Nagata Tetsuzan is known as one of the leading figures of the Imperial Army after the Manchurian incident. However, the full- scale research on him has not been done yet. This paper, therefore, as part of the research on the relations between Nagata and the Imperial Army, explores Nagata's action based on his vision and policies during the Manchurian incident. In 1929, just before the incident, Nagata gathered elite army officers and organized a group called "Isseki-kai." With the power of the group, Nagata influenced the central headquarters to cause Manchurian incident. Furthermore, he drove for the national reconstruction led by the Army. The background to his action was his own perspective on "total war."

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Дипломат и политический аналитик Сиратори Тосио (1887-1949) был заметной фигурой японской внешней и внутренней политики 1930-х и начала 1940-х годов, однако, его идеи и деятельность до настоящего времени остаются недостаточно исследованными. В настоящей статье дан анализ позиции Сиратори в отношении СССР и японскосоветских отношений в первой половине 1930-х годов, когда отношения между двумя странами, бывшие до того вполне дружественными, существенно осложнились в результате <<Маньчжурского инцидента>> и его последствий. Осенью 1931 г. Сиратори под воздействием националистических и военных кругов совершил <<поворот на 180 градусов>>, став решительным сторонником японской экспансии на континенте и <<жесткого курса>> в отношении СССР. Антисоветские взгляды Сиратори в наибольшей степени проявились в его неопубликованных письмах к коллеге-дипломату Арита Хатиро, написанных в ноябре 1935 г. Главную опасность для Японии Сиратори видел не в коммунизме и не в идее мировой революции, а том, что СССР продолжает экспансионистскую политику царской России. Однако, именно такой геополитический подход позволил ему осенью 1939 г. перейти от антисоветской позиции к идее континентального блока Японии, Германии и СССР.

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The political influence of the Japanese military rapidly expanded amid the tense domestic and international events following the Manchurian incident of 1931. For the purposes of coordinating national defense, foreign and financial policies, the Saito Cabinet in October, 1933. convoked the "Five-Minister Conference" as an inner cabinet. An additional significance of the meeting was its role in the political fortunes of Army Minister Araki Sadao and his personal clique within the Army. Following Araki's appointment as Army Minister in December, 1931, the group surrounding the Generals Araki, his close friend Masaki Jinzaburo and Hayashi Senjuro-they are to be called the protetype of the "Imperial Way Faction" -was elevated by factional patronage to a position of dominance within the Army. The institution of the Five-Minister Conference offered Araki, the group's leader, an excellent opportunity to increase his power. The Conference also had its dangers to Araki, however. When he failed to gain the Conference's approval of increased armaments to implement the Army's demands for a hard line against the Soviet Union, Araki found himself politically stymied. He had attended the Five-Minister Conference in anticipation of Foreign Minister Hirota Koki's support and hence had taken no precautions. With the refusal of Finance Minister Takahashi on financial grounds, the Army's request was effectively rejected, and the Foreign Minister also withheld his support. Araki next pinned his hopes for recovery on securing approval for his proposals of domestic reform from the Domestic Policy Conference, held in November and December. Once again, his plans could not gain a firm financial base and were defeated. Araki found himself faced with a dilemma. He believed his resignation would bring down the Saito Cabinet, but he was apparently unwilling to take this action in the fear that new minister might be from an anti-or non-Araki faction. On the other hand, if he stayed on in his present state without prospect his strong position within the Army would be badly shaken. The problem seemed conveniently solved when Araki was incapacitated by an attack of influenza in January, 1934. His successor Hayashi Senjuro, on the contrary, allied himself with Nagata Tetsuzan and Tojo Hideki. Then they formed what I call "the early Control Faction" and together they entered into competition with Araki and Masaki as the "Imperial Way Faction (in a narrow sense)" began to break up. It had been the Five-Minister Conference which had led to these developments.

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Japan's entry into World War I is often said to have been at the behest of its ally, Britain. The First World War began on 28 July and Britain entered the war on 4 August. Three days later, Britain requested Japan to remove the German fleet from Tsingtao (Qindao) in China as Britain wanted protection for its merchants ships sailing the coast of China.
However, even before that, Japan had already begun to believe that it would become involved in the war after learning on 2 August that Russia, with which Japan had concluded an entente, would be going to war with Germany. The Minister of the Navy had sent an order to the commander of the Second Fleet to prepare for deployment. The “strategic plan” for the removal of the German fleet from Tsingtao was already being hammered out by the next day. The army also had begun preparing its own battle plans. From 4 August, the entire navy had already begun concrete preparations for fighting the Germans in Tsingtao. Preparations for the Second Fleet were completed along with those for the expeditionary force on the tenth day of that month. The request from Britain came when these preparations were already underway. It is, therefore, clear that Japan's entry into the war was not simply a result of the British request.
The army, the navy, the bureaucracy of the Foreign Ministry and powerful politicians were all as eager to join the fight with Germany as the Foreign Minister. Leading politicians from the older generation and elderly statesmen (genro) were more cautious, but this proved to be more of an exception. It was the hope of the Foreign Minister and those that agreed with him that by chasing Germany out of China Japan would be able to establish hegemony over the Far East, strengthen its cooperative relationship with China, and furthermore, be able to improve its international standing by maneuvering to be one of the victor naitions after the war. Japan was given a concrete excuse for participating a war in Europe with the appearance of the British request. It is said that the Foreign Minister at that time tried to keep the genro out of the decision process. However, what was more important than anything for him was not the elimination of the genro from this process but to enter the war as quickly as possible.
Until now, opposition voiced by part of the navy has been cited as evidence of the entire navy's reluctance to joining the war. However, it is not possible to understand the events after 2 August through that kind of interpretation. Furthermore, since the navy were busying themselves with plans forestablishing a central headquarters, it is difficult to say that Japan's entry in the war was a passive event. Although there was some disagreement among the genro and part of the navy, the Japanese-German war in Tsingtao was a war that was unanimously advocated by the cabinet and that was voluntarily started with the same purposes, ambitions and plans as any other war. The war did not happen because of coincidental request from a foreign government; the Japanese government was able to make use of the British request to further its own aims. Even if the Tsingtao war had not occurred, there can be little doubt that Japan would have taken on Germany at some point given Japan's intentions.

