In the study of prewar Japanese political history, the issue of colonial rule has been taken up only as an “external issue,” so to speak. In recent years, excellent research results have been published from the field of colonial history studies, and there has indeed been progress in understanding Japanese political history from an empireorientated perspective. However, in order to truly cross-link the studies of colonial history and Japanese political history, it is essential to clarify how the expansion of imperialism in prewar Japan affected the political structure of Japan as a whole. The author believes that this is the key to building an understanding of “Imperial Japanese Political History,” and is diligently researching the Takumushō（Ministry of Colonial Affairs）, which was newly established in 1929 as the government agency with jurisdiction over colonial affairs. As a part of this analysis, this paper presents the validity of this perspective by analyzing how the Takumushōʼs movement affected the retreat of the “responsible cabinet system” in modern Japan, taking up the issue of the South Manchurian Railway Company（SMR）reorganization that became a problem between 1932 and 1934 as a case study.

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Wir haben, zusammen mit Prof. IMAMUAR im Okt. 1941 in Wulagai, in der Prafektur Yungchi in der Provinz Chilin, Mandschukuo, und in dessen Umgebung bei _??_ 483 and _??_ 205 untersucht, und auf der Heimreise, in Fuyu in derselben Provinz _??_ 14 und _??_ 11 gemmessen. Ich habe aber in diesem Bericht ausserdem noch die noch nicht veroffentlichten Messungen aufgenommen, die 1939 von Prof. IMAMURA und von Assistent-Prof. SHIMA in Shuang-cheng (bei _??_ 62 und _??_ 27) and in A-cheng (bei _??_ 138 und _??_ 49) vorgenommen wurden, and ich will auch hier die von Prof. IMAMURA and von dessen Schülern bereits publizierten Materiale zur Betrachtung heranziehen.
Noch Prof. IMAMURA7) zeigen die im Mandschukuo lebenden Mandschus eine gemeinsame körperliche Eigenschft, obwohl such bei ihnen gewisse lokale Verschiedenheiten nicht zu vermissen sind. Und zwar soll der Messungswert und der Index den Koreanern nicht allzu fern liegen. Ich habe daher die Mandschus hauptsächlich mit den Koreanern vergleichen and festgestellt, dass die körpergrosse bei den Mandschus grösser ist als bei den Koreanern, dass aber dagegen der Index des körpers bei den beiden Völkern, ungefähr gleich ist.
Grösste Kopflänge, grössee Kopfbreite and Längenbreiten-Index sind wie in der Abb. 1 angegeben. Viele der Lokaltypen der Mandschus stimmen mit den Koreanern überein ; aber der Index neigt bei den Mandschus mehr zu Brachykephal bez. zu Hyperbrachykephal hin, und die Koreaner befinden sich moistens im Bereich von Brachykephal.
In der Abb. 2 habe ich Kopfbreite, Kopfhöhe und Längenhöhen-Index des Kopfes. vergleichen. Auch hier stimmen die Koreaner mit den gewissen Lokaltypen der Mandschus Therein.
Die Abb. 3 zeigt ferner Jochbogenbreite, morphologische Gesichtshöhe und morphologischen Gesichtsindex. Die lokale Unterschiede, sowohl bei den Koreanern als auch bei den Mandschus, sind gross. Aber als allgemeine Tendenz ist zu beachten, dass Jochbogenbreite bei den beiden Volkern keinen grossen Unterschied zeigt, dass aber die Gesichtshohe bei den Mandschus etwas grösser ist als bei den Koreanern.
Im Ubrigen ist die Nasenhöhe bei den Koreanern etwas grösser as bei den Mandschus, aber die Nasenbreite ist bei den beiden ungefähr gleich. Zusammenfassend kan man sagen, dass gewisse Lokaltvpen der Mandschus mit den Koreanern übereinstimmen, und dass im Ganzen die ersteren den letzteren sehr nahe stehen. Nur ist die Tendenz zu bemerken, dass die Gesichtshohe und Nasenhöhe bei den Koreanern etwas grösser ist.

