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  • 村上 節太郎
    地学雑誌
    1934年 46 巻 6 号 280-290
    発行日: 1934/06/15
    公開日: 2010/10/13
    ジャーナル フリー
  • ―信州郷軍同志会・大日本赤誠会を中心に―
    玉木 寛輝
    法政論叢
    2014年 51 巻 1 号 67-
    発行日: 2014年
    公開日: 2017/11/01
    ジャーナル フリー
  • 川田 稔
    人間環境学研究
    2008年 6 巻 1 号 1_1-1_21
    発行日: 2008年
    公開日: 2009/06/19
    ジャーナル フリー
    Nagata Tetsuzan is known as one of the leading figures of the Imperial Army after the Manchurian incident. However, the full- scale research on him has not been done yet. This paper, therefore, as part of the research on the relations between Nagata and the Imperial Army, explores Nagata's action based on his vision and policies during the Manchurian incident. In 1929, just before the incident, Nagata gathered elite army officers and organized a group called "Isseki-kai." With the power of the group, Nagata influenced the central headquarters to cause Manchurian incident. Furthermore, he drove for the national reconstruction led by the Army. The background to his action was his own perspective on "total war."
  • 秦 郁彦
    史学雑誌
    1980年 89 巻 7 号 1156-1162
    発行日: 1980/07/20
    公開日: 2017/10/05
    ジャーナル フリー
  • 鵜沢 義行
    年報政治学
    1963年 14 巻 120-140
    発行日: 1963/12/16
    公開日: 2009/12/21
    ジャーナル フリー
  • 東中野 多聞
    史学雑誌
    1999年 108 巻 9 号 1619-1638,1713-
    発行日: 1999/09/20
    公開日: 2017/11/30
    ジャーナル フリー
    In 1960, Prime Minister Kishi Nobusuke revised the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty. He was a well known politician, having been Minister of Commerce and Industry in the Tojo wartime cabinet. When Tojo requested Kishi to resign in order to reshuffle the Cabinet, Kishi declined, causing Tojo to yield and dissolve his Cabinet on July 18,1944. After the war, Kishi explained that his anti-Tojo actions were aimed at avoiding accusation as a war criminal after the War. There are only a few studies about his wartime politics. Kishi said that he spent his days in idleness after the resignation of the Tojo Cabinet and every study so far acccepts this explanation. The author of the present article doubts this point. After resignation of the Tojo Cabinet, Kishi and 32 others organized a political club called the "Gokoku Doshikai" within the House of Representatives. It consisted of socialists, generals, admirals, and nationalists. They adopted a committee system, established an office, and held study group once a week. Kishi was the virtual leader of this club. They carried out a nationwide campaign called the "National Defence Movement". Kishi also established an ultranationalist association, the "Bocho Sonjo Doshikai", in his hometown of Yamaguchi city. Author also investigates this group, and concludes that both Kishi and the Bocho Sonjo Doshikai were opposed to the end of war. The Gokoku Doshikai was based on one concept of national defence, a "productive Army", (seisan-gun), which aimed at strengthen the economic control. By unifying the munitions industries, Japan could use the materials more efficiently, in preparation for the decisive battle of the Japanese mainland through self-sufficiency. The Gokoku Doshikai was opposed to the Japanese government, because then Prime Minister Suzuki was aiming at ending the war, they denounced the government's policy vehemently; and when Suzuki decided to surrender, the Gokoku Doshikai and the Japanese army resisted. The author concludes that while Kishi contributed to the anti-Tojo movement, he was opposed to surrender. We can see the root of the Kishi's postwar faction in the "Gokoku Doshikai". After the war, two of its members entered the Kishi Cabinet, and five socialist members became the leaders of the Socialist Party. Here we see another point of continuity and discontinuity between prewar and postwar politics.
  • 土田 宏成
    史学雑誌
    2000年 109 巻 3 号 415-437,486
    発行日: 2000/03/20
    公開日: 2017/11/30
    ジャーナル フリー
    This article studies the number of military officers among Imperial Diet members and their influence in prewar Japan. The first half explores the number of officer MPs on the basis of biographical dictionaries edited by the House of Representatives and the House of Councilors. The author finds that 1) their number was not very large, except during World War II ; 2) their number among members of the House of Representatives increased after the fourteenth general election (1920) ; 3) many generals and admirals were made barons after the Russo-Japanese War, and some of these were elected as a member of the House of Peers. The second half of the article analyzes the activities of officer MPs after the year 1920. They did share common interests with the military authorities as servicemen ; however, a conflict of interest arose between ex-servicemen and active-servicemen. Therefore, they were not always loyal supporters of the military authorities. In conclusion, officer MPs had considerable influence as military specialists, representatives of ex-servicemen and supporters of the military authorities in the Diet despite their position as a minority. It was often the case that they were detrimental to parliamentary government due to their anti-liberal and anti-party government tendencies.
