This article aims to analyze the responses of the Visegrad Four countries (Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia and Hungary) to the Iraq War which started on March 20, 2003. Central and East European countries, including these four countries, were considered to be“pro-American, ”particularly as demonstrated by their leaders' signatures to“the Letter of Eight”or“the Declaration of the Vilnius Ten, ”issued at the end of January, and at the beginning of February 2003, respectively.
U.S. unilateralism was particularly notable during the period between November 2002, when the UN Security Council adopted resolution 1441, and May 2003, when the US declared an end to major combat in Iraq, and the UN Security Council adopted resolution 1483. Specifically during this period responses of the Visegrad Four countries to the crisis in Iraq differed significantly from one another. Poland, for example, sent its special forces unit (GROM) to Iraq at the beginning of the War. The Czech and Slovak Republics deployed their NBC weapon response units in Kuwait, however they did not engage militarily in Iraq. Hungary allowed the U.S. to use an airbase located in its territory as a training ground where Iraqi opposition members were trained by U.S. forces as police officers and interpreters, but it did not send any military units to the Middle East during this period.
The military measures taken by the four countries varied in accordance with the different agendas of their respective key parties in parliament. Generally speaking, the main pro-American factions were the Trans-Atlanticists within the center-right parties, who oriented themselves toward mainstream European Christian democrats or liberal democrats. Realism among center-left social democratic parties, especially the parties in power, was another factor which encouraged conciliatory attitudes toward U.S. policy and the crisis in Iraq. At same time, however, a considerable group of social democrats opposed U.S. unilateral military actions in Iraq because of their high regard for maintaining multilateralism in respect to agreements established by international institutions, such as the UN, NATO or the EU. Therefore, center-left parties faced a dilemma in evaluating whether or not to support military action in the Middle East.
Extreme leftists, nationalists and Catholic traditionalists were almost universally opposed to dispatching troops to the Middle East. However, most of these were only“protest parties”which did not have the actual ability to influence decision-making in parliament. One of the key factors which inhibited Central and East European participation in the U.S. military's intervention in Iraq was in fact heavy criticism leveled by populist opposition parties. These parties were sensitive to public criticism of U.S. unilateral military activity in Iraq and thus blocked local involvement therein.
Thus, the differing responses of each country to the Iraq War can be viewed as a reflection of local political dynamics between the Pro- and Anti-American forces within each country's internal politics.

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This article focuses upon the concepts of ‘services of general economic interest (SGEI)’ or ‘services of general interest (SGI)’, which correspond to public services in the EU, then, investigates the policy-making process of so-called ‘Services directive’. In that process, political actors debated about pros and cons of application of ‘country of origin’ principle to SGEI or SGI.
Through this investigation, I observe that once the key committee (Internal market and consumer protection) in the European Parliament (=EP) approved application of ‘country of origin’ principle to SGEI, however, about 3 months later, at the crucial voting stage of EP plenary session, the application was substantially watered down by compromise between the center-right (EPP-ED) and the center-left (PSE) EP parties. This compromise was largely produced by the formation of new national coalition government in Germany. Because of this conversion, the attempted radical introduction of market mechanism into SGEI or SGI through ‘Services directive’ was definitely avoided.
As for the constellation of political conflict about public services in the EU, I find three points. Firstly, conventional confrontation between left and right is significantly formed at EU economic policy dimension as the cleavage between the center-right and the center-left EP parties. Mainly, as confirmed by consistency of Evelyne Gebhardt's protectionist approach to SGEI or SGI, the positive differentiation by PSE against EPP-ED brings about this cleavage. However, EPP-ED also intensified the cleavage when it aligned with Liberal party at the voting stage of the key committee in the EP.
Second, some national political parties' positions expected by their affiliated EP parties are distorted by their domestic condition. On the one hand, national center-left parties from United Kingdom, Spain, Hungary, and the other center and eastern new member states, hoped application of ‘country of origin’ principle to SGEI or SGI. On the contrary, UMP, French center right party supported Gebhardt's protectionist approach very positively, and sudden conversion of German CDU caused by the formation of national coalition government with SPD can be included in this kind of distortion.
Thirdly, there is ‘east-west’ cleavage between new and old member states. Especially, regardless of their affiliated national parties between center-left and center-right, most deputies from center and eastern new member states were at heart eager for the application of ‘country of origin’ principle to SGEI or SGI, which were opposed, for example, by French political parties, irrespective of center-left or center-right.

