of the traditional social institutions of Iran, not the ideology of Islam, has given their guardians (Mullahs) the commanding position in the revolution. They are Madrese, Bazar, Zur Khane, and Taziyeh theater and others. The colonialists and their successors have emasculated these institutions in other Islamic societies, while in Iran they were left relatively untouched, for Anglo-Russian rivalry had kept Iran independent as a buffer state. Mutual antagonism between these parties prevented the development of Iran by concessionaires (oil being a conspicuous exception). The Mullahs utilized these traditional organizations to mobilize the disenchanted masses, first to overthrow the Shah, and then to overwhelm the liberals and the leftists.
The other contributing factor is the historically enjoyed autonomy of the Iranian religious institutions from the state. Neither of these two elements exists in other Islamic countries. Therefore, we are unlikely to see another Iranian-type revolution.
The perception of the revolution as “Islamic”, however, has boosted an already surging movement of Islamic Fundamentalism. The continuing failure of the Arab regimes to recover Palestine has been feeding this movement, especially since Nasser's defeat in 1967.
The Fundamentalist forces have found an “ally” in an odd quarter, Begin's Israel. The revolutionaries in Iran and supporters outside see that the way to liberate Palestine lies in spreading the Islamic revolution into the Arab world. Thus they are hostile to the current Arab regimes. On the other hand, Israel is determined to first take on the immediate enemies such as Iraq and the PLO, ignoring the distant drums of Fundamentalists.
Here, the short-term goal of Begin and Khomeini merge. As a matter of fact, Israel has aided Iran in the Gulf War in order to weaken Iraq. Begin is helping Fundamentalism indirectly, too. Israel's invasion of Lebanon has painfully proved the impotence of the Arab political leadership including that of the PLO. This has accelerated the growth of the Fundamentalist influence among Palestinians, engendering the distinctive possibility that Palestinian Fundamentalists may split the liberation movement by breaking away from the secular leadership of the PLO. Israel is not unmindful of this potential when it tolerates the inflow of Iranian influence and money into the West Bank.
Thus, both religious states have practically entered an “alliance” of a sort against the moderate Arab leadership: Zionist Israel to defend Jerusalem, and Islamic Iran to liberate it.

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