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  • 小針 進
    アジア研究
    2015年 61 巻 1 号 81-85
    発行日: 2015/05/24
    公開日: 2015/06/04
    ジャーナル フリー
  • ―“臨床政治'’的考察―
    岡野 加穂留
    組織科学
    1981年 15 巻 1 号 2-10
    発行日: 1981/03/30
    公開日: 2024/09/10
    ジャーナル フリー

     政治組織の活動体として,自由民主党の分析に焦点をおく.西欧先進諸国の政党組織との比較考察を念頭におきながら,党の組織化の度合いを知るための党員率の比較,カルテル型政党としての自民党の構造内における政策立案・決定のプロセスと,それにかかわる財界との構造的結びつきを観察する.政党以上に政治的活動をする田中角栄派の政策立案過程における政治機能のスケッチについてもふれておく.

  • ―「国会会議録」による反対論・慎重論・不可避論の分析(1994~2003)―
    鄭 榮蘭
    国際情報研究
    2013年 10 巻 1 号 13-24
    発行日: 2013/12/13
    公開日: 2013/12/13
    ジャーナル フリー
    This essay tries to examine those discussions on the propriety of adopting an open-door policy towards Japanese culture which were carried out in the South Korean Diet during the years 1994-2003.On October 8, 1998, a joint statement concerning “a new Japan-Korea [Korea-Japan] partnership towards the 21st century” was made by Kim Daejung and Keizo Obuchi (who were President of ROK and Prime Minister of Japan respectively). This was where the process of deregulating the introduction of Japanese culture into Korean cultural soil came to a decisive turning point. The open-door policy towards Japanese culture actually got started. It is to be noted that up to that year there had been vehement and serious discussions and arguments about the issue, and that after the joint announcement of 1998 discussions and arguments went on. During the period 1994-200, some argued against deregulating; others accepted the process of opening the door because of the inevitability of the cultural trends; still others stressed the need of suspending the judgment as it was too soon to determine the merit/demerit of the policy. In this essay the author considers these arguments and discussions in terms of the political and historical context of the period.In what political and historical conditions did those discussions and arguments occur? What changes did political and historical situations go through with the going on of the debates and controversies? This is what the author is going to investigate into.
  • 「世界の記憶」登録推進事業を巡る対立と協働
    山口 祐香
    グローバル・ガバナンス
    2019年 2019 巻 5 号 113-129
    発行日: 2019年
    公開日: 2022/05/16
    ジャーナル オープンアクセス
  • 髙村 竜平
    村落社会研究
    2004年 10 巻 2 号 19-30
    発行日: 2004年
    公開日: 2013/09/18
    ジャーナル フリー
       This paper aims at examining the historical background and the social implications of “public cemeteries” in Korea. The colonial government of Japan introduced such cemeteries to Korean society in 1912, and the post-independence Korean government also has been promoting the similar policy, especially since the 1970s. The purpose of those policies was to control the location and size of cemeteries for land use planning.
       In Jeju province, the biggest island of Korea, graves traditionally located by Pungsu (Feng-sui), and it did not mattar whether the burying place was on burier’s own land or not. However, from the 1980s, local residents started to use maul cemeteries built in the 1970s. This change was due to the shortage of space for burial land, because the expansion of citrus cultivation as well as the introduction of tourism changed the agricultural land use system and increased the price of land.
       In the death study, scholars have proposed a hypothesis that the modernization of any societies is accompanied by the concealment of death. This hypothesis could apply to the development process of public cemeteries in Jeju province. However, this process occurred not only by the government policies implying the concealment of death but also by the changed conditions on land use, which force residents to use cemeteries separated from their settlement.
  • ポスト冷戦外交の「予行演習」
    若月 秀和
    国際政治
    2000年 2000 巻 125 号 197-217,L23
    発行日: 2000/10/13
    公開日: 2010/09/01
    ジャーナル フリー
    The purpose of this essay is, firstly, to analyze how the Japanese government coped with the international situation before the Fukuda Doctrine was announced and how the government aimed at a continuation of détente and secondly, to evaluate the essence and significance of the doctrine, with a greater focus on Mr. Fukuda's diplomatic idea, namely omnidirectional-peace diplomacy. The doctrine was announced during his visit to Southeast Asia in August 1977. The basic principles are (1) to reject the role of a major military power, (2) to establish reliable relationships with Southeast Asian countries, and (3) to contribute to the building of peace and prosperity throughout Southeast Asia by cooperating with ASEAN and its member countries in their own efforts to strengthen their solidarity and resilience, while aiming at fostering a relationship based on mutual understanding with the nations of Indochina.
    The essay consists of five sections. In the first section, I review the international circumstances surrounding the Fukuda Doctrine, where so-called “détente” and unstable international relations were mixed. In the second section, I review the omni-directional-peace diplomacy which Mr. Fukuda advocated. Based on the US-Japan relationship, this policy was intended for friendly relationships with all countries, refusing to be a major military power. And this idea was a major influential factor in making the basic nature of the doctrine. Japan's intention to overcome the structure of the cold war was also another influential factor for the doctrine. In the third and fourth sections, I explain concretely how relationships with ASEAN and the countries of Indochina were established before the Fukuda Doctrine was announced. Mr. Fukuda's insight and leadership, together with the accumulation of steady contacts with those countries by officials of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, enabled the announcement of such diplomatic policies for Southeast Asia. In the fifth section, I review the essence and significance of the Fukuda Doctrine. The doctrine stabilized international relations directly after the Vietnam War. It consolidated the foundation of Japan's diplomacy for Southeast Asia and strengthened the feeling of togetherness among free nations. Though Japan could not prevent the diffusion of Soviet-China enmity to Indochina and the new cold war in 1980s, the doctrine left a legacy for Japan's diplomacy and international society after the cold war
  • 李 秉哲
    アジア研究
    2022年 68 巻 3 号 1-19
    発行日: 2022/07/31
    公開日: 2022/08/10
    [早期公開] 公開日: 2022/06/20
    ジャーナル フリー