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Using newly available diplomatic sources from Spain and the United States dating from the 1970s to the 1990s, this article examines both the transformation of the relationship between the two countries as the Cold War came to an end in Europe and Spain's effort to conduct an “independent foreign policy” in the Mediterranean under the old bipolar system.
Franco's dictatorial regime, initially isolated after World War II, had attempted to draw closer to the West through a bilateral agreement with the United States based on an anti-communism platform as Cold War tensions grew. The article thus first considers how this bilateral relationship was affected by the process of the winding down of the Cold War.
We conclude that during this period Spain changed the manner and focus of its participation in international politics from passive to active and from bilateral to multilateral, especially with regard to Europe. Specifically, Spain, which had been drawn into the Cold War through an anti-communist bilateral partnership with the United States, gradually aimed to increase its international influence by continuously confronting its sense of rivalry and distrust towards the United States as well as its feelings of inadequacy vis- ` a-vis Europe. After democratization, Spain resolved this internal inconsistency between its foreign and domestic policies and transformed itself from an economic, military, and political dependency of the United States to a country pursuing a multilateral foreign policy.
Secondly, the article considers how the democratizing Spain, which had long hoped for a “return to Europe,” utilized the opportunities provided by the process of the Cold War' s close and how it later balanced its actions on the international stage with its bilateral relationship with the United States.
This period proved a felicitous one for the new Spain as it tried not only to return to Europe but also to expand its activities in the international arena. We conclude that Spain effectively utilized this period to achieve a reduction in the number of American troops stationed within its borders while consolidating its democracy and playing a bridging role between theWest and other Mediterranean countries. Specifically, steadily gaining the support of the public after joining the NATO and the EC, the Spanish government exhibited a flexibility that transcended bipolar divisions as the progressive PSOE (The Spanish Socialist Workers' Party) moved to the right, allowing Spain to reduce its American troop burdens while maintaining balance in its relations with Europe, domestic politics, and the Spanish-American bilateral relationship.

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The concept of the ‘Social Market Economy’ has been the main idea of the domestic economic governance during the post-war period in Germany. And it is also influenced by the Ordo-liberalism, which is mainly represented by Walter Eucken of the Freiburg School.
This idea was first adopted as one of the purposes of the EU in the Treaty of Lisbon. But the meaning of this idea is not clearly defined in this treaty. Therefore, it might lead to the complicated discussion about the interpretation of this concept. This paper investigates possible meanings of ‘Social Market Economy’ in the Treaty of Lisbon.
At first we take a close look at the exact definition and the theoretical framework of this thought on the original papers written by Alfred Müller-Armack, who was the initiator of this concept. The essential characteristic is the policy target, in which the balanced combination between the value of individual freedom and social fairness (or social security) should be found within the competitive market economic order.
Several factors of this idea are transposed into the treaty. For example, economic policy of the member states must be made within the principles of the “open market” with “the free competition” (TFEU/Art. 119). And the independence of the ECB (TFEU/Art. 130) and “the stability of prices” (TEU/Art. 3-3) are so strictly established in the Union, that they build the important institutional framework from the view of the ordo-liberalism.
To value the meanings of the concept of social market economy in the treaty, it is also important to point out, that we must consider the social aspects of the integration process.
As the concluding remarks, we could say that the Social Market Economy is a ideal model or distinguishing marks for the economic system of the EU. But it depends on the practice by each of the member states, concerning the way, how they will approach the ideal goal of social market economy with their own policy measures.

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In the context of the development of the EU's policy towards the Korean Peninsula and North East Asia the aim of this article is to analyze and evaluate the EU's policy towards the North Korea. While there has been extensive scholarly work undertaken on the role and impact of the EU in an international context there have been few studies on the relations between the EU and the North Korea-the ‘world's last unreformed Stalinist state’.
The paper will focus on the way the EU is handling relations with the North, especially in light of the North's ballistic and nuclear missile developments and the absence of human rights in the country. In so doing it will be divided into four sections. First, it will highlight the explanations of certain EU actors in charge of the external relations with the North. Here the thoughts of DG personnel in the European Commission and the Committee on Foreign Affairs/Commission des affaires étrangères (AFET) in the European Parliament will be drawn upon. It will also touch upon the formation of the delegation for relations with the Korean Peninsula (DKOR).
Secondly, a short history of the relations between the two will be undertaken by paying attention to the Korean Energy Development Organization (KEDO) and the EU's rapid establishment of diplomatic relations with the North. The change of the political context between the two, due to the missile launches in July and the nuclear test in October 2006, will also be examined.
Thirdly, the ways in which the European Parliament is dealing with the issues in light of recent deterioration in relations across the Korean Peninsula are also commