This article examines changes in trading between Choson Korea and Qing Manchuria, from 1637 to 1644, focusing on Choson's situation and reaction to the changes. Choson, who was defeated by Qing during the Bingzi War in 1637, was ordered to send regular tributes to Qing, and princes to Shenyang. Choson began to send tributary goods and an annual gift, suibi, to Qing. Suibi was intended to compensate for Qing's weak economy. Choson also began an open market at the Qing border, Hoeryong, in 1638. After 1637, irregular trading between Choson and Qing increased. This increase forced the Choson government to collect goods from all over the country to meet the demands. However, Choson could also buy commodities from Qing for agricultural reproduction, such as cows and cotton seeds. Choson prohibited officials from carrying tobacco and qingbu, Chinese blue cotton cloth, to Qing, and restricted the number of horses that could be taken. Choson was given a lot of additional responsibilities and duties related to Qing from 1637 to 1644. It is likely that Choson was forced to support Qing economically. After Qing entered Beijing, the need for Korean goods decreased dramatically.

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This article examines according to what information and for what reasons Japan attempted to set up a system for capturing suspicious foreign ships shipwrecked in Korean waters and the manner in which Joseon, which accepted the arrangement, implemented those transfer requests and disposed of the ships, within the context of its relations with Qing China and Japan. After its prohibition of Christianity and in the aftermath of the Jesuit Infiltration Plots of 1642 and 43, Japan requested that in the case of any suspicious ships adrift in Korean waters, Joseon divert them to Japan House (J: Wakan/K: Waegwan 倭館) in Pusan for transfer to Japan. From testimony given by Jesuit missionaries apprehended in the Infiltration Plots, the Japanese authorities were cognizant of the possibility that more missionaries would launch similar attempts from Korean shores and were thus on the alert. In order to maintain friendly relations between the two countries, Joseon accepted Japan's request, replying that it would divert all suspicious vessels to Japan House. The ships of Ming Dynasty subjects were frequently cast adrift upon Korean shores, and in the midst of the transition from the Ming to the Qing Dynasty, Joseon as a tributary of Qing was obligated to return Ming subjects to the Qing authorities, which opened the possibility that those people would be executed upon their arrival in Qing China. Upon the shipwreck of a Ming vessel in 1644, Joseon, which was thankful to the Ming Dynasty for defending her from Japanese invasion and felt obligated to help Ming subjects, tried to save the survivors by sending them to Japan under the pretense that they were possible Christian adherents. Pleased with Joseon's response, Japan requested that any suspicious ships adrift in Korean waters would continue to be diverted to Japan House. However, when the next Ming shipwreck occurred, a Qing Dynasty envoy happened to be visting Joseon, making it, impossible to transfer survivors to Japan without drawing the attention of the Qing envoy. On that occasion Joseon King Injo decided to confer with the envoy about how to deal with Ming survivors. Although the consultation did not take place due to the surrender of the Ming subjects to Qing authorities, Qing Dynasty, wary of the military alliance formed between the Ming Dynasty and Japan, forbade Joseon from sending Ming subjects to Japan. At the same time, Joseon reported to the Qing Dynasty the fact of Japan's request for the diversion of suspicious ships, as well as the dispatch of Ming envoys to Japan in search of military assistance, emphasizing a Japanese threat to Qing security, all in the hope of gaining such concessions as exemptions from Qing-imposed rice and maritime corvee duties, the lifting of prohibitions on the building and repair of military fortifications and the resumption of army training. Although Joseon's plan was initially successful, upon the enthronement of Joseon King Hyojong, Qing China reprimanded Joseon for citing a Japanese threat as an excuse for remilitarization. Consequently, fearing the anger of Qing China, Joseon proceeded to return all shipwrecked Ming subjects (with some exceptions) to the Qing authorities. Nevertheless, the debate continued within Joseon on the strength of strong anti-Qing sentiment as to whether or not to send shipwrecked Ming subjects to Japan as suspected Christian adherents.

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Diplomatic relations between the Jeoson and Qing Dynasties were first established in 1637, marking the most important event in the history of the Korea's foreign relations to date. However, the circumstances leading up to that event have still not been made sufficiently clear. This article takes up the 1627 Chongmyo 丁卯 War, which marked the Qing Dynasty's first invasion of Korea as the starting point in the process by which diplomatic relations between the two countries were established. First, the author examines the relations between the Jeoson Dynasty and the Jurchen Kingdom of Aisin Gurun, the Qing Dynasty's predecessor, leading up to the 1627 invasion. Although the Jeoson government at the time had emphasized friendly relations with the former Ming Dynasty, it also was planning to dispatch envoys to Aisin Gurun in order to resume diplomatic negotiations. However, Aisin Gurun, out of intimidation by the forces of Ming General Mao Wen-Long 毛文竜 and a serious famine, decided to launch an invasion of Korea. The attack was thwarted by internal strife within the Aisin Gurun ranks over lack of preparedness in their military operations, and the disorganization also posed difficulties in suing for peace. The author then turns to diplomatic relations in the wake of the Chongmyo War. Due to differences in perception that arose between Hong Taiji, who remained in the Aisin Gurun capital of Shenyang, and Amin, the commander in chief at the front, two different peace treaties were concluded with Korea, one at Kanghwa, the other at Pyongyang. The Jeoson Dynasty chose ally to itself with Aisin Gurun based on the former treaty, since it agreed with Hong Taiji that this treaty did not specify the political superiority or advantage of either party. The author ends the article with an examination of the first dispatch of envoys by the two states based on the Kanghwa Treaty. He concludes that the extremely proactive attitude shown by the Jeoson government resulted in the withdrawal of the Aisin Gurun army from Uiju on the northern border. Furthermore, in the peace negotiations there were no discussions of exchanging tributary gifts on a regular basis or opening trading posts on the border, indicating an agreement far different from setting up mutual relations of friendship between the two states. From that time on such fluidity characterizing Jeoson-Aisin Gurun relations would continue to a certain extent, which is directly attributable to the vagueness of the peace treaty concluded after the Chongmyo War.

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