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This essay is based on the diary kept by General Suzuki Teiichi (1888- ) from September 27,1933 until August 29,1934. At the time Lieutenant colonel Suzuki (promoted to colonel in December 1933) served as the chief of the press section of the Army until March of 1934 when he resigned to become secretary of the research department of the Army Staff College, Suzuki was close to General Araki Sadao who was the Army Minister until January of 1934. Thereafter, Suzuki became one of the important members of the Kodo-ha which was centered around General Araki. This essay uses the informatibn from Suzuki's diary to analyze four important topics involving the army during the 1933-1934 period. First, we have looked at the different army factions which became politically influential after the Manchurian Incident. In particular, we have examined the process by which the anti-Ugaki party headed by Generals Araki, Mazaki, Hayashi divided into the Kodo-ha and the Tosei-ha after General Araki's resignation in 1934. Secondly, we have examined Suzuki's relationship to those in the inner circle around Genro Saionji, in particular Harada Kumao, Kido Koichi, and Konoye Fumimaro. The third topic covered in this essay involves the relationship between the army and the cabinet. Finally, we have closely examined and analyzed the role of the chief of the Army press section. By using this diary, we have been able to examine the inner structure of the army as well as analyze some of the actions involving high army officers during this crucial 1933-1934 period.

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Nagata Tetsuzan is known as one of the leading figures of the Imperial Army after Manchurian incident. However, it can be said that the full- scale research on him has not been done yet. The author has interpreted so far Nagata's visions and policies during 1920s and Manchurian incident. This paper focuses on the period from April 1932 to August 1933 while he was chief of the intelligence divisions of the general staff to explore what Nagata was thinking particularly in 1933. Those are the times when a committee was organized among chief officials in the war ministry, which brought about contentions between two factions of army officers; the Imperial Way group (Kohdoh-ha) and the Control Faction (Tohsei-ha). And furthermore, during that time, Nagata and his group were clearly coming out with their political stance towards the movement of national reconstruction by younger military officers. This period historically has a significant meaning.

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From 1935 to 1945 reformist bureaucrats in Japan occupied virtually the center of policy making along with a group of politically and economically concerned military officers. These bureaucrats were not only able to exert influence in the complete bottom-up process of policy formation, but also, despite little formal powers, were also able to effect decision making to a far greater extent than in the era of the political party cabinets. These reformist bureaucrats belonged to a group of government officials who had received their formal university education in the 1920's in the Marxist tradition. They rose up through the ranks in the latter half of the 1930s from personal and professional relationships in the background of building a controlled economy. They philosophically refuted both Marxism and capitalism, which they viewed as degrading the human character by the strong emphasis on materialism. Focussing their views on success in Manchuria, they stressed domestic totalism (planned economy) according to political priorities (presuming of course the existence of the monarchical [Tenno] institution), and insisted on the "East Asian (toa) bloc" as the corresponding state of affairs on the foreign front. This way of thinking was based on German totalistic thought; however, we can also discern their Marxist educational background enabling them to adopt such an ideology. In terms of concrete goals, their totalism was commonly directed towards "reform" plans geared to increasing the military strength of the army. It was for this reason that these reformist bureaucrats joined hands with politically and economically concerned military officers in policy making and political action. The practical behavior of these reformist bureaucrats, being based generally on this kind of ideology, was geared towards carrying out within such integrative offices as the Cabinet Planning Board (Kikaku-in) a radical state reorganization effort (almost impossible in peacetime) as one link in the creation of a wartime system for supporting the war in China and the Pacific War. Their efforts meet with a fair amount of success. The true intentions of the whole "reformist faction", which included these bureaucrats and embraced totalism in the wake of the German victorids on the European front, came to light during the Konoe New Organization movement of 1940 and 1941. However, the "citizens organization" plan that they were most eager to put through was not realized fully due to resistance in the National Diet. In any case, these reformist bureaucrats, as a result of giving up on both Marxist and capitalist solutions, inevitably plunged Japan into the Pacific War and continued to hold this ideology even after the War was over. While we can say on the one hand that their criticism of both Marxism and capitalism was not completely irrelevant in that it can be linked in the end to Japan's postwar high economic growth, on the other hand, it was because of their hastiness in trying to reform the present situation that they brought a great many of human and material damages in the Pacific War. Furthermore, when looking at the problem in terms of comparative history and national system theory, in the sense that it was the army officers and reformist bureaucrats who exerted real political influence through their commitment to totalist ideology, but were able to realize only a part of their goals in very gradual steps, we could call this period in Japanese history "a wartime state regime tending gradually towards totalism".

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