The research to date concerning commodity distribution in ancient Japan has concluded that it was provincial governors (kokushi 国司) who manipulated commodity prices and controlled markets within their jurisdictions. The present article disputes these conclusions by showing that provincial governors did not manipulate prices, but rather when they did trade with people within their jurisdictions, a system of fixed prices was used. Since these fixed prices did not fluctuate in accordance with changes in current prices, the system did not conform to the price stipulations contained in the ritsuryo codes. Given the fact that each province developed its own system of fixed prices, the author calls them "customary provincial prices". These "customary provincial prices" were a part of administrative precedents being established at the time by lower level bureaucrats (kuni-zonin 国雑任) for the purpose of discharging their duties with the utmost speed and efficiency. Therefore, rather than the top provincial bureaucrats manipulating prices at their own discretion, it was their subordinates who put local customary prices into practice, thus established a provincial precedent. One example of this practice has found at archaeological sites in Kaga Province (present day southern Ishikawa Prefecture), indicating that the river ports and fords (including their markets) operated by local powerful families during the 8th century came under the administrative control of the provincial governments during the 9th. Such a change corresponds to the absorption of local powers into the provincial government as its functionaries. What this means in terms of the "provincial customary price" system, is that it was local powerful families in the capacity of lower level provincial administrators that were greatly influencing their respective provincial economies.

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The research that has been done on the ancient Japanese state governed under the ritsuryo 律令 codes, which is based on the pioneering work of historians Ishimoda Sho and Yoshida Takashi, has recently been deepened by Otsu Tooru in his comparison with the Tang Dynasty. However, research has yet to be done on the Ritsuryo State from the point of view of fiscal administration on the local level and how this local character was transformed beginning in the tenth century. The present article is an attempt to delve into such matters. Local matters of the Ritsuryo State system were put in charge of sub-provincial district (gun 郡) administrators (gunji 郡司), who were supervised by the central government through provincial governors (kokushi 国司), whose performance was monitored by inspectors called yodo-no-tsukai 四度使. These central government inspectors submitted reports on both local administrative and fiscal affairs during the term of office of each successive governor. Local fiscal administration was based on taxes levied on yields of arable land allocated by the state to individuals (so 租), a part of which was accumulated in district storehouses as shozei 正税, and lent to cultivators at interest to defray administrative expenses. In this sense, the ritsuryo system was operated on a dual structure. The momentum for the system's transformation was provided by growing ties of dependency between members of the central aristocracy and commoners to whom land had been allocated (hyaku-sho 百姓) in the midst of a decline in the administrative authority of gun administrators. The central government began appoint ing tax farmers as deputy provincial governors (zuryo 受領) to take direct control over the hyakusho under their jurisdictions. Ac cording to the procedure that was instituted in a ministry of state order issued in 902 AD, the central government and provincial/districts were to allocate arable land to local hyakusho and collect from them a part of the harvest (sozei 租税) and a part o the fruits of their labor (choyo 調庸), together referred to as kanmotsu 官物, resulting in a system that fiscally unified the center and the provinces. This system, characterized politically as a "dynastic" state (ochokokka 王朝国家) was fiscally supported by taxes collected in accordance with the ritsuryo codes being channeled into stipends and rewards for the central aristo-bureaucracy (including state controlled religious institutions) on the strength of tax farming and proxy provincial administration conducted by zuryo. In addition to stipends from public tax stores, both the secular and religious aristocracy was allowed tax exemptions on their own proprietary holdings and permitted to organize their own labor forces (yoriudo 寄人) However, such privileges were not the results of grabbing exclusionary or feudal rights of coercion and ownership, but rather depended on controlling the administrative mechanism linking the center and the provinces. The result was a totally centralizes political entity created by unifying the dual structure characterizing the Ritsurvo State.