  • 史学雑誌
    1992年 101 巻 4 号 615-655
    発行日: 1992/04/20
    公開日: 2017/11/29
    ジャーナル フリー
  • 松永 智子
    マス・コミュニケーション研究
    2012年 81 巻 143-161
    発行日: 2012/07/31
    公開日: 2017/10/06
    ジャーナル フリー
    This study aims to clarify the characteristics of the readers' column in the Japan Times during World War II. Founded in 1897 with the support of the government, businessmen, and researchers, the newspaper was expected to produce Japanese propaganda after the Manchurian Incident in 1931. Previous studies have tried to examine Japanese propaganda through the analysis of the editorials in the newspaper. However, very little has been written about the readers' column, which was laid out beside the editorial and was supposed to be a forum for free speech. This article focuses on the Asama Maru Incident (January 21^<st>, 1940) - a scandal that provoked an anti-British campaign in the Japanese-language press and eventually propelled Japan into World War II - to reveal how the readers' column in the Japan Times was a forum for open international discussion. From when the incident occurred (January 21) to when some of the captured Germans were released in Yokohama (March 2) , 13 out of a total of 66 letters published in the readers' corner were about the Asama Maru Incident. An analysis of the writers, who were from England, Japan, and Germany (in addition to a few anonymous writers) , reveals that eight were pro-Britain and five were anti-Britain. In comparison, the Japanese-language press was completely anti-Britain and the two other English papers were completely on the side of Britain and the U.S. during the same period. I conclude that this column functioned as an 'asylum for foreign people's free speech' in order to make the Japanese propaganda in the rest of the paper more effective and palatable. I also point out that the messages in the column, the editorial and the translations from the Japanese press functioned in a mutually complementary manner to each other with regard to the propaganda in the Japan Times. The results are discussed in terms of their implications for understanding public diplomacy in English-language media.
  • ―戦前期日米学生会議と日比学生会議を題材に―
    中村 信之
    国際政治
    2018年 2018 巻 191 号 191_80-191_94
    発行日: 2018/03/28
    公開日: 2018/12/19
    ジャーナル フリー

    One of the present criticism towards modern historical science is that the West is central to history while the non-Western world is “peripheral.” This view can also be seen in international cultural relations, where there is often bipolarization between “bad” and “good,” with the former caused by governments such as through propaganda, and the latter brought about by civil agencies. This research aims to re-examine this problematic structure of international cultural relations based on the hypothesis that “central versus peripheral” in terms of history is a problem inherent in all studies of international cultural relations. This research focuses on two student conferences that took place during the 1930s: the Japan-America Student Conference (JASC), and the Philippines-Japan Student Conference. These two conferences were both managed by the same organization—the Japanese Students English Association—which was a part of kokumin-gaikō, or the concept of the national diplomacy of Japan prior to World War II. Another hypothesis was established to investigate how these two conferences were affiliated without a factor of contingency.

    The Japanese side of JASC wanted to communicate the “rightness” of Japanese policy in Manchuria, and the excellence of Oriental culture, while the American delegates viewed this mostly as Japanese propaganda and viewed the country’s censorship as problematic. At the Americans’ suggestion, a rule was created, that prohibited “observers” from entering any rooms at the conference where round-table discussions were being held. This illustrates that the pre-war JASC was not only an example of Japanese kokumin-gaikō but also that it served as an American cultural exchange program. There were also nisei participants in JASC, though they were viewed as “peripheral” actors and unable to send any codes in international cultural relations due to the presupposition of kokumin-gaikō, where a person only has one culture. However, nisei participants did send a code throughout the cultural exchange program, which was the existence of discrimination against Japanese American ethnicity as well as a message of ethical equality towards the white community. As a result, one Japanese delegate at the conference communicated his understanding toward nisei’ duality, where a person have both Japanese ethnicity and American nationality.

    At the Philippines-Japan Student Conference, the Japanese side tried to appeal to the existing goodwill between the two countries in addition to highlighting the success of Japanese immigrants in the Philippines. Japanese delegates met with some of the old Japanese workers in the Philippines who were part of the construction of Benguet Road. From this work arose a “legendary story,” where only Japanese laborers were able to successfully complete the construction of this road, while work while non-Japanese laborers were not able to do well. This story was exaggerated by the Japanese working in the Philippines during pre-war period and was exported to Japan, which served to support the idea of Japanese supremacy and the success of Japanese living in areas of nanshin (proceeding south).

