How does a nation cope with a situation in which its sovereign cannot convene the parliament? This is exactly the problem that arose in Japan when enacting the Wartime Emergency Measures Act at the end of the Pacific War. The research to date has made two points : 1) the Emergency Measures Act was "legislation of the highest delegated authority," and 2) the Diet resisted the government by criticizing the relation between this bill and Article 31 of the Constitution, which provided for emergency powers. The author of the present article focuses on the fact that the mainstream opinion in the Diet was that the Emperor should exercise emergency powers and concludes the following. The Dainihon Seijikai was intent on making the Wartime Emergency Measures Committee a de facto standing committee, and in making this a reality, supported the imperial exercise of emergency powers. On the other hand, the Gokoku Doshikai and Koseikai stood together on the issue in principle, but the former intended to use those powers in continuing the War, while the latter thought that they would help control the military and realize a peaceful settlement. A group of Diet members from the Godo and Nissei parties led by Funada Naka attempted to create a political regime committed to an all out war of resistance through emergency powers governance based on a "national guard" formed in alliance with the Imperial Army. Given the inability to convene the Diet, this "national guard" took on the split personality of a legislative body of Diet members and a symbol of "national leadership," the latter character functioning to institutionalize the organization's internal workings. Under such a "national emergency" situation, it became possible to reinterpret the constitutional views held by the two former leading parties in terms of Article 31 instead of provisions related to the Diet. Although the question of what would happen if the Diet could be reconvened under such conditions was rendered moot in the midst of Japan's defeat, it was to become a point of debate within the process of promulgating the new constitution. Here, we can confirm the intent of political parties at the time to perform the dismantling and rebuilding necessary to transfer emergency powers exercised by the emperor under the Meiji Constitution to the Diet as the holder of ultimate political authority.

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Just before noon on September 1, 1923, a catastorophic earthquake of a magnitude of 7.9 widely struck Tokyo, capital of Japan, and surrounding areas. Consequently, to add to so much destruction, fires broke out, and several cities including Tokyo, Yokohama and Yokosuka were largely burnt to ashes. The damage was so much that the killed persons in total amounted to about 130, 000, and the home-lost to 2, 800, 000. This disaster has been called "The Great Earthquake of 1923".
The situation demanded some urgent countermeasures to maintain the public peace and order, and to give relief to a great deal of victims.
Then the Japanese Government practically executed a number of emergency orders provided in the Constitution to cope with the situation as promptly and strongly as possible.
Half the number of the emergency orders then issued were in substance related to the private rights of the sufferers or citizen in large.
Those contained the measures as follows; the national indemnity for requisition orders, the recovery of the lost private properties, the transaction of a great amount of suspended obligations, the recovery of the burnt official registration records of private rights, the financial measures for the reconstruction of the devastated, the national subrogation of benefits of fire assurances, the preservation of bank bills against a financial crisis, etc.
This is a study of the law-making respecting the emergency measures taken by the Japanese Government at the time of the 1923 great earthquake as mentioned above.

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