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The circulation of material goods in ancient Japanese society has been frequently studied from the viewpoint of tribute paid vertically from local society to the central government. However, barter as a form of horizontal material circulation must also have existed. In fact, in the background of the cho-yo 調庸 system of tribute, there is the existence of trade activities forming the basis of a circulation economy. In the present paper the author focuses upon the characteristic features of the institution of yo 庸 within the ritsuryo taxation system in an attempt to identify goods used as money (in the sense of payment and a medium of exchange), which played an important role in the circulation of goods during the ancient period. Basically, yo tribute consisted of four goods: cloth, rice, wata 綿 (stuffing made from boiling silk worms), and salt. The provinces that submitted each good seem to have been groups together regionally. Furthermore, if yo indeed was intended to be the daily necessities for supporting corvee labor performed in the capital, then these goods must havd functioned on the local leve1 as media of exchange. Turning to the yo goods themselves, first, cloth, which was initially paid as jofu 常布, has already been identified as a unit of cloth functioning widely in pre-Taika times as a medium of exchange. Therefore, there is no doubt that cloth for yo tribute functioned a money. Next, regarding rice tribute, we know that rice was widely used throughout ancient society as a form of payment. As to wata stuffing, it was used in Kyushu as payment for foreign trade goods and at Dazai-fu as part of the stipends paid the bureaucrats there, showing it functioning as payment. After establishing the general monetary character of each of the four yo tribute goods, the author offers the hypothesis that is was because of this basic character that these very goods were designated as yo. Moreover, the fact that each of these tribute goods seems to have been grouped together regionally suggests the existence of trade spheres using specific "in kind" monetary forms. For example, in the eastern provinces cloth functioned as the medium of exchange and payment for goods, while in western Japan rice and wata played those roles. The present study is an attempt to add a new viewpoint to the conventional research, which has tended to recognize in a vague sort of way that rice and cloth probably functioned as money in ancient Japan.

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In medieval English history, the loss of Normandy during the reign of King John (1199-1216) is regarded as marking the end of the "Anglo-Norman Realm," a territorial union between England and Normandy which existed from the "Norman Conquest" in 1066. Some scholars have attributed this loss to John's inability in military affairs, while others have cited the fiscal weakness of the government at that time. To discover the true cause of the loss, however, the presence of the barons who formed a personal network across the English Channel must also be considered. This article attempts to show how important a role these "cross-channel" barons played in maintaining the Anglo-Norman Realm based on an examination of scutage, a tax levied on tenants-in-chief by their lords during wartime, in particular changing attitudes concerning payment of that tax. During the reign of King Richard I, a time when the cross-channel barons were politically active during the king's absence, three scutages were levied : one was for the king's ransom, and the others for campaigns to defend English territories on the Continent. Judging from the related sources, the cross-channel barons appeared rather cooperative in paying for the king's ransom, but they seemed not only reluctant in paying for campaigns on the Continent, but also tried to obtain exemptions from payment. During John's reign, four scutages were levied, all to finance campaigns on the Continent before the loss of Normandy. Although some historians point to John's adamancy in collecting the taxes and a certain improvement in collection, which is evident in the figures presented in this article, more cross-channel barons were exempted from payment at that time than during Richard's reign, and even those who did pay seemed to no longer willing to do so. To gain their support, King John had to grant large amounts of land to these reluctant barons resulting in a decline in his own revenues. It was in this way that the cross-channel barons, who had once played an important role in supporting the Anglo-Norman Realm, became an equally important factor in its demise.

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The main revenue sources of the Court in the early middle ages in Japan were Shokoku-Noumotsu (諸国納物), Jogo (成功) and money contributed by the Bakufu (幕府). Most people recognized that of those three Shokoku-Noumotsu was adequate to for financing public ceremonies. The reveune was sent to the offices of Court by Kuni-Zassho (国雑掌), a subordinate of the Kokushi (国司), and was received by the Nenyo (年預) of these offices. A transition in the system of collecting Noumotsu from Kokuge (国下) to Kyoge (京下), which took place in the late 12th century, meant that giving and taking Noumotsu between the provinces and the capital changed to the manipulation of funds. It was done by a financier and a central government minor official acting like a financier, having nothing to do with the situation in the provinces. On the other hand, the offices organized Benpo-no-ho (便補保) in various places, in order to collect Noumotsu smoothly. Few office were successful, however, most of them failed and were reduced to a nominal existence losing the power to generate revenue sources. For the Court the contribution of money and Jogo by the Bushi (武士) of Bakufu were important revenue sources, as well. As long as the Bushi was happy with the official ranks and posts given them by the Court, they agreed that the ceremonies performed at Court were necessary and participated accordingly, therefore, the Court could count on diverse support from the wealthy Bakufu. Such a trend in financing public ceremonies was engineered by minor government officials, having full knowledge of the decorum of the Court and stocking some funds. They always had contact with a financier like Sanmon (山門) and others. When they wanted to raise funds for management of the provinces or Jogo, they acted themselves like financiers. Moreover, offering their knowledge and talents, they became intimate with the Bushi of Bakufu and played an important part in the Bakufu's economic power and governmental power vis-a-vis the Court.

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