This paper presents the results of some research on the network of interlocking directorships in Hong Kong. A director who sits on two or more boards is termed a ‘multiple director’. ‘Interlocking directorships’ are the relations between enterprises that are created when one person is a member of two or more company boards. These two concepts are the building blocks of the edifice constructed in this paper. In Hong Kong, there have been few studies of interlocking directorships, and there has been almost no attempt to map out the structure of the network in a systematic way. This paper is an attempt to use interlocking directorships in a systematic way to explore how business groups rule Hong Kong’s commerce.
This paper is based upon companies listed on the Hang Seng Index. The Hang Seng Index acts as a barometer for the Hong Kong stock market. The Hang Seng Index comprises 33 constituent stocks, which are representative of the market. Section 1 presents this theoretical framework and introduces some of the key network concepts. Section 2 examines the concentrations of capital and interlocking directorships. Subsequent sections investigate three main typologies of interlocking directorships, treating capital relations in order to map the structure of interlocking directorships in Hong Kong.
This paper attempts to discriminate between different types of interlocking directorships. There are three main typologies of interlocking directorships. The measure of ‘strength’ ­assumes that interlocking directorships involving executives are more ‘intimate’ and therefore stronger than those which do not. A typology of interlocking directorships is based on the ­intensity of the interlocking directorship between any two companies. The most intense interlocking directorship is the tight interlocking directorship, which exists when a person holds an executive directorship in both company A and company B. A primary interlocking directorship occurs when an inside, executive director of an enterprise holds an outside, non-executive directorship in another. A secondary interlocking directorship is the least intense type of ­interlocking directorship, and results when a person holds an outside position on two boards.
Using company annual reports, this paper confirms that the positive relations between capital relations and interlocking directorships are connected by executives. The empirical analysis shows that interlocking directorship correlates closely with capital relations between enterprises. Large capital-intensive enterprises were formed by domestic capital and comprised the tight interlocking directorships inside Hong Kong. Tight interlocking directorships are created to reinforce capital relations between enterprises, which are the biggest shareholders of one ­another. Tight interlocking directorships normally occur within enterprises and are typically found between a parent company and its operating subsidiaries. The network of primary interlocking directorships and secondary interlocking directorships enlarged itself to the point where it encompassed most of the large enterprises. Primary interlocking directorships supplement non-capital relations. Primary interlocking directorships may be created for the purpose of access to valued resources of material, money and information in order to maximize one enterprise’s own advantage. Secondary interlocking directorships are generally summed up as bringing in an outside view. Current intelligence can be garnered by sitting on the board of another enterprise and by having outside directors on one’s own board. Information may flow through secondary interlocking directorships.
The structure of interlocking directorships has been changing in Hong Kong. Interlocking directorships were created larger than capital relations. Business groups expanded interlocking directorships to access valued resources of material, money and

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An unstable world economic situation continues in the aftermath of the Lehman Shock, and major European and American banks are exposed to severe financial conditions. However, in China, which is maintaining rapid economic growth, the activities of domestic banks, particularly the four state-owned banks (SOBs), are noteworthy. In terms of scale, each SOB is a giant in China’s banking industry. Overthrowing state bank market control and accepting the entry of private capital were the most critical elements of the economic reform that started in the beginning of the 1980s, which sought to promote bank competition. However, the Chinese government, which forced the SOBs to become joint-stock companies, may also change existing policies to protect domestic banks since its joining of the World Trade Organization (WTO). This national protection may be the reason behind SOB growth. Because of such protective policies, foreign banks entering China might have been unable to compete within the banking industry. To verify this, we need to measure the degree of market competition within the Chinese banking industry. This study attempts to do that by using two techniques, the“ non-structural approach” and the “structural approach”, both of which have been widely used in earlier research. From the results, it is hard to say that the degree of competition improved since the joint-stock reform of the SOBs in the period 2003 to 2010, and it is clear that banks in China operate under a monopolistic or oligopolistic system of competition.

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商業銀行は投資銀行に比べ、業務の現地への密着度が高く、外国人主体の経営は困難とされてきた。中でも、一般に個人及び中小の法人向けの取引を対象とするリテール業務は、世界展開が特に難しいとされる。多国籍リテール銀行業務の理論化では、競争優位の源泉は自国で培われた経営管理能力やマーケティング力、さらに、低い限界コストでこれらを海外に移転・活用できる能力にあるとされた。また、サービスを特定の顧客層に適応させる調整力や支店の立地選択、広告宣伝に関わる知識・スキルが重要な要素であることも指摘されている。しかし、こうしたこれまでの研究はプロダクト・ライフ・サイクル理論を視座としており、金融先進国として優位性をもつ米国の金融機関の活動が主な対象であった。自国の先進市場で開発・提供した金融商品・サービスの他国への移転は検討されているが、優位性をもたない国や地域からの知識の吸収は考慮されない。さらに、自国で培われた能力の海外への移転がどのように行われ、活用されるかについての分析もなされていない。本稿ではリテール展開において、市場の規模が小さく、政治経済的に不安定な香港に本拠をおきながら、多国籍展開に成功したHSBCを事例研究の対象とする。多国籍化のプロセスを、国際的に移動するマネジャーの存在に注目しながら明らかにすることを目的としている。研究にあたり、多国籍企業組織論の枠組みの中で研究されたグローバル・マトリックス組織や、トランスナショナル組織におけるカントリー・マネジャーと比較分析する。トランスナショナル組織には、世界規模の効率、各国のニーズへの柔軟な対応、世界規模の学習という相矛盾する要件を同時に満たすことが必要とされる。この中で、カントリー・マネジャーは、各国政府からの様々な要求に応えながら、世界の競合企業に対して市場の地位を防衛し、顧客ニーズに対応することを求められてきた。こうしたカントリー・マネジャーに対し、本稿ではHSBCのインターナショナル・マネジャーの役割、選考・育成プロセス、キャリアパスを検討し、メタナショナル経営研究の中で議論されるナレッジのキャリアー、ナレッジを集める役割を果たすマグネットの具体例として示す。これは、今後発展が期待される、日本企業によるサービス分野での多国籍展開の成功要件についても示唆となると考える。

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このエッセイも3 回目になるが，諸般の事情で前回（2013 年6 月号）から1 年も間が空いてしまった。まずは筆者の怠慢を関係者にお詫び申し上げたい。今回は「香港で困ったこと」と題して，（1）ビザ（2）住居（3）銀行の3 点について書きたい。なお筆者はすでに2013 年秋に帰国しており，このエッセイは日本で当時のことを思い起こしながら書いている。

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