    This article aims to add a new perspective on how the Japanese government conducted Japan-South Korea negotiations on security-economic cooperation during the early 1980s.

    The Zenko Suzuki administration judged that Japan could not meet the U.S. government’s expectations of strengthening its own defense capabilities. For this reason, the administration expressed willingness to cooperate with the U.S. for the economic and social development of strategically important countries. This was intended to work as a means to achieve the ‘comprehensive security’ policy adopted by the Masayoshi Ohira administration and burden-sharing in the U.S.-Japan Alliance. In other words, Japan had an economic cooperation policy that aimed to support developing countries, while recognizing the political impact of foreign aid. Japan had this policy in place before South Korea’s request in 1981 for 10 billion dollars in economic assistance.

    The Suzuki administration had already acknowledged the need to support South Korea to ensure Japan’s cooperative relationship with the U.S. Nevertheless, there was a marked contrast in position between Japan and South Korea during the early stages of the negotiations on the official purpose and contents of economic cooperation. Steady negotiation efforts were necessary to create a situation where the Japanese Prime Minister could make bold political judgments and take action on this issue.

    The Japanese government later decided to negotiate with South Korea based upon its main principles of economic cooperation, such as ‘improving people’s livelihood’ and ‘maintaining a balance among beneficiary countries’, while recognizing the political nature of such cooperation and its indirect contribution to Korea’s security. In other words, the Japanese government intended to maintain its own initiative on economic cooperation while responding flexibly to South Korea’s request for aid.

    During the negotiations, the Japanese side had explicitly stated that it could not agree with Korea’s view that Japan should promote economic cooperation with Korea in order to ease Korea’s military burden. However, Japan did express some understanding of South Korea’s situation and Korea accepted Japan’s assertion that it would contribute to Korea’s economic and social stability. Negotiations then made progress and the two sides agreed on the official purpose for economic cooperation and the amount of assistance from Japan to Korea. Under these circumstances, Prime Minister Suzuki played an important role in deciding the proportion of Japan’s ODA to the total amount of assistance to South Korea. He also explained Japan’s position during the summit talks and dispatched his special envoys to Korea. Consequently, the differences in stance between the two countries on the content of the assistance was narrowed to a considerable extent before the inauguration of the Yasuhiro Nakasone administration.

    However, negotiations between Japan and South Korea were suspended during the Japanese history textbook controversy that surfaced at the end of June 1982. When the textbook issue was settled, Suzuki announced that he would not run in the Liberal Democratic Party leadership election. Therefore, the Nakasone administration assumed responsibility for resolving the remaining issues.

    There is thus room for further consideration of whether the Suzuki administration’s pacifist stance should be regarded as the reason behind the failure of negotiations with South Korea. It is important to bear in mind the necessity of examining various aspects of Japan’s domestic and international situations. Furthermore, Japan-South Korea negotiations on security-economic cooperation revealed a high degree of policy continuity among the Ohira, Suzuki and Nakasone administrations.

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