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The Interdepartmental Liaison Conference on Anti-Comintern and Counterintelligence Measures (hereafter, "the Conference") was established as a working-level conference in July, 1937, on the initiative of the Police Security Bureau of the Ministry of Home Affairs. It was one of a number of committees and other such entities arising at that time, outside the process of administrative reform. Other participants in the Conference were the Ministries of the Army, Navy, Foreign Affairs, Communications, Finance, Justice, Colonial Affairs and Education, the Bureau of Resources and the Bureau for Manchurian Affairs, the Committee on Intelligence, and Military Police Headquarters. Records are extant for four meetings of the Conference ; and there may only have been four. The Conference's existence was secret. The objective of this essay is twofold : First, by examining the structure and function of the Conference, the author delineates the actual measures undertaken in the exercise of its dual mandate. Secondly, the author attempts to place within a larger political context conditions obtaining within the Ministries of the Army and Home Affairs, which played leading roles in the exchange of information, etc., within the Conference. Among the Army representatives to the Conference was Iwakuro Hideo, who had been instrumental in the preparation of the Military Secrets Act reform bill recently submitted in the Diet. In Conference deliberations as well, the Army addressed chiefly matters relating to counterintelligence, seeking comprehensive measures for the preservation of military secrets even after passage of the reform bill. Previously, in the 69th Diet, deliberations on a General Mobilization and Preservation of Secrets Act, based on a concept of national security broadly defined, had ended inconclusively. Subsequent efforts to pass a Military Secrets Act reform bill represented a retreat to a concept of national security narrowly defined in accordance with the prerogative of supreme command. One may surmise that the Military Affairs Bureau of the Army Ministry, which was in charge of counterintelligence, saw the Conference as providing some compensation for this policy retreat. From the point of view of the Home Ministry, the original proponent of the Conference, it would appear that the Conference was envisioned as a Trojan horse for the standing committee provided for under Section III of the Protocol to the Japanese-German Anti-Comintern Pact. This was denied by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, but may nevertheless be inferred from the subsequent dispatch to Rome of a Secretary of the Ministry of Home Affairs with the objective of establishing just such a committee. The committee was never in fact established. The Conference thus provides a perspective on the ineffectiveness of the Anti-Comintern Pact. A further point of interest is that among the other governmental agencies represented in the Conference, the Ministries of Communication, Justice and Education, and some others, thanks to current administrative reforms, had parallel sections perfectly suited to participation in the Conference, and participated actively. The Conference was succeeded by a Committee on Counterintelligence established in December, 1938 ; a consideration of that committee will be undertaken in a separate article.

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The Cabinet Planning Board (CPB : October 1937-November 1943) continued for the longest period and was the most extensively developed office of the so-called "Offices for the Integration of National Policy" (OINP). These offices were established to strengthen the Cabinet in the period of the post-Party Cabinets in Japan. Moreover, the CPB continued throughout one of the most important periods of the Japanese modern history, from the Sino-Japanese War to the Pacific War. Accordingly, we must examine the actual condition of the CPB in order to study the decision making process of national policy during that period. But the image that is derived from past studies about the formation process of the CPB is that it was simply "an Office for General Mobilization" (OGM) or was "weak". This image does not coincide with that of an "active" CPB in the period of the Konoe New Organization (Konoe Shin-taisei) in 1940. Therefore, the author describes the actual condition of CPB from October 1937 to the end of 1939 in this paper. The CPB was established as a result of the amalgamation of the Resources Bureau (Shigen-kyoku) as OGM and the Cabinet Planning Agency (Kikaku-cho) as OINP. The Army had taken the lead in establishing it. But it still maintained the "structual" weak point of OINP. The CPB did not have authority over the other government offices. But the weak point was overcome through the roles which the CPB was allowed to play during the Sino-Japanese war. It planned the National General Mobilization Plans (Kokkasodoin-keikaku), which were at the heart of the Material Mobilization Plans (MMP ; Butsudo-keikaku), and it spearheaded the application of the National General Mobilization Law. The CPB was the real power behind the National General Mobilization Business Committee which organized each ministry for the purpose of mobilization, and the CPB also established the Temporary Materials Coordination Bureau as a external unit of the Ministry of Commerce and Industry for the application of MMP. The CPB also held the real power of making the budget for the subdivision of MMP around the first half 1939. That is, the CPB became the center of "the System for the application of the Mobilization Law" which included the National General Mobilization Council. Moreover, the CPB was closely connected with the establishment and operation of government offices for the National General Mobilization in the broad sense of the word. These offices included the Second Committee, the Third Committee, the Science Council (Kagaku-shingikai), the East-Asian Laboratory (Toa-kenkyujo), and the Asian Developement Board (Koa-in). And the CPB came to control a group of government offices which should be called "the CPB System". In order to see how much political influence the CPB had in the "circumstantial" sense, the author concentrates on two issues : 1)the expansion of the CPB from the autumn of 1938 to the spring of 1939 ; and 2)the establishment of the Trade Ministry in the autumn of 1939. It became clear that CPB had more considerable political influence over the contemporary political scene as the proposer and promoter of "reformatory" policies. However the outcome of these two issues was not as the CPB and the Army had expected or wished. The CPB was not simply an OGM. Besides, such CPB actions were caused by some of "the Reformists" among the bureaucrats and military officers who served in CPB. "The Reformists" increasingly entered the CPB through "the CPB System".

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