金融危機に係る研究では，金融機関の破綻が金融システム全体に波及するリスク，いわゆる“システミック・リスク”に注目が集まっており，当該リスクの未然防止や拡大防止のために，

がどのような役割を果たすべきかについてさまざまな議論や研究がなされている．そこでは，が資金供給等を積極的に行うことで危機の拡大を抑えることができるとの見方がある一方で，別のリスクを内包することに繋がるとの意見もある．本研究では，によるインターバンク市場の機能代替の問題に注目する．エージェントモデルによるシミュレーション・プラットフォームを構築し，の資金供給が連動的な破綻に与える影響の分析を行う．主な結果は以下の通り：1）の資金供給は，資金繰り破綻を減少させることで連動的な破綻を抑制しうる，一方で，2）金融機関の資金調達がへ依存するリスクや，3）本来市場から退出すべき金融機関が残存するリスク，が存在する．

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近年、仮想通貨(Virtual Currency)の一種であるビットコインが大ブームとなっている。仮想通貨とは、インターネット上で発行取引されるデジタル通貨である。日本の場合、平成21 年6 月に「資金決済に関する法律」という、いわゆる「仮想通貨法」が制定され、その後、銀行法等の関連法が改正され、平成29 年4 月から「仮想通貨法」は施行された。それにより、仮想通貨はモノやサービスの決済等、法定通貨(日本銀行券)との換金も可能となった。そのため、仮想通貨というデジタル通貨の登場・流通は、未来の法定通貨及び金融システムを変えるものとして評価され、紙幣(銀行券)がなくなる時代の到来が目前に迫っている。日本銀行、イングランド銀行(英国)、カナダ、スウェーデン、デンマーク国立銀行、オランダ、中国人民銀行等の世界各国のは自らが発行する公的なデジタル通貨を検討中であり、世界各国が仮想通貨というデジタル通貨を、法定通貨と同等なものとして取り扱う日の到来は遠くない。

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日本語経済テキストのマイニングと市場分析の手法を英文テキストに応用するため、連語の抽出等の英文テキストの特徴に合わせた改良を行った。その上で、連邦準備制度理事会、イングランド銀行、欧州

の発行するレポートをテキストマイニングし、市場との関係性を分析した。

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本研究では，テキストマイニング技術を用いた

の金融政策変更を予測するフレームワークを提案する．による金融政策の変更は為替市場や株式市場，国債市場などにも影響を与えることから，企業や銀行は金融政策変更の予兆を捉えようと試みているが，によって公開される情報の量が限られることから非常に困難である．そこで，我々はテキストマイニング技術を用いて，金融政策変更の予兆に関する情報をニュース記事から抽出することを試みる．この問題を解決するために，我々は因果関係に基づく金融政策変更を予測する新たなフレームワークを提案する．本フレームワークはトピックモデル，機械学習に基づく文選択，機械学習に基づく期待値予測から構成される．

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銀行間ネットワークにおいて、ある銀行が破綻すると、そのショックがネットワーク全体へと波及して連鎖破綻の起きる危険性がある。その際、政府・

は連鎖破綻の拡がりを阻止すべく公的資金注入や市場介入を通じて破綻の危機に瀕する銀行を救済しようとする。このとき、政府・による銀行救済の効果を最大限に引き出すためには、どのような救済ルールを採用すべきであろうか。

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The new Bank of Japan Law, passed in the Upper House plenary session on June 11, 1997, and became effective in April 1998. It is the first revision in over half a century of the BOJ Law of 1942, which has relegated the central bank to government control. The new law strengthens the central bank's autonomy and provides for greater transparency. This paper examines the background to the revision, the significant points of the revision, and unresolved issues. The autonomy is the quite unique problem of the Public Choice. Also, in light of the new law's emphasis on autonomy, we apply a “central bank independence index” to evaluate the law's impact.
As a result, BOJ got the greater legal independence, when we use the same method to evaluate the new BOJ Law as Cukierman's method, the index rose 0.37 from 0.18 due to improved policy objectives.
That result was supported if we used Gllili's method. However many pending issues depend on actual operations. Especially banking supervision is the biggest issues in the point of the efficiency of the Central banks and many banks.

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Central bank independence continues to become the global standard for the activities of monetary authorities. Increasing the independence of the central bank is widely acknowledged to decrease inflation by enhancing the credibility of commitments to price stability. This does not create an effect on economic costs in real terms, such as economic growth or employment.In accordance with Article 105 (1) of the Treaty on European Union, the primary objective of the ESCB shall be to maintain price stability. The statutory mandate to aim at price stability will give the ESCB a clear direction for its policy. This idea is rapidly becoming the consensus of academics and policymakers not only in the EU countries, but also all over the world.
This paper examines the empirical relationship between central bank independence and the costs of disinflation among the EU countries. Many previous papers suggest that central bank independence has a negative correlation with inflation. Granting greater independence to a central bank associates with lower inflation. However, few papers elucidate the relationship between central bank independence and the costs of disinflation. To investigate the effect of central bank independence on the trade-off parameter, we create estimates for both the EU and the G7. We use various ‘political’ and ‘economic’ indices provided by several papers to gauge central bank independence.
The result shows there is a positive correlation between central bank independence and the trade-off parameter in the EU. There are, of course, many other factors that determine output-inflation trade-off or the slope of the Phillips curve, but the clear real cost of disinflation is shown. For the EU countries at least, the growing political independence of central banks may have substantial real effects than in other countries such as those in the G7.
However, the evidence of the negative correlation between central bank independence and average rates of inflation shows that the important issue of causality is a negligible factor. There may be a labor market structure that makes reducing inflation more costly. Such factors may increase the value of an independent central bank that maintains low inflation. For example, there may be nominal wage rigidity in the EU.
Our empirical evidence suggests that both the incentive to inflate and the costs of reducing inflation may increase with greater central bank independence. Central bank independence delivers lower inflation but with real effects. It is certain that individual countries will have more independent central banks in the near future. Therefore, the problem of disinflation may be a big cost for the EU. The EU unemployment rate is quite high now. That may create many problems for achieving independent central banks.

