The Saiwai-Club (which consisted mainly of bureaucrats) wielded power in the House of Peers through the Meiji era. The assimilation of the Kenkyukai party (which consisted mainly of peers) helped the process. However, the club's power leclined gradually from the Taisho political crisis to the establishment of the Hara Takashi Cabinet. Why? In this paper, I will discuss the movements of the Saiwai-Club and Kenkyukai party, paying close attention to the sinking fund problem of the early Taisho era. After the Taisho political crisis, the political world was split in two groups: supporters of the Second Okuma Cabinet and its opposition. During the Second Okuma Cabinet regime, leaders of the Saiwai-Club were also split in two biterly opposing groups. At the 37th session of the Diet, they vehemently opposed the government's policy concerning the sinking fund. Though the Second Okuma Cabinet lived on until a half year later, Genro Yamagata Aritomo Suggested its general resignation to mediate both groups and this helped their diminish the tension. Finally, the government and leaders of Saiwai-Club suggested a compromise, and most parties accepted it. However, it did not mean the dispute was solved completely. It often re-emerged in later sessions. In fact the Saiwai-Club declined due to dissent among their leaders. Baron-members in their party particularly tended keep their distance. Leaders of the Kenkyukai party also came to lose their trust, because they did nothing but following the Saiwai-Club party line. Many members (particularly the younger ones) wanted them to leave the Saiwai-Club, resulting in their fall from the leading position. Such a situation made them oppose government policy when the sinking fund problem occurred. They were urged by their leaders to accept compromise at last; but this did not mean that their feelings had changed. They continued to search for the chance to regain party leadership. As they had expected, they did become the new leaders a few years later. Their party came to grow as the Saiwai-Club decayed. As mentioned above, the ruling party changed from the Saiwai-Club to the Kenkyukai party during the Second Okuma Cabinet Period. This important trend laid the foundation for the structure of later governments and had much influence on the political history of the Taisho era itself.

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The purpose of this article is to show adjustment to the party rules by the leaders of the Kenkyukai, which was a party in the House of Peers, and influence of their activities on the political situation under the first WAKATSUKI Reijiro cabinet. By passing its act of manhood suffrage in 1925, the Japanese House of Representatives received firmer legitimacy. It was expected that party-led governments would continue, but that rebutted political action by the House of Peers. In particular the members of the Kenkyukai needed their legitimacy, because they had lost legitimacy on due to their coalition with the KATO Tomosaburo cabinet and KIYOURA Keigo cabinets, which were blamed for being partyless. Then KONOE Fumimaro advocated that the House of Peers should defer to the cabinet based on a majority in the Lower House. This seemed to be adequate for recoverring their legitimacy at first glance, but it was impossible to put into practice very easily, since there was no party with an absolute majority in the House of Representatives at that time and the parties were bickering among themselves. So the leaders of the Kenkyukai tried to form a majority in the House of Representatives by stabilizing the tumult, hoping that popularity and legitimacy would result from their action. At first they supported WAKATSUKI's government and tried to make it join hands with Seiyuhonto. But they suddenly began to blame the government for its maladministration in October in 1926. The turn of the front office of Kenkyukai tipped the scale.

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The political crisis that occurred in Japan in 1916 (Taisho 5) is represents a crucial stage in the transition between 1913 and 1918 from the "Keien" settlement to the era of parliamentary government. Although many historians have investigated the process of this political crisis, which lasted from February to October 1916, they have not fully understood the political situation during 1913-1918, known as "Taisho-zenki". This paper mainly investigates the complicated situation in the House of Peers at the time of the crisis, a subject that has here-tofore been ignored by almost all historians. First, the author attempts to elucidate negotiations concerning succession to the premiership among Okuma, Terauchi and Yamagata, a "Genro", during this crisis. It is generally thought that the crisis was caused by the stubbornness of Terauchi. However, he was the only one with the flexibility to solve the problem. On the contrary, it was Okuma who refused to compromise. Secondly, the House of Peers' Saiwai club, the largest group in the House, was split into many factions. Therefore, they did not have enough power to support the Terauchi Cabinet. Meanwhile, in the House of Representatives three main government Parties, the Rikkendoushi-kai Kensei-kai and Koyu Club, were united. into the "Kensei-kai" to support Takaaki Kato as prime minister. Okuma advised the Emperor to select Kato as his successor; but Yamagata opposed this move and selected Terauchi. Although Yamagata rejected Kato as primier, he did not think the new administration could stand up against both Houses. Nevertheless, contrary to Yamagata's expectations, Terauchi did not receive the support of both Houses, resulting in a new ministry that was fragile legislatively.

