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  • 内藤 一成
    史学雑誌
    2002年 111 巻 4 号 505-528,584-58
    発行日: 2002/04/20
    公開日: 2017/12/01
    ジャーナル フリー
    A lot of research has already accumulated on the 1912-13 political crisis and Katsura Taro's new political party. On the other hand, there is no much research into the movement in the House of Peers. This article aims to make clear movement in the House of Peers, the political process in the House, and also understand the meaning of the Katsura's new political party in parliamentary government history. Part 1 clarifies the political transition from Katsura Taro's resignation in 1911 to the day his formed his new party. As to why he formed his new party, first discord with Yamagata Aritomo began to make it possible for him to lose his own political base altogether. Secondly, the new political party aimed at the establishment of a huge power base across both Houses of the Diet. Part 2 clarifies the relationship between the Katsura's new political party and the House of Peers, by likening it to the change occuring in the two influential groups in the House : the Saiwai Club and the Kenkyukai. An intimate relationship between the new political party and those groups had been maintained throughout Katsura's second cabinet, but it grew worse gradually afterwards. When the Katsura's third cabinet was organized, Oura Kanetake, a leading member at the Saiwai Club and as a Cabinet minister, and his comrades made a request to members of those groups to participate in Katsura's new party. However, Hirata Tosuke, a leading member opposed such a move tendency towards. Finally, nonparticipation became dominate among them over a strong participation at first. In the Kenkyukai, Hirata's request also ended in failure because of counterinfluence mainly formed among younger members. The House of Peers did not participate in the new political party, which shows the permeation of personal views of "hree and unbiased policy" in that aristocratic chamber. However, it seems that the later changes in the House of Peers were caused by the gradual progress of the above movements, like political disagreement between executives of the Saiwai Club and growing power of young members of the Kenkyunkai.
  • 伊藤 隆
    史学雑誌
    1984年 93 巻 8 号 1369-1374
    発行日: 1984/08/20
    公開日: 2017/11/29
    ジャーナル フリー
  • 明治•大正期
    富田 信男
    選挙研究
    1986年 1 巻 65-93
    発行日: 1986/03/20
    公開日: 2009/01/22
    ジャーナル フリー
  • 日本外交の国際認識と秩序構想
    櫻井 良樹
    国際政治
    2004年 2004 巻 139 号 60-73,L9
    発行日: 2004/11/29
    公開日: 2010/09/01
    ジャーナル フリー
    This paper presents an elucidation of the real role played by foreign policy concepts such as “international cooperation, ” “foreign interference in domestic affairs” and “Asianism” during the second Okuma Cabinet, by examining the antagonisms surrounding the foreign policy of the ruling party during the Okuma Cabinet, or, more concretely, the antagonisms between its elder statesmen, Takaaki Kato, Yukio Ozaki and other party leaders.
    The outbreak of the First World War gave Japan an opportunity to wield a free hand in diplomacy (except toward the USA), which had thereto been conducted within the framework of an Asian diplomacy designed to function in coordination with (or subordination to) the European and American powers. Under such circumstances, a conflict arose within Japan regarding the choice between two diplomatic policies: cooperation with the world powers or partnership with China.
    The antagonism arose over the priority of the two policies. Takaaki Kato pushed for prioritizing the first, while Aritomo Yamagata, Kaoru Inoue and Shimpei Goto promoted the latter. Meanwhile, party politicians (antimain-stream faction) of the ruling party of the second Okuma Cabinet adopted a nationalistic attitude: they criticized the diplomatic approach of Kato as too adulatory of Great Britain, and attached great importance to the relations with Asia, calling for an independent diplomacy.
    This criticism had something in common with the criticism leveled at Kato's diplomacy by the elder statesmen, and immediately after Japan's entry into the war, a united front was formed against Kato. However, their wish to open a partnership with China was incompatible with the wishes of the elder statesmen who supported China's Yuan administration. After the reorganization of the Okuma Cabinet, the influence of Kato weakened temporarily. Once the party politicians took leadership and anti-Yuan policy came to be carried out, the united front collapsed, and Yamagata and Goto confronted the cabinet on the matter of which political force in China Japan should cooperate with.
