In this paper I intend to describe how a Japanese group has built a confidential relationship with women survivors in China, who have suffered from sexual violence committed by Japanese soldiers in the Japan-China War between 1937 to 1945. A Japanese group visited China and listened to the stories of women survivors in their villages from 1996, twice a year in average. The Group has realized that listening to the survivors implies that they mutually construct a confidential relationship with women survivors and that the Japanese are able to understand the reality and extent of the war damage Chinese have experienced. In addition, members of the group have always asked themselves why they have listened to the survivors. Thus, they have changed their methodology for research on history, etc.

抄録全体を表示

Chinese nationalism tends to excessively react to some specific problems which oppose to Japan, USA or West European countries in particular. This “anti-West” sentiment of the Chinese society has been regarded as the “trauma” of invasion by the Great Powers. Yet when reviewing Chinese cognition after the national foundation in 1949, there were the times when Chinese nationalism expanded without connecting to the “anti-West” assessment. For example, despite the rise of “patriotism” in the 1980s, Chinese public opinion took a conciliatory attitude to the Western countries, especially to Japan. Similarly, it was observed that while the nationalism kept on surging, Chinese public sentiments towards Japan continuously improved from 2006 to 2010. These phenomena can’t be explained by a simple logic that “the surge of nationalism promotes anti-foreignism.”
This paper hypothesizes the contemporary Chinese nationalism as multiple political thought in order to examine the dynamism of its “anti-West” logics. Here, the centripetal force of Chinese official nationalism is extracted as the four elements; national identity, socialism, economic development and notion of great power. Using these factors, this paper discusses the mechanism how Chinese nationalism links to the “anti-West” sentiments.
In conclusion, this paper argues that the “anti-West” sentiments is not only an extension of the historical trauma, but it is also promoted by official nationalism. At the same time, however, it is also pointed out two elements of the official nationalism—economic development and notion of great power—functioned to offset the public “anti-West” feelings.

抄録全体を表示