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This paper is an attempt to supplement the present states of the insufficient studies in the power structure in the political history of modern Japan. That is, it is an attempt to elucidate the structure of the Yamagata clan's rule over the House of Peers, which was, beside the Army, one of the most important bases of the clan. Chapter I is to be a basis for the analysis of the structure of the House of Peers. In this chapter, the clarification of the structural characteristics of the parties will be made by analysing the decline of the Konwakai parties-both in regard to the titled members and to the imperial nominees in the House. Chapter II is an attempt to elucidate the last period of the Second Katsura Cabinet, in which the system of the Yamagata clan's rule over the House of Peers was reorganized. Part I of this chapter deals with the two parties of Saiwai-Club, which played the major role in the rule by the Yamagata clan. This part not only discusses the nature of "the executive system" (which played a leading part in controling the parties), but also indicates the fact that the Yamagata clan practically ruled and controled both the two parties of Saiwai-Club by organizing the chief members of the executives into an unofficial organization called Jukkin-Kai. This part, in addition, investigates the generational characteristics of the Yamagata clan as a union of officials. Part II of this chapter investigates, with special attention to the viscounts and barons, the development of the Yamagata clan's deal with the titled members. Thus investigating, this part elucidates the fact that the Yamagata clan succeeded both in ruling the viscounts by ensuring its initiative in the Kenkyu-Kai under Mishima's order, and in ruling the barons by absorbing them into the two parties of Saiwai-Club. Also, this part clarifies the main causes of the Yamagata clan's success in ensuring its initiative in the Kenkyu-Kai. Chapter III is an attempt to investigate the divisional nature of the whole structure of the Yamagata clan as well as to explain concretely its centripetal tendency by paying attention to the actual cases in the House of Peers. And lastly, the importance of the House of Peers for the whole of the Yamagata clan is examined by comparing the House and the Privy Council.

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As the "Taisho political crisis" has shown, the political situation of the early Taisho period featured a number of political movements of a pluralistic nature. This and the related "Kei-En (Katsura-Saionji) system of the government" led to a situation of extreme instability. The Yamagata Aritomo faction was thus unable to prevent the infighting of the political factions in the bureaucracy. At the same time, the confrontation in the Seiyukai Party between Hara Takashi and Matsuda Masahisa was brought to the surface. Thus, neither of them had enough power to form a main stream in the bureaucracy and the diet. Accordingly, there arose possibilities of the formation of various powers. And as the result of the rise of the Satsuma clique and the Doshikai Party, it was difficult for any group to make a cabinet easily. On the other hand, the Genros were unable to function of controlling among groups. In this essay, I will discuss the structure of the Second Okuma cabinet which appeared in the middle of this complicated political situation, and the political tactics of the Genros and the government parties (Doshikai, Chuseikai, etc.), so as to make clear of the political system of the early Taisho period. Among the Genros, Yamagata and Inoue Kaoru strongly supported the Okuma cabinet. They tried to cooperate with non-Seiyu diet members (the government party members of the Okuma cabinet) and restore their political power. On the other hand, the parties in power sought to establish the government based on political parties. But, there existed the opposition between a group of Kato Takaaki and Oura Kanetake and of Ozaki Yukio and Oishi Masami in persuit of leadership. There was inclination of the linkage of Yamagata with the former group, and Inoue with the latter. This reciprocity of confrontation and cooperation became apparent in the process of selecting the Home Minister, deciding foreign policies, dissolving the Diet, and uniting government parties. As the result of these, the Kato-Oura group took over the leadership of the Okuma cabinet. However, the Kato-Oura group was duly counterattacked by other political groups. Due to the efforts by Ozaki, Justice Minister, the Oura bribery case was brought to light, and then Oura had to resign from his office in August 1915. Soon after that, other members of the Kato-Oura group mostly left the cabinet. Although it is not discussed in this essay, the Genros could not reconcile with the government parties against their expectations. Rather, two groups in the government parties weakened their confrontation and organized newly the Rikken Kenseikai Party. In this essay, I would like to point out following points. First, the explanation until now that the Okuma cabinet was merely a puppet of the Genros is wrong, and the power of the government parties should be valued more. Secondly, although usually only the Seiyukai has been acclaimed for its activities, the non-Seiyu parties also need to be estimated as has conducted important roles during this period.

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How does a nation cope with a situation in which its sovereign cannot convene the parliament? This is exactly the problem that arose in Japan when enacting the Wartime Emergency Measures Act at the end of the Pacific War. The research to date has made two points : 1) the Emergency Measures Act was "legislation of the highest delegated authority," and 2) the Diet resisted the government by criticizing the relation between this bill and Article 31 of the Constitution, which provided for emergency powers. The author of the present article focuses on the fact that the mainstream opinion in the Diet was that the Emperor should exercise emergency powers and concludes the following. The Dainihon Seijikai was intent on making the Wartime Emergency Measures Committee a de facto standing committee, and in making this a reality, supported the imperial exercise of emergency powers. On the other hand, the Gokoku Doshikai and Koseikai stood together on the issue in principle, but the former intended to use those powers in continuing the War, while the latter thought that they would help control the military and realize a peaceful settlement. A group of Diet members from the Godo and Nissei parties led by Funada Naka attempted to create a political regime committed to an all out war of resistance through emergency powers governance based on a "national guard" formed in alliance with the Imperial Army. Given the inability to convene the Diet, this "national guard" took on the split personality of a legislative body of Diet members and a symbol of "national leadership," the latter character functioning to institutionalize the organization's internal workings. Under such a "national emergency" situation, it became possible to reinterpret the constitutional views held by the two former leading parties in terms of Article 31 instead of provisions related to the Diet. Although the question of what would happen if the Diet could be reconvened under such conditions was rendered moot in the midst of Japan's defeat, it was to become a point of debate within the process of promulgating the new constitution. Here, we can confirm the intent of political parties at the time to perform the dismantling and rebuilding necessary to transfer emergency powers exercised by the emperor under the Meiji Constitution to the Diet as the holder of ultimate political authority.

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