    As just described, in the period of the second Okuma Cabinet, various mutually inconsistent foreign policies were carried out, and it is difficult to find any single diplomatic concept underlying them all. Such inconsistency occurred because Takaaki Kato, the President, had not yet established sufficient leadership to gain complete control of the party, while Rikken-doshikai (meaning “Constitutional Comrades' Society”), Chuseikai (meaning “Neutral Justice Society”), etc., which had formed the ruling party supporting the cabinet, had adopted motley foreign policies. And if any mention is necessary in connection with the period thereafter, the foreign policy of Kato consisted basically of cooperation with Great Britain and nonintervention in the internal affairs of China, and these lines were criticized as weak-kneed diplomacy, too adulatory of Great Britain.
  • 奈良岡 聰智
    年報政治学
    2009年 60 巻 1 号 1_40-1_61
    発行日: 2009年
    公開日: 2013/02/07
    ジャーナル フリー
      In 1925 the Law of the election of the Lower House was revised, and the medium-sized constituency system was introduced. This system had been continued for about 70 years and given great influence to Japanese politics. Why and how was the medium-sized constituency system introduced in 1925? The aim of this paper is to answer this question.
      It has often been said that the three parties in power introduced it in order to escape from competing each other and to keep their base. This is the case, but the background was much more complicated. This paper focuses on three points.
      First, quite a few medium-sized constituencies had already been made when Hara Cabinet revised the Law of the election of the Lower House in 1919. It reflected wishes of Upper House, which was afraid of Seiyukai's mastery over Lower House, and wishes of some Seiyukai or independent MPs, who were afraid of changes of their constituencies.
      Second, the small-sized constituency system was greatly criticized among journalism and academic world after World War I. They insisted that corruption in election and higher cost for election was due to the small-sized constituency system, and they were generally welcome to proportional representation and multi party system in Europe. In 1923 Advisory Committee on Law expressed that proportional representation should be adopt. These voices promoted the review of the small-sized constituency system.
      Third, it was Kenseikai rather than three parties in power that took the initiative in introducing the medium-sized constituency system. Kenseikai did it in order to avoid returning to the large-sized constituency system, which was likely to make excessive multi party system, and to introduce the favorable election system to it. The medium-sized constituency system was favorable for Kenseikai in that it would not lose heavily. Kenseikai aimed to grow as one party in two party system, and the plan really came true after that.
  • 明治•大正期
    富田 信男
    選挙研究
    1987年 2 巻 64-88
    発行日: 1987/03/10
    公開日: 2009/01/22
    ジャーナル フリー
  • 藥學雜誌
    1913年 1913 巻 379 号 895-922
    発行日: 1913/09/26
    公開日: 2011/02/09
    ジャーナル フリー
  • 柴 孝夫, 廣山 謙介, 松本 貴典
    経営史学
    1990年 25 巻 1 号 38-57
    発行日: 1990/04/30
    公開日: 2009/11/06
    ジャーナル フリー
  • 季武 嘉也
    史学雑誌
    1982年 91 巻 6 号 1009-1040,1096-
    発行日: 1982/06/20
    公開日: 2017/11/29
    ジャーナル フリー
    As the "Taisho political crisis" has shown, the political situation of the early Taisho period featured a number of political movements of a pluralistic nature. This and the related "Kei-En (Katsura-Saionji) system of the government" led to a situation of extreme instability. The Yamagata Aritomo faction was thus unable to prevent the infighting of the political factions in the bureaucracy. At the same time, the confrontation in the Seiyukai Party between Hara Takashi and Matsuda Masahisa was brought to the surface. Thus, neither of them had enough power to form a main stream in the bureaucracy and the diet. Accordingly, there arose possibilities of the formation of various powers. And as the result of the rise of the Satsuma clique and the Doshikai Party, it was difficult for any group to make a cabinet easily. On the other hand, the Genros were unable to function of controlling among groups. In this essay, I will discuss the structure of the Second Okuma cabinet which appeared in the middle of this complicated political situation, and the political tactics of the Genros and the government parties (Doshikai, Chuseikai, etc.), so as to make clear of the political system of the early Taisho period. Among the Genros, Yamagata and Inoue Kaoru strongly supported the Okuma cabinet. They tried