It is not easy to provide a comparative assessment of the situation of the U.S. economy at the turn of the 21^<st> century. On the one hand, the domination of the United States on the world economy and its political and military preeminence appear even stronger in the early 2000s than in the late 1970s. On the other hand, the sudden contraction of the growth rates at the end of 2000, the ensuing recession, and the collapse of the stock market suggest a new, less favorable, course than during the second half of the 1990s. Even more importantly, the growing disequilibria of the U.S. economy-notably the external debt, and the debt of households and of the state-raise doubts concerning the capability of this country to maintain its unrivalled leadership. The problems lie in the "internal" trajectory asserted in the country, and their consequences on external disequilibria, in particular the constant decline of domestic savings-the expression of a growing propensity to consume. This movement was a consequence of the increased income and wealth of the richest fraction of households, a fundamental characteristic of neoliberalism. It reached such degrees that the capability to spend of the country became thoroughly dependent on the import of goods, and opened new opportunities to the financial investment of foreigners. This foreign capital must also be remunerated, drawing important income flows out of the country. The central element in this new course to be found is obviously the reduction of the expenses of rich households, the redirection of demand toward domestic markets, and larger accumulation rates financed domestically. Keeping profits within corporations would be a straightforward manner of cutting the income of rich households and financing investment. It means lower interest rates and lesser dividend payout. Thus, it contradicts the fundamental neoliberal objective of restoring capitalism in its pre-World War II patterns. A falling dollar is a tool toward the correction of external trade balances, but it contradicts U.S. financial domination. In the movement toward such a trajectory, the macroeconomy will remain a constant constraint. The stimulation of the spendings of households is a central element of the preservation of the economic activity-the avoidance of recessions or more dramatic crises. The outcome will be determined by the interplay of political forces, domestically and internationally. Domestically, the "neoliberal compromise" with upper middle classes which benefited from capital income flows, notably through their pension funds, could be broken, most likely adding to the pressure on popular classes. In this case, the pursuit of the historical endeavour of ruling classes in neoliberalism could only be perpetuated by way of a growing distance taken from traditional "democratic" rules-unless a radical change away from neoliberalism can be implemented, and this is what "struggle" means. Internationally, a similar confrontation is under way, in which one can identify growing popular and government initiatives toward resistance, though still quite moderately. A major foreseeable component will be the attempt to increase the pressure on the rest of the world.
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