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The need for central bank-market communication has been pointed out. In this research, we will deal with the case of Japan in this communication with the central bank and the market, and focus on information dissemination by the Bank of Japan. What kind of information is the Bank of Japan currently sending out? Through the case analysis, it is pointed out that communication with the market may be difficult due to excessive information dissemination by the central bank.

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本研究の目的は、中国における政策金融と郵便貯金との関係を明らかにすることである。すなわち、(1)1994年以後、は郵便貯金を預託させる背景には、政策銀行への資金供給源を確保するという目的である。(2)現在の政策金融制度のもとでは、郵便貯金は政策金融の重要な資金源の1つである。また、人民銀行は実際に"中間部分"としての役割を果たしている。郵便貯金は農村から資金を流出させるという郵貯批判論は必ずしも正しくない。(3)政策金融の利子構造を明らかにすることによって、はいまだに財政への補填を行っていると言える。こうした現行の制度上の問題点を明らかにしたうえで、その改善策を提言する。

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The global financial crisis broke out at on August 9, 2007. Although the U.S. was origin of the crisis, it became the global one. The entire global economy entered a severe recession. Both the U.S. government and the Federal Reserve began to react aggressively and it didn’t take so long time to stabilize the U.S. economic growth. On the other hand, the European economy has suffered from both the sovereign debt and banking system crises for years. Comparing the U.S., it takes too long time to cope with the sovereign debt and banking system crisis. It has been wondered broadly why the European authorities and people can’t solve the problems with affluent resource, sophisticated knowledge and painful historical experiences of the economic and financial crises.
It is noticeable to see that the Federal Reserve’s responses to the crisis have been aggressive, theoretical and accountable. Including the unconventional monetary policy such as LSAP, Large Scale Asset Purchase Program, their easing policies have followed systematically a response function, which is a derivative of the Taylor rule, Year 99 version of the monetary policy rule. After years, we have got an accumulation of the historical data and it is possible now to estimate how effective their quantitative easing is and they are following the Year 99 rule. This denotes that the Federal Reserve’s monetary policies during the crisis era have been theoretical and very accountable. This means that the monetary authority can cope with a similar crisis in the future.
The European authorities have responded the crisis substantially. Comparing the U.S., it was not successful for the European authorities to stabilize the economic fluctuations and the recession has come. This poor outcome may be coming from the nature of European integration. The EMU doesn’t have the united power to handle all of economic policies simultaneously and the biggest concern has been how to finance the unintended debt of fiscal failure. Stabilizing the economic fluctuations has not been the first priority. It is the era of flat Phillips curve and stabilizing inflation doesn’t mean stabilizing the economic fluctuation directly. In the past it was possible to say that stabilizing inflation rate will be followed by the economic stability and sustainable economic growth. It may not be true under the current flat Phillips curve era.
The ECB began to act aggressively to promote economic stability in 2011. They introduced LTRO, Long-term Refinance Operation and OMT, Outright Monetary Transaction. It is remarkable to find that they have apparent strategies. The worst of the financial crisis in the U.S. has gone due to many measures by the Fed to inject liquidity. They were successful to revive the paralyzed money markets in the U.S. Some academic authors explained how they worked very well. The LTRO by the ECB was very successful to gain trust in the Euro money markets. Seeing the difficulties in the sovereign bond markets, the ECB decided to react decisively to protect the EMU and they introduce the OMT. This measure may be a historical revolution of the monetary policy. It requires implementation of economic reform and fiscal consolidation, if the country needs an intervention by the ECB to their sovereign bond markets. Some of major economies are walking on the edge of the liquidity trap. This OMT programs is considering the incentives explicitly. If the OMT is successful, the monetary policy can be more effective than people have believed because the monetary policy may alter behaviors of the economic agents.
(View PDF for the rest of the abstract.)

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Images on money provide a widely circulated medium through which a state can make its values visible: the money circulated in postwar Taiwan displayed almost no “Great China” ideology, even in the Chiang Kai-shek era (1945–1975). Chiang ordered the Bank of Taiwan to issue the Taiwan dollar in 1946 and the New Taiwan dollar in 1949, rather than having a Taiwan branch office of the Central Bank of China circulate the legal tender of the Republic of China (ROC). From 1961 on, a picture of the ROC presidential office building in Taipei appeared on notes. Images on money and related currency laws up to 2000 reveal the ROC’s Taiwanization. At first, this process was heavily driven by the Japanese legacy and American influence; later, it was shaped more by Taiwan’s democratization. Imperial China’s culture was reinstated, and pre-1949 ROC symbols were reproduced; the unification of the ROC’s Taiwan money diverges from the diversification of money of the imperial China and of the pre-1949 ROC.

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