  • 史学雑誌
    1983年 92 巻 7 号 1233-1256
    発行日: 1983/07/20
    公開日: 2017/11/29
    ジャーナル フリー
  • 佐藤 恵一
    日本英語教育史研究
    1989年 4 巻 149-179
    発行日: 1989/05/01
    公開日: 2012/10/29
    ジャーナル フリー
  • 講和後の戦犯釈放と日米関係
    日暮 吉延
    アメリカ研究
    2001年 2001 巻 35 号 135-154
    発行日: 2001/03/25
    公開日: 2010/10/28
    ジャーナル フリー
  • ―『週刊ブエノスアイレス』の世界―
    睦月 規子
    ラテンアメリカ研究年報
    2009年 29 巻 30-58
    発行日: 2009年
    公開日: 2022/05/18
    研究報告書・技術報告書 フリー
  • 川田 稔
    人間環境学研究
    2003年 1 巻 2 号 2_57-2_68
    発行日: 2003年
    公開日: 2009/06/22
    ジャーナル フリー
    The Minseito cabinet under Hamaguchi came to government in April 1929. Hamaguchi appointed Shidehara as foreign minister and Inoue Junnosuke as finance minister. Hamaguchi carried on the 'internationalist' policy of Shidehara and at the same time he adapted the domestic policy such as lifting the embargo on gold and arranging a rationalization of industry. Hamaguchi started with combining industries and organizing unions. He was making the Japanese economy competitive enough in the international market through mechanization and expansion of productivity. He was trying to seek for an international policy of 'sound finance' by reintroducing the gold standard and was activating Japanese industrialists' trades and business in China. He supported the Japanese economic expansion in China in order to realize the development of domestic industries, the stability and improvement of the people's life. Hamaguchi favored disarmament and took an action over the London naval treaty. The Sumistu-in was against his idea, but he controlled it by force because he had a great support from the public and the Elder Statesman, Prince Saionji. Hamaguchi's purpose at that time was to cut military expenditures and to take on the leadership over internationalism. His vision collapsed after the Wall Street crash of autumn 1929. Hamaguchi was assassinated on the platform at Tokyo railway station in 1930. He recovered to resume his position as prime minister but died the following year.
  • 川田 稔
    人間環境学研究
    2004年 2 巻 1 号 1_37-1_49
    発行日: 2004年
    公開日: 2009/06/22
    ジャーナル フリー
    A series of political arguments during negotiation and ratification process of the London Naval Treaty of 1930 was one of the most serious domestic political situations in modern Japan within the Cabinet, the Foreign Ministry, the Navy, the political parties such as Minseito and Seiyukai, the Privy Council, the Kizoku-in, the Army and civilian right wingers. The London treaty fight deeply affected the fate of Japan. This study examines the policy argument over the treaty, focusing on Prime Minister Hamaguchi who was a main player to press for the treaty. It has been pointed out that Hamaguchi was moved by budgetary concerns but those who were against ratification of the treaty like Admiral Kato Kanji, were opposed him from military point of view. My interpretation, however, is that there are other significant factors: Hamaguchi's and Kato's argument over how Japanese policy toward the United States and China should be, or the future of Japan should be as a member of international community. Hamaguchi and his opponents' ideas were so different, and that was one of the reasons for their serious conflict. After all the political argument within Japan, it can be said Japan's new state system operated by political parties including the Navy, the Army, and Privy Council was eventually working under the Hamaguchi Cabinet. At the same time, ratification of the London Naval Treaty of 1930 made it possible for Japan to become one of the leading countries in international society, along with the United States and Britain.
  • 『国策』樹立による『挙国一致』から戦時体制への民智総動員へ
    茶谷 翔
    史学雑誌
    2022年 131 巻 6 号 35-59
    発行日: 2022年
    公開日: 2023/06/20
    ジャーナル フリー
    本稿は、日中戦争勃発の前後に当たる一九三六年末から一九三八年における国策研究会と大蔵公望の動向について、主に同会の会誌や大蔵日記を元に検討し、以下のことを明らかにした。
    国研について、第一に、国研の積極的な政治協力が見られるのは第一次近衛内閣期からであり、第二に、それが戦時政策・「革新」政策への民間の意向を把握し政策の実現や妥協を円滑に進めるための役割を担ったこと(「民智総動員」)、第三に、一方で前身の国策研究同志会から唱えられていた指導精神としての「国策」樹立には成功しなかったことである。
    大蔵について、大蔵は個人の動向としても国研の掲げる「国策」研究を通じた「挙国一致」実現の方針に忠実であり、特定の政治勢力に与しない中立的傾向を持ち、関係各方面からの意見聴取や国研での集団的検討を元にした政策立案・提供に専念していた。反面、政局への関心や情報把握は弱く、通説的には宇垣側近とも見なされるものの、宇垣をめぐる政局への関与も政策提供以外にはほとんど確認できない。
    以上の実証的成果を踏まえ本稿では、当該期の国研が官僚出身者や利害関係者(例えば統制経済下の財界人)など〝実務家層〟を中心とした、戦時政策の立案・遂行を円滑化する「官民一致」の調整機関としての機能を獲得したと評価した。国研の「挙国一致」的志向や中立性については、従来筆者や高杉洋平氏の研究により指摘されていたが、これにより、その性格が戦時体制の開始時期においていかなる役割を得たかが明らかになった。
    また、これを元に、総力戦体制における統制政策や国家総動員の立案・遂行過程、あるいは近年再評価されつつある戦時議会が持った重要性の軽重について、国研が有用な検討対象となり得ることを展望として示した。
  • 栗原 彬
    年報政治学
    1972年 23 巻 181-230
    発行日: 1973/03/30
    公開日: 2009/12/21
    ジャーナル フリー
  • 伊藤 隆
    年報政治学
    1972年 23 巻 134-180
    発行日: 1973/03/30
    公開日: 2009/12/21
    ジャーナル フリー
  • 赤木 須留喜
    年報政治学
    1972年 23 巻 20-70
    発行日: 1973/03/30
    公開日: 2009/12/21
    ジャーナル フリー
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