What do we consider as the Soviet/Russian foreign policy toward East Asia? Many historians tend to discuss its nature using an “expansionist” model in general, particularly in Europe. This may differ in terms of discourse: some have emphasized the security factor against neighbors, while others have focused on ideology as “socialist” in the Cold War era and “Eurasia” in the present day. However, the recent development of Soviet/Russian studies accents more on the “pragmatic” and “state-interested” based causes for policy orientation.

As background, this paper sheds a light on comparative studies of Soviet/Russian foreign behavior toward China and Japan. In contrast with the European/Atlantic front, Soviet/Russian behaviors have been more “moderate” and “restraint” toward East Asia/Pacific before/after the Cold War period. Indeed, it depends on the difference of Soviet/Russian power influence between Europe and East Asia. How have the Soviet Union/Russia dealt with China and Japan in East Asia/Pacific? For the Soviet Union/Russia, China and Japan have been big powers to manage for security as an “enemy” or as a “friend” in triangular relations dependent on historical factors.

This paper focuses on the foreign activities of Khrushchev era to Putin via Gorbachev. It is well known that Khrushchev’s foreign policy of “peaceful coexistence,” which tried to use “space” between “friend and enemy,” triggered a more pragmatic and flexible orientation than the predecessor’s dichotomy. At the time, with the Soviet Union facing territorial/border disputes with China, a communist ally, and with Japan, a potential enemy under US control, Khrushchev decided to deal with each in a different way: For Japan, a promise in the 1956 joint declaration for the handing over of two islands, Shikotan and Habomai, but for China, the ignoring of its demand for re-bordering the Amur and Ussuri rivers after the negotiations of the mid-1960s. As a result, war with China started while a deal with Japan was frozen mostly because of US pressure on Japan.

The failure of Khrushchev’s foreign policy impacted his successor’s decision. The lessons brought about Gorbachev’s success on the border agreement with China in 1989 and Putin’s follow-up on finalizing the remaining border issues in 2004. It also framed Russia’s policy toward Japan. Gorbachev never recognized Khrushchev’s failed proposal of the 1956 declaration and Putin, recognizing the validity of the declaration, has strictly demanded that Japan depart from US influence as a condition of Khrushchev’s deal. As a result, Russia has enjoyed its best relationship with Japan while using the “territorial card” as a theoretical concession of the 1956 declaration to keep Japan from going against Russia.

This paper draws conclusions from the transformation of the Soviet and Russian foreign policy toward China and Japan. It also suggests lessons gleaned from Russo-Japan relations for academics and foreign policy circles in Japan and Asia.

This essay sheds light on Soviet and Russian Foreign Policy through use of the “critical geopolitical” concept of the “geo-code.” A state’s “geo-code” refers to the construction of narratives regarding its own space and history over time. Borrowing from Klaus Dodd’s ideal-type categories, which he uses to explain geo-coded narratives of British policy (“little England,” “cosmopolitan,” “European” and “American”), this paper proposes to utilize combinations of four ideal-type categories, “Atlantic/European,” “ethnic Russian,” “Eurasian” and “super power,” in order to analyze and explain Soviet and Russian foreign policy.

The first section applies the metaphor of a photograph to the memoirs of several foreign policy leaders: Andrei Gromyko and Eduard Shevardnadze in the Soviet-era; and Andrei Kozyrev, Evgenii Primakov and Serghei Ivanov in contemporary Russia. The paper shows how the composite image of Russia held by these individuals shaped the state’s foreign policy. It also stresses that different concepts of sovereignty have been sustained or reconstructed within Soviet/Russian international law theories in dialogue with changes in images held by the foreign policy leader.

The latter half of the paper further develops this theory in order to apply it to Putin’s current Russian foreign policy perception of Northeast Asia, and particularly of China and Japan. From the late Soviet period under Gorbachev to the early Russian period of Yeltsin, Japan was considered as one of the “rising” powers able to aid Russia’s political and economic transition, and it was widely recognized that the relationship would be facilitated by a peace treaty resolving the territorial issue between the two countries. However, following reconciliation between Russia and China, China became the more important partner for Russia, not only in Northeast Asia but also throughout Eurasia.

Following its disengagement with the West after the Ukraine crisis in 2014, Russia’s image of itself as close to “Europe” slipped, while that of the state as “ethnic Russian” and “Eurasian” that must become a “great power” to oppose the US was emphasized. This has meant that Japan is no longer an essential partner from the viewpoint of Russia’s dominant foreign policy images. In turn, the significance of China has increased and developed for Russia beyond the two countries historical “love-hate” relationship. Not only policy makers but also ordinary people look to China as Russia’s “No.1” partner, while the United States is its indefatigable “enemy.” There is no room for Japan in this picture while Japan remains so dependent on the US for security matters.

In the conclusion, the paper debunks the myths associated with “classical geopolitics,” which associate foreign policy solely with perceptions of state power and geography. It shows that a “geo-politics” which links the positivist and constructive approaches, and which seeks to account for various analytical scales—from micro to macro, below/beyond the state—can analyze foreign policy change more effectively.