In South Korea, the Act on the Establishment and Operation of Teachers' Union (Educational Workers Labor Union Act) was enacted to partially recognize teachers' rights to work and to legalize the Korean Teachers and Educational Workers' Union (KTU).

This paper aims to reveal the reason why the Educational Workers Labor Union Act was enacted as a“special law”of the Labor Union Act, not of the Civil Servants' Law or education-related law. I analyzed the process of enacting the Act, focusing on the internal discussions of KTU and the changes in the view of the teaching profession by the Ministry of Education and the Korean Federation of Teachers' Association (KFTA). The main results of this paper are as follows.

First, the KTU and the KFTA have influenced each other. When the KTU was being formed as an outsider union, the KFTA tried to break away from its image as a “government service association” by reorganizing its internal organization, pushing for collective bargaining with educational administration. The KTU was influenced by KFTA's legislation on the advancement of teachers, and had tried to create a politically favorable situation for legalization.

Secondly, there were not only changes in discussions within the KTU, but also changes in the view of the teaching profession held by the Ministry of Education and the KFTA. The Ministry of Education expressed opposition to the establishment of teachers' unions, emphasizing teachers' law-abiding spirit, but began to recognize a part of teachers' right to work in the late 1990s to meet international standards. The KFTA insisted on obtaining the rights to collective bargaining, while claiming that it is a professional teachers' association.

Third, as mentioned above, the KTU and the KFTA had a similar view of teachers' rights to work, while there was a difference in their perception of rights to collective bargaining. The KTU interpreted the right to bargain collectively as guaranteeing teachers' independent union rights without legal restrictions. They recognized that as long as the education law restricts them, it is not a negotiation held in the equal relationship with the educational administration. This is the reason why the KTU rejected the special law that applies only to teachers and based its establishment on the Labor Union Act.

The KTU regarded teachers in collective bargaining as equivalent to educational administration staff. That differs from the perspective of the KFTA, which emphasizes the duty of political neutrality of teachers as just“government employees”. The“dualization”of collective bargaining, which has been criticized in previous studies, is due to the difference in views of both institutions regarding the teaching profession.

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  This study explores to examine the organizational changes in Korea public bureaucracy since the Chun Doo Hwan administration. Why do some public organizations grow old and others die young? Is there any particular pattern in reorganizations of government organizations? How the turnover of political power in the presidential election has affected the government reorganizations?
  The decisive factor of government reorganizations is the political power shifting that involved in a wide range of organizational reform. Public organizations are at the greatest risk when the political turnover occurs, and the ruling party and the opposition party conflict with each other after the political turnover with accompanying large-scale reorganizations. And, agencies are more stable than cabinet-level departments.

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This article analyses long-term transformation of government-chaebol relationships in South Korea. Since Park Chung-Hee in the 1960s, all presidents Chun Doo-Hwan, Roh Tae-Woo, and Kim Young-Sam repeated cyclical transformation patterns of government-business relationships. Every president immediately after inauguration reinforced the legitimacy by initiating chaebol regulatory policies, which were along with anti-chaebol sentiments of people and economic necessities. Meanwhile, labour policies were liberalized. However, liberalized labour became extremely radical; it affected economic performance negatively. Moreover, as long as the Korean economy is largely based on chaebol, these chaebol reform measures required a certain pain of chaebol and ultimately led to worsening performance of the national economy at least for short-term. Since good economic performance, as well as strict chaebol reform, is one of the important sources of regime legitimacy, deteriorating economic performance negatively affected regime legitimacy and president popularity. Hence, while all regimes initiated chaebol regulations due to legitimacy, they also ironically returned to the conventional priority to economic growth due to legitimacy, too. Although the Kim Dae-Jung administration certainly succeeded in reforming chaebol after regime changes, these cyclical patterns were also emerging.

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This paper examines South Korea’s change of foreign policy toward Japan due to its changes of government since democratic transition in 1987 by taking into account the three points of view: First, I focus on the policy makers’ ideal inclination, conservative or progressive, as well as on power relations among ruling party, opposition party and public opinion; Second, South Korea’s policy toward Japan have to be analyzed in connection with ones toward North Korea and US; Third, I take the 1965 regime, under which diplomatic relations between South Korea and Japan was established with containing not merely communism but also post-colonial issues, as an indicator to classify continuity and change of the policy.
The two conservative governments after the 1987 transition, Roh Tae-Woo and KIM Young-Sam administration, showed continuity of foreign policy toward Japan as seen from the perspective of the 1965 regime. The two administrations cooperated with Japan when Japan kept adopting hard-liner policy toward North Korea. The two also continued containing post-colonial issues although South Korea instead confronted Japan when Japan tried soft-liner policy toward North Korea.
The change of power on election in 1997, unprecedented in the South Korean political history, brought about a significant change. Kim Dae-Jung’s “National Government” developed reconciliation and cooperation with North Korea and simultaneously maintained cooperation with Japan. Roh Moo-Hyun’s “Participatory Government” forged ahead with such a change. It pursued peace and prosperity with North Korea despite confronting US because a fear of entrapment was mounted among South Korean public opinion. Roh, moreover, promoted policy toward Japan to overcome the colonial past, which have had been contained under the 1965 regime.
Lee Myung-Bak’s “Practical Government”, inaugurated in return of power to conservatives after 10 years’ progressives. Lee administration adopted again hard-liner policy toward North Korea and reintensified the alliance with US while adhered to the 1965 regime with Japan. Lee, however, confused coherence of policy and strategy toward Japan by sudden landing on Takeshima/Dokdo in just before his term expired. The present Park Geun-Hye administration, irrespective of her conservative ideal inclination, couldn’t but tackle with the post-colonial issues from the beginning of the term, as well as is trying a kind of soft-liner policy toward North Korea.

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In today’s Korea, articles on misogyny and misandry are often found in the media. Also, many Koreans consider misogyny and misandry to be a serious problem. In this paper, I will focus on Korean masculinities in order to clarify the cause of misogyny.

Section 1 reviews Korean masculinity studies. Through the review, it becomes clear that Korean masculinity has been analyzed using the concepts of “militarism” and “militarization.”

Section 2 will clarify the change of Korean masculinities from their relation with militarization. Firstly, there have been points in common between the military regime’s masculinities and the prodemocracy masculinities. Secondly, the masculinities called for by the military regime and the IMF Era were similar. Thirdly, since the 2000s, the difference between men and women has been maintained by a way of thinking that men who serve military service are victims of society.

Section 3 examines the reasons why men are hostile to women using the framework of Messner and Ito. Firstly, a general sense of deprivation felt by today’s young men makes it difficult for them to feel superior to women. Secondly, because of the socialization of male-dominated values in the militarized society, young men’s anger is directed at women.

In other words, the reason for the spread of misogyny is recent women’s social advancement despite the fact that a debasing attitude toward women still exists in society. In order to break out of the negative cycle of misogyny and misandry, people should realize the following: Firstly, Korean society is a militarized one. Secondly, there is a possibility that people are being socialized by militarization. And lastly, there are differences and inequalities between men.

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