For a long time, a majority of people have thought that the military would attempt a coup d'etat in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea due to the widespread economic deterioration in the past, and the fact that the domestic economy has seen some recent improvement makes this event more unlikely at present.
Why haven't a group of officers within the Korean People's Army attempted a coup d'etat? In this research, I provide three key reasons that explain why, even during three crisis periods involving major politico-military purges, this has not happened.
Chiefly these were: entrenched clique competition in the military; the existence of an organization that can oppose the armed forces; and a systemic and purposeful division of the military. I have confirmed through this research that the system that has divided the military still exists in the army, a system controlled effectively by a senior commissar. Therefore, this research concludes that the possibility of a coup d'etat occurring is low even in the present D. P. R. K.

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This paper studies the movement to institute the “Democratic Base” in North Korea under the Soviet Forces after World War II. It intends to show that this movement was a particular developed form of the Korean Communist Movement defined as the “Movement for National Liberation”, which tried to surmount the Cold War by establishing a sovereign state with a united government over the whole Korean peninsula.
Originally the Korean Communist Movement developed as the Movement for National Liberation in order to end Japanese colonial rule and establish an independent nation. From this movement some parties emerged to assume leadership when Korea was liberated by the forces of both the United States and the Soviet Union. This post-liberation leadership tried to surmount the special difficulties of the divided occupation and form a united government with Korean sovereignty.
But the two super powers began to establish separate regimes following theoir intentions in each occupational area with the progress of the Cold War. The American army of occupation in South Korea suppressed the left elements under the influence of the Korean Communist Party and backed the right wing nationalistic elements such as Syng-man Rhee. By contrast the Soviets gave the Koreans the right of self-administration on the surface and pretended not to prevent them from governing their inner politics, but in reality Soviet policy pursued a “divide and rule” policy from the early stages of occupation. The Soviet Army of occupation in North Korea contrived to win the nationalist elements over to its side through the so-called “united front” policy, which was also used in Eastern Europe as “People's Democracy”. Behind the “united front” the Soviet Army had the communist parties follow its instructions and promoted Kim Il-sung to take the initiative and found a Party in the northern area only. After the famous “Trusteeship Imbroglio” the Soviet Army formed a political power headed by Kim Il-sung. With the development of the Cold War, Soviet style socioeconomic reforms were carried out by Kim Il-sung from 1946 only in the north. These policies by the two super powers finally gave birth to the crisis of a civil war between their client states.
In this difficult environment the most urgent problem for the Koreans was to escape such a war and form a united independent government over all of Korea. The assertion of the “Democratic Base” as a resolution of this problem was raised first by Kim Tu-bong, the president of the “Korean New Democratic Party” founded in February 1946, not Kim Il-sung, who has been thought to be its first advocate. Kim Tu-bong formally proposed the idea at the inaugural assembly of the “North Korean Worker's Party” in August 1946.
Kim Tu-bong was a prominent intellectual leader of the anti-Japanese independent movement by the “Korean Voluntary Army” centering around Yenan with close connections to the Chinese Communist Party. His idea and plan for establishing the “Democratic Base” was an application of his experiences in Yenan to North Korea, that is, to institute first the same style “Democratic Base” in the northern area similar to the one founded by Mao Tse-tung in Yenan and then, as a second step, extend it from there to the south through the “National United Front” policy. Adapting this policy to the situation under the Soviet forces he tried to establish a united government over both areas under Korean sovereignty, a priority in the Korean Communist Movement from its inception in the anti-Japanese independent conflict.
Today, in the “post-Cold War” world with “the Grand Failure” of Communism, it is critical to consider the role that the “Democratic Base” played in the Movement for National Liberation in the history of the

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In this paper, I reflect on the correlation between the formation of Korean Worker's Party (KWP) and KIM Il-sung's maneuver to wage the Korean War. For a long time, it was believed that KWP was formed through the merging of South Korean Worker's Party (SKWP) and North Korean Worker's Party (NKWP) from June to July in 1949 with KIM Il-sung as the chairman of the Central Committee. However, new materials prove that the formation of KWP just meant the integration of the Central Committee of both KWPs and had a close connection with the tactical defferences between PAK Honyong, the top leader of SKWP, and KIM Il-sung who had been pointed out the leader of Korean Communist Movement by Stalin in 1946.
PAK pursued the overturn of Rhee Syng-man's regime by guerrilla conflict of SKWP in South Korea and tried to avoid the civil war between South and North regimes by appealing for a ‘peaceful unification plan’ which the Democratic Front for the Unification of the Fatherland (DFUF) proposed. DFUF was established under PAK's initiative in June 1949. In this tactics it seems that SKWP and NKWP formed a ‘Joint Central Committee’ to manage activities of DFUF between June 28 and July 7 in 1949, when KIM Il-sung failed to take up the chairmanship of the Central Committee since the appeal of DFUF was not only one to withstand invasion of South Korea but also to contain KIM Il-sung's tactics. His tactics had dual purposes to achieve Korean unification and to seize the actual initiative of Korean Communist Movement with KIM's head position of KWP through advancing Korean People's Army into South Korea.
KIM opened up his tactics in a conversation with T. Shtykov, Soviet Ambassadar to North Korea, in August 1949 after his agreement to the ‘peaceful unification plan’ of DFUF. Although in September 1949 the Central Committee of Soviet Communist Party rejected this military option and ordered KIM and PAK to develop the latter's tactics with alerting KWP to the intervention of U. S. forces into the civil war, KIM Il-sung made a use of an opportunity of the favorable turn of Sino-Soviet relation. Finally, KIM gained his end in January 1950 that Stalin allowed him to prepare to open the war on condition that Mao Tse-zung should agree with KIM's tactics. Before the agreement of Stalin and Mao to open the civil war in Korean Peninsula, PAK had no other choice but to cooperate with KIM's tactics. Therefore the Korean War broke out in June 1950 and KIM began a purging of KWP after failing to accomplish his purposes through the war.