to cooperate with non-Seiyu diet members (the government party members of the Okuma cabinet) and restore their political power. On the other hand, the parties in power sought to establish the government based on political parties. But, there existed the opposition between a group of Kato Takaaki and Oura Kanetake and of Ozaki Yukio and Oishi Masami in persuit of leadership. There was inclination of the linkage of Yamagata with the former group, and Inoue with the latter. This reciprocity of confrontation and cooperation became apparent in the process of selecting the Home Minister, deciding foreign policies, dissolving the Diet, and uniting government parties. As the result of these, the Kato-Oura group took over the leadership of the Okuma cabinet. However, the Kato-Oura group was duly counterattacked by other political groups. Due to the efforts by Ozaki, Justice Minister, the Oura bribery case was brought to light, and then Oura had to resign from his office in August 1915. Soon after that, other members of the Kato-Oura group mostly left the cabinet. Although it is not discussed in this essay, the Genros could not reconcile with the government parties against their expectations. Rather, two groups in the government parties weakened their confrontation and organized newly the Rikken Kenseikai Party. In this essay, I would like to point out following points. First, the explanation until now that the Okuma cabinet was merely a puppet of the Genros is wrong, and the power of the government parties should be valued more. Secondly, although usually only the Seiyukai has been acclaimed for its activities, the non-Seiyu parties also need to be estimated as has conducted important roles during this period.
  • 国道沿いの花園
    永井良和
    地域史研究
    2022年 2022 巻 122 号 2-33
    発行日: 2022/12/28
    公開日: 2023/02/23
    研究報告書・技術報告書 オープンアクセス
  • 罰則規定の改正を中心に
    高倉 史人
    法制史研究
    1996年 1996 巻 46 号 41-74,en4
    発行日: 1997/03/30
    公開日: 2009/11/16
    ジャーナル フリー
    In this report, I made clear the significance of revision, focusing on penal regulations in the revision of commercial law enacted in Meiji 44, by examining the deliberations in the "Law Investigating Committee" and "The 27th Imperial Assembly".
    First, in the Law Investigating Committee, the two ideas of government and bureaucracy were revealed. That is, one was an idea that, like the revision of regulations for company merger or corporate flotation, met the demands in the economic world and hastened economic growth by conquering the depression after the Russo-Japanese War, promoting post-war management, concentrating company funds and facilitating the induction of foreign capital. And another was the idea to maintain the economic order strongly restoring the trust in companies and eliminate malpractice by company directors as in the Nitto case by the intensifi-cation of penal regulations for company directors, for example a revision of the penal regulations.
    And the former idea was followed with little amendment in the House of Peers, the House of Representatives and the Conference of Both Houses, but the latter was, though accepted by the House of Peers, revised substantially in the House of Representatives and the Conference of Both Houses and became a revised act because of the reflection of the fear of the economic world and Seiyu-kai that sound economic development would be disturbed.
    When I consider the details, I can say that the revision of commercial law in Meiji 44 was an amendment aimed at overcoming the depression after Russo-Japanese War, promoting post-war management, centralizing company capital and making easy the induction of foreign capital, and an amendment for restoring the strong preservation of economic order by the government and judicial bureaucracy to the maintainance of eco. nomic order that was "suitable for the economic world of today."
    Consequently, the combination of companies that were established after Taisho era and the concentration of funds were accelerated by, for exam. ple, the clarification of regulations for company amalgamation. And, by the revision of penal regulations, the later economic activity was led in an appropriate direction, the credit of companies was raised and the company management was made wholesome. Therefore, the revision of the commercial law in Meiji 44 has a meaning as the fundamental law for commerce and industry to redress the defects and imperfections of the commercial law in the Meiji era that was revealed after the economic growth after the Russo-Japanese War and to support the Japanese economic activity since Taisho era.
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