L’Extrait du Projet de paix perpétuelle de monsieur de l’abbé de Saint-Pierre et le Jugement sur le Projet de paix perpétuelle sont rédigés la même année （1756）. Mais le premier toutefois soutient la « confédération européenne » de Saint- Pierre, alors que le second lui fait objection. Notre étude a pour objectif, en comparant ces deux textes et le Projet de la paix perpétuelle de Saint-Pierre, de mettre en relief l’idée originale de Rousseau sur la confédération. Dans l’Extrait, Rousseau approuve la confédération européenne, attendu que les autres moyens pour apporter la paix en Europe, c’est-à-dire la monarchie universelle, l’équilibre des puissances et le commerce, sont tous impuissants. En procédant par élimination, il donne ainsi son accord au projet de Saint-Pierre. Les raisons par lesquelles il renonce par la suite à la confédération européenne résident en la manière de l’établir. Pour Saint-Pierre, c’est par l’intermédiaire de la « diète européenne » que les princes aboutissent à un accord. Cependant Rousseau prévoit qu’une confédération régie par un corps juridiquement supérieur ne manquerait pas de dégénérer en despotisme et de soumettre l’Europe tout entière. Une confédération basée sur les liens entre les peuples （les mœurs） est pour lui le seul moyen qui peut unir plusieurs États sans limiter la souveraineté de chacun.

　Solution building, which is a key concept in solution-focused brief therapy, is an effective approach to resolute various problem. However, the environmental factors associated with solution building have not been clarified. Since solution building requires the ability to articulate one's own goals and focus on positive aspects, family factors such as respecting and affirming a children's opinions are associated with solution building.

　In the current study, family structure and parenting style served as family factors, and their relationship to solution building was examined. Two hundred university students were surveyed. Two-way analysis of variance revealed the main effects of family structure and parenting style. In addition, a significant interaction between family structure and parenting style was observed, indicating that strong cohesion, a balance of power, an open family structure, and an accepting parenting style were associated with a high degree of solution building. These results indicate an association between solution building and family factors.

In the process of the end of the Cold War, President George H. W. Bush announced that the United States, as a “European power,” would maintain significant military forces in Europe as long as its allies desire U.S. presence as part of a common security effort. This image of the U.S. at the Cold War’s demise might contradict its classical self-image in the context of U.S.-European relations. Traditionally, the U.S. took measures to avoid power politics on the other side of the Atlantic Ocean. This paper explores why the U.S. decided to engage in the future of Europe, revealing its image as a “European power.” To this aim, first, this paper classifies theories of U.S. foreign policy into four types: 1) primacy, 2) isolationism, 3) offshore balancing, and 4) selective engagement. Furthermore, it examines as a case study the Bush administration’s foreign policy toward Europe on the basis of declassified primary materials located at the Presidential Library in Texas, memoirs by the former officials, and secondary sources. In this section, the way the U.S. managed the “German Question” at that time in collaboration with neighboring countries including the Soviet Union will be investigated. From 1989 to 1990, many in Europe were concerned about the scenario that the unified Germany became militarily and economically powerful, followed by a European imbalance of power. In this context, many neighbors in Europe, including the Soviet Union, welcomed U.S. military presence in the future of Europe as a “stabilizer.”

This story provides us with an answer to the question why the U.S. redefined its self-image as a “European power” at the ending of the Cold War. The Bush administration followed the cooperative principle in both areas of the bilateral U.S.-Soviet relationships and the Western alliance. The I-I.S. tried to treat the exhausted Soviets as still “superpower” to avoid political crisis that would lead to subversion of the Gorbachev-Ied Soviets regime. In terms of Atlantic relations, the U.S. always sought its strong leadership within the alliance to strengthen the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) solidarity at the time of turbulence. President Bush and his national security advisor Brent Scowcroft recognized that the drastic development in Europe would lead to European imbalance of power as shared by many countries in the continent. To avoid this scenario, the U.S. adamantly denied the return to isolationism, and as a “stabilizer” in new European order, it decided to continue to maintain significant military forces. U.S. military presence never retreated offshore.

In sum, when Germany unified and Europe transformed, the U.S. employed the strategy of selective engagement in new European order. The reason the U.S. redefined itself as a “European power” is to show the denial of isolationism and the continuation of stationing significant military forces to manage the European balance of power in the post-Cold war era.