A second half of the 1950s, Tokyo Metropolitan City Planning Council approved the underground parking garage construction at the part of Hibiya Park in the central area of Tokyo. In this council, many members discussed the right and wrong of the parking garage construction concerning the fundamental law, ownership, supervision, toll system and management by private enterprise. On march 1957, this planning and project were approved at the Council. The Japan Highway Corporation (public sector) began the construction this parking garage and spent one year and eight months. The total cost was about thousand and forty million yen. This garage began the operation on June 1960, and is now managing by private enterprise.

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Originating in the Shiga Highlands, which is the remnants of an ancient volcano, the Yomase River has a catchment basin of 117 km² and runs for a total length of 26 km. The downriver area is characterized by a vast alluvial fan measuring 6 km in length and 25 km² in area. Hot spa communities, such as Yudanaka and Shibu, in the midstream area of the Yomase River and the urban area of Nakano city in the downstream area have frequently experienced serious damage due to sediment and flood disasters. The prefectural government of Nagano started work on sabo facilities in 1906, but the sabo facilities constructed then were destroyed by heavy rainfall in 1909 to 1910 and the sabo project was suspended. As such, the topography, geology, and history of sediment disasters along the Yomase River were investigated, and their relationship with sabo projects was studied. The location maps of the sabo facilities constructed from 1906 to 1910 were found in storage at the Nagano Prefectural Museum of History, so they were reviewed in detail. This paper identified the location mentioned in an anecdote by Professor Masao Akagi, who contributed to the sabo works along the Yomase River, where he slipped and fell during a field survey. Based on the relationship between the catchment area and the bed slope, useful knowledge was obtained that will help in reviewing the marginal conditions related to the dry masonry dam work conducted back then and conserving these facilities in the future. A symposium was held in Yamanouchi town in 2018 to commemorate the 100th anniversary of the start of the sabo project for the Yomase River, as a direct project of the central government.

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　本稿は戦前期の日本内地における港湾政策の詳細と役割を明らかにする研究の一環として，昭和前期の日本の港湾政策決定に主導的な役割を果たした組織の概要と審議内容とそれらの歴史的な意義について解明を試みるものである．

　本稿で分析を試みるのは戦前の日本で設立された土木会議という組織である．同組織は道路・河川・港湾等の土木に関する事項を調査審議することを目的に1933年に設立された．そして土木会議内で，特に港湾に関する重要課題について審議する部門として港湾部会が設置されることとなった．それ以後，日本が敗戦を迎えるまでに実施された全ての港湾改良工事は同部会内での審議を経て実施されたものであった．そこでは現在の日本の社会経済基盤を形作る各計画が審議され策定されていた．

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This essay is based on the diary kept by General Suzuki Teiichi (1888- ) from September 27,1933 until August 29,1934. At the time Lieutenant colonel Suzuki (promoted to colonel in December 1933) served as the chief of the press section of the Army until March of 1934 when he resigned to become secretary of the research department of the Army Staff College, Suzuki was close to General Araki Sadao who was the Army Minister until January of 1934. Thereafter, Suzuki became one of the important members of the Kodo-ha which was centered around General Araki. This essay uses the informatibn from Suzuki's diary to analyze four important topics involving the army during the 1933-1934 period. First, we have looked at the different army factions which became politically influential after the Manchurian Incident. In particular, we have examined the process by which the anti-Ugaki party headed by Generals Araki, Mazaki, Hayashi divided into the Kodo-ha and the Tosei-ha after General Araki's resignation in 1934. Secondly, we have examined Suzuki's relationship to those in the inner circle around Genro Saionji, in particular Harada Kumao, Kido Koichi, and Konoye Fumimaro. The third topic covered in this essay involves the relationship between the army and the cabinet. Finally, we have closely examined and analyzed the role of the chief of the Army press section. By using this diary, we have been able to examine the inner structure of the army as well as analyze some of the actions involving high army officers during this crucial 1933-1934 period.

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The Cabinet Planning Board (CPB : October 1937-November 1943) continued for the longest period and was the most extensively developed office of the so-called "Offices for the Integration of National Policy" (OINP). These offices were established to strengthen the Cabinet in the period of the post-Party Cabinets in Japan. Moreover, the CPB continued throughout one of the most important periods of the Japanese modern history, from the Sino-Japanese War to the Pacific War. Accordingly, we must examine the actual condition of the CPB in order to study the decision making process of national policy during that period. But the image that is derived from past studies about the formation process of the CPB is that it was simply "an Office for General Mobilization" (OGM) or was "weak". This image does not coincide with that of an "active" CPB in the period of the Konoe New Organization (Konoe Shin-taisei) in 1940. Therefore, the author describes the actual condition of CPB from October 1937 to the end of 1939 in this paper. The CPB was established as a result of the amalgamation of the Resources Bureau (Shigen-kyoku) as OGM and the Cabinet Planning Agency (Kikaku-cho) as OINP. The Army had taken the lead in establishing it. But it still maintained the "structual" weak point of OINP. The CPB did not have authority over the other government offices. But the weak point was overcome through the roles which the CPB was allowed to play during the Sino-Japanese war. It planned the National General Mobilization Plans (Kokkasodoin-keikaku), which were at the heart of the Material Mobilization Plans (MMP ; Butsudo-keikaku), and it spearheaded the application of the National General Mobilization Law. The CPB was the real power behind the National General Mobilization Business Committee which organized each ministry for the purpose of mobilization, and the CPB also established the Temporary Materials Coordination Bureau as a external unit of the Ministry of Commerce and Industry for the application of MMP. The CPB also held the real power of making the budget for the subdivision of MMP around the first half 1939. That is, the CPB became the center of "the System for the application of the Mobilization Law" which included the National General Mobilization Council. Moreover, the CPB was closely connected with the establishment and operation of government offices for the National General Mobilization in the broad sense of the word. These offices included the Second Committee, the Third Committee, the Science Council (Kagaku-shingikai), the East-Asian Laboratory (Toa-kenkyujo), and the Asian Developement Board (Koa-in). And the CPB came to control a group of government offices which should be called "the CPB System". In order to see how much political influence the CPB had in the "circumstantial" sense, the author concentrates on two issues : 1)the expansion of the CPB from the autumn of 1938 to the spring of 1939 ; and 2)the establishment of the Trade Ministry in the autumn of 1939. It became clear that CPB had more considerable political influence over the contemporary political scene as the proposer and promoter of "reformatory" policies. However the outcome of these two issues was not as the CPB and the Army had expected or wished. The CPB was not simply an OGM. Besides, such CPB actions were caused by some of "the Reformists" among the bureaucrats and military officers who served in CPB. "The Reformists" increasingly entered the CPB through "the CPB System".

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