本稿は，国際ニュース報道における「引用」に着目し，引用とメディア翻訳の不可視性との関係を明らかにした上で，社会記号論系言語人類学の「出来事モデル」に依拠し，メタ・コミュニケーションとしてのメディア翻訳の多層的実践について事例分析を通し考究するものである．事例として取り上げたのは，1990年代に壮絶な民族紛争を繰り広げたボスニア・ヘルツェゴヴィナにおいて20年ぶりに行われた国勢調査に関するニュースである．従来，ニュースにおける引用の翻訳は，もとの発話の忠実な再現であり，異なる言語間の単なる意味の等価的伝達と考えられてきた．この前提がニュースの真正性を支えてもきた．分析の結果，引用箇所の翻訳においては，言語使用における「言われていること」のレヴェルには大きなシフトは見られなかった．それに対し「為されていること」，即ち言語使用者たちのアイデンティティやイデオロギーに関わる社会指標的意味のレヴェルにおいては相対的に大きなシフトが生じていた．このことは，メディア翻訳が単なる意味の等価的伝達ではなく，翻訳という出来事が生起する社会・文化・歴史的コンテクストに根差した複層的な実践であり，メタ・コミュニケーションであることを示唆する．さらに，メディア翻訳においては，引用に見られるようにそれ自体が言及指示的に非明示的，したがって社会指標的，メタ語用的要素の転移にこそ困難があることを示すものである．

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This study aims to clarify the characteristics of the readers' column in the Japan Times during World War II. Founded in 1897 with the support of the government, businessmen, and researchers, the newspaper was expected to produce Japanese propaganda after the Manchurian Incident in 1931. Previous studies have tried to examine Japanese propaganda through the analysis of the editorials in the newspaper. However, very little has been written about the readers' column, which was laid out beside the editorial and was supposed to be a forum for free speech. This article focuses on the Asama Maru Incident (January 21^<st>, 1940) - a scandal that provoked an anti-British campaign in the Japanese-language press and eventually propelled Japan into World War II - to reveal how the readers' column in the Japan Times was a forum for open international discussion. From when the incident occurred (January 21) to when some of the captured Germans were released in Yokohama (March 2) , 13 out of a total of 66 letters published in the readers' corner were about the Asama Maru Incident. An analysis of the writers, who were from England, Japan, and Germany (in addition to a few anonymous writers) , reveals that eight were pro-Britain and five were anti-Britain. In comparison, the Japanese-language press was completely anti-Britain and the two other English papers were completely on the side of Britain and the U.S. during the same period. I conclude that this column functioned as an 'asylum for foreign people's free speech' in order to make the Japanese propaganda in the rest of the paper more effective and palatable. I also point out that the messages in the column, the editorial and the translations from the Japanese press functioned in a mutually complementary manner to each other with regard to the propaganda in the Japan Times. The results are discussed in terms of their implications for understanding public diplomacy in English-language media.

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This article provides insights into why Japan tried and failed to acquire “recognition” for Manchukuo by the international community through the Institute of Pacific Relations (IPR). It focuses on responses by Canadian intellectuals and the Canadian government.

Japan was attracted by the Canadian government’s policy of appeasement. Neither Canadian diplomats in Japan nor delegates to the League of Nations condemned the country’s behavior over the Manchurian Incident. They did not make a show of solidarity with, or extend sympathy to, the Chinese. This appeared to Japan as an opportunity to gain recognition for Manchukuo. Japan’s ambassador in Canada pressed the government to recognize Manchukuo. When this strategy failed, Japan sought invitations for Manchukuo officials at an IPR conference at Banff in Canada.

Opinion in both Canada and at the IPR was divided. The policy of the Canadian government toward Japan was not necessarily popular with the Canadian public. The Canadian Institute of International Affairs, which represented the country at the IPR, was established and predominantly opposed to Japanese immigration into Canada. Members of this organization were much more critical of Japan’s violation of international law than their own government was.

The policy of appeasement could not necessarily be construed as Canada’s willingness to defy the United States and Chinese governments by recognizing Manchukuo. The most important stumbling block was the Chinese government. This policy proved to be a poor basis for achieving recognition in the absence of any agreement with the Chinese government.

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When the Alien Land Law prohibiting land ownership by aliens not eligible for citizenship (mainly Asians) was passed in the California Assembly in May 1913, Japanese officials and immigrants alike realized the merit of swaying US public opinion. To quell the rising anti-Japanese movement, the Japanese Foreign Ministry set up in 1914 two publicity bureaus-the Pacific Press Bureau (PPB) in San Francisco and the East and West News Bureau (EWNB) in New York City-disguising both as private "press agencies". Kiyoshi Kawakami, who had been invited to San Francisco by the Japanese Association as manager of the Campaign of Education, was appointed chief of PPB, a low cost operation designed to placate the local California press and contribute news items to influential papers throughout the country. The Japanese consul-general, who held the ultimate responsibility for PPB, was pleased with Kawakami's capability as a propagandist. At the onset, PPB activities were hindered due to poor cablegram communications with Tokyo; however, on the occasion of the declaration of war on Germany, the Japanese Foreign Minister took a more positive attitude and imposed upon PPB the role of an agency for war propaganda. Therefore, Kawakami came to play a dual role as a promoter of Japanese military policy in the Far East and debunker of prevalent anti-Japanese public opinion, especially the rumors of a pending US-Japanese war being spread by propagandists for the German and Chinese governments. Kawakami was also involved in intelligence work, obtaining confidential State Assembly documents for the Japanese Consulate and lobbying against anti-Japanese bills introduced during the Assembly's 42nd Session. After the war, PPB was forced to tone down its blatant propaganda due to public antipathy towards such activity on the part of Japanese and pro-Japanese Americans, conflict within the Bureau between Japanese and American staff members, and a threat that Kawakami's secret arrangements with the Japanese government would be become public. From 1917 one, Kawakami was frequently absent from his San Francisco headquarters, travelling to the Far East, New York and Washington DC courtesy of the Japanese Foreign Ministry. Kawakami was expected of wide-ranging activities as a Ministry intelligence agent, not merely a kind of propagandist in San Francisco. Both PPB and EWNB were shut down because of the establishment in August 1921 of the Foreign Ministry's Intelligence Office which changed the tone of its information policy from "active" and "wartime" to "moderate" and "peaceful". Kawakami left San Francisco for Washington DC in January 1923, where he continued to maintain secret connections to the Japanese Embassy.

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