This paper examines the hypothesis that one of the possible reasons for the recent negative perception of Japan in China is the relatively low volume of mutual human exchange between the two countries.
Based on an analysis of various opinion poll data, the characteristics of Chinese perceptions of Japan can be summarized as follows:
(1) Since the mid-1990s, the Chinese perception of Japan has been consistently negative.
(2) Such a negative perception of Japan is stronger in China than in other East Asian countries.
(3) In terms of the medium- and long-term trend since the mid-1990s, Chinese perception of Japan has continued to worsen, which is a unique phenomenon unseen in other East Asian countries including South Korea.
(4) Those Chinese who have experienced direct contact with the Japanese in general have a more moderate perception toward Japan than those Chinese who have not had such experience.
Apart from the historical fact that Japan and China have fought against each other, such a uniquely negative perception toward Japan in China can be attributed to the following reasons:
(1) The strengthening of patriotic education campaigns in China since the mid-1990s.
(2) The upsurge in anti-China perceptions in Japan since the 1990s (which are reflected back to China).
(3) Misperceptions and misunderstandings at an individual level in China, mainly due to the lack of objective knowledge about Japan as well as cultural differences.
One of the possible reasons for the misperception and misunderstanding at the individual level in China could be the relatively low volume of human exchange between China and Japan, which is still relatively low compared with the volume of exchanges between Japan and other major Asian countries.
For instance, Japan’s “visitor-population ratio” (ratio of the number of visitors to Japan compared to the nation’s population) in 2006 is as follows: China, 0.04% (one visitor per 2,500people); South Korea, 4.14% (one visitor per 24); Taiwan, 5.61% (one visitor per 18); Hong Kong, 5.04% (one visitor per 20); Singapore, 3.12% (one visitor per 32).
Data analysis indicates that the current negative perception of Japan in China is unique compared with similar perceptions in other East Asian countries.
There are several reasons for such a situation in China, and the current situation may not be due to only one reason.
Nevertheless, the enhancement of human exchanges between the two countries could be useful to prevent any increase in mutual misunderstanding as well as for managing any outbursts of negative feelings.

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On August 23, 1958, the People's Liberation Army of China began a heavy bombardment against the Quemoy Island, an island still under the control of the Chinese Nationalist regime in Taiwan. This action escalated tensions across the Taiwan Strait, leading to the direct military confrontation between China and the United States. In fact, the conflict was so serious that the United States considered using tactical nuclear weapons against the Communist China.
This paper explores why China chose to conduct such military activities despite risks of direct military engagement with the United States. China's decision to bombard the Quemoy is puzzling because it was fairly predictable that China's use of force would prompt the United States to respond militarily, bringing the two countries to the brink of a nuclear war. Why did China dare to take such risks and what were they trying to accomplish?
There are two schools of thought that attempt to explain China's behavior leading to the Second Taiwan Strait Crisis. The first focuses on an external factor, that is, China's security environments. According to this view, China's decision to conduct bombardment against the Quemoy was driven by Chinese leaders' concerns about increasing military threats posed by the United States. The second school of thought, the so-called “domestic mobilization” school, argues that the main reason for China's use of force was the necessity to mobilize domestic support for “the Great Leap Forward, ” a radical communization program that Mao Tse-dong tried to promote. Recently, researchers who utilized new documentary evidence from China and the former Soviet Union emphasize the role of Mao's radical communist ideology, and they claim that the “domestic mobilization” argument combined with an explanation based on Mao's ideology, provides a better explanation for China's behavior. Chen Jian, for instance, argues that Mao, who was committed to radical communist internationalism, was concerned about the slow speed of communization in China, and tried to accelerate the speed by creating an external crisis.
While recognizing the importance of Mao's radical ideology, I argue that the importance of Mao's ideology was exaggerated because many of his radical statements were interpreted without analyzing contexts in which they were made. Furthermore, I point out evidence that shows that the Chinese leaders' decisions were driven by their concerns about China's security, not only because of increasing US threats but also because of the Soviet Union's pursuit for the “peaceful coexistence” with the West. In this sense, China's use of force was designed to serve two political purposes: warning the United States against increasing support for Taiwan and damaging what Chinese leaders considered to be Moscow's “appeacement” policy toward the United States.
In making the argument stated above, I analyze the Chinese leaders' statements and decisions from 1954 to 1958 by examining Chinese and Soviet primary documents made available through the Cold War International History Project. Special attention is paid to analyzing Chinese leaders' diplomatic decisions within the context of China's strategic environments, because doing so provides a more complete picture of how China decided to bombard the Quemoy. In conclusion, I not only summarize the research findings, but also attempt to derive some theoretical implications from this case study by utilizing the notion of a “building block approach” to theorizing international relations.

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It is said that Japan did not approach her enemies to end the hostilities until the last stage of the Pacific War. But she tried repeatedly to negotiate a cease-fire between herself and Nationalist China (Chungking) during the war. What made Japan consider a separate peace only with China? How did she intend to make peace with China? This paper aims to analyze the objectives of Japan's approach to China and to make clear the circumstances of her peace efforts toward Chungking.
At first Japan contemplated making peace with China as a part of the plan to weaken the will of the United States to continue the war. As the tide of war turned unfavorably to her, Japan wanted to move her troops stationed in China to the other fronts by making a cease-fire with Chungking. In the last stage of the war, some of the Japanese leaders hoped that China would act as an intermediary between Japan and the United Nations to obtain less severe peace terms than unconditional surrender.
Japan, however, did not negotiate directly with China. The approaches in the early stage of the war were limited to gathering intelligence about Chinese tendency to make peace. Japanese were afraid that they would betray their weakness if they made overtures to China. Japan relied on the Wang Ching-wei Government (Nanking) to make contact with Chungking. Nanking government leaders, especially Chou Fo-hai, opened and maintained various routes of contact with Chungking through liaison agents. But they used the routes as a means to pursue their own purposes other than making peace overtures.
Japan did not regard China as a full-fledged member of the United Nations. So she expected that she would be able to exploit the differences between Chungking and its allies and to make a separate peace with it. But China would not show any attitude to accept Japan's overtures. Japan had few resources or means to induce China to consider making a separate peace.

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