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The Communist Bloc as an international political phenomenon collapsed when the Soviet Union vanished in December 1991. It may be clear that the idea of socialism did not work effectively in the world of real politics. But there are many people in Japan who hesitate to state that the spirit of capitalism or capitalism modernization had gained the final victory in human life because human beings have been suffering from public hazards and environmental pollution which are considered as the result of the rapid development of capitalism moderniization. Additionally, the query on the meaning of the “state” or “nation” has been still at issue.
As it is well-known, Karl Marx proposed the idea of socialism in opposition to captalism and the “state”. From the sense of political science, Marx might be an utopian as most of originators of new thought had been. Marx regarded “society” as an ideal existence, realizing the spirit of the common law. Then, Lenin, temporarily, connected this idea of “society” with “the advanced guard of the proletarian class”, though he did not clarify “one party rule”. After that, Stalin replaced the advanced guard of the proletarian class with the sole leading party of the state. Thus the notorious nationalization of the party commenced. This phenomenon should be contraty to the idea of Marx, though he might have some responsibility with this transformation or change.
The most important thing to consider today should be to clarify the process and political phenomena in communist countries whereby Stalin could succeed in nationalizing the party. It may be possible to explain this with the rule of movement in political power, or as the immaturity of politics in Russia. Here, however, I would like to explain this considering the pressure of international politics. It might be irrational if a social scientist were to neglect the important influence of international circumstances on these developments. In the period of Lenin there was the menace of Imperialism surrounding the new-born state, and in the period of Stalin there was the fear from Fascist countries, though Stalin's response to them might be regarded as more than a little morbid. Also it may be unfair to blame the barracks communism of Mao Tse-tung without discussing the pressure from Japan and, later, the United States of America. Of course, we had better not attribute every cause to international circumstances. Perhaps external influence suould appear connected with some internal elements. So we must analyze the complicated relations of external and internal mutual influence. Still in the period of 20 Century the external elements have become greater and greater. From that point of view, I will compare the common phases of nationalization of the parties in Russian and East European countries and those in Asian countries, though their internal conditions are quite different.

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The catalyst for improvement in recent North Korea (NK)-Soviet relations was the Soviet's acknowledgement of the Kim Jong Il successor regime, and its de facto recognition of NK's independence after Brezhnev's death. NK's assessment of “perestroika” has strong diplomatic implications, which reflects the closer relationship between the two countries. Perestroika is highly appraised on parts in accord with “juche (self-reliance)” ideology and course stressed by Kim Il Sung and Kim Jong Il. However, the NK leaders have clearly shown that, they will independently choose the reforms to be introduced. In this aspect, NK's reforms may be called selective reforms or openness based on “self-reliance.”
Namely, political structural reform or, “glasnost, ” a major part of “perestroika” is not in consistence with their own base for legitimacy. Therefore, it is necessary for them to prevent the influences of those reforms from penetrating the domestic arena. From the lessons of the past, the leaders feel a need to prevent the development of a domestic political power based on Soviet theories which would challenge the Kim Il Sung-Kim Jong Il regime. It becomes more imperative, especially, at the present moment when the effectiveness of the Kim Jong Il successor regime is being tested.
Therefore, as a preventive against the impact of “perestroika” a new ideology called “social-political organism” theory has been created as a legitimation for the successive regime. In this theory, it is said that the supreme leader, the party, and the poeple comprise one social organic body, and the supreme leader guarantees eternal “social-political organism” to its members. A socialist society have been redefined not only as collective possession of manufacturing means, but also as a society in which a “social-political organism” is created. Furthermore, this is a strong expression of NK nationalism, with the purpose of the recovering the superiority of socialism vis-a-vis capitalism.
Accordingly, in ideological terms, it could be said that the Soviet “perestroika”, political structural reform in particular, is being criticized as revisionism. However, it must be stressed that this ideology, at the present, is only domestically-oriented, and does not comprise a direct criticism toward the Soviet Union. As long as autonomy is respected between NK and the Soviet Union, a sense of incompatibility in each other's course or regime would not develop into open criticism as in the past. But the very fact that these mutual differences exist, sets the limits on NK-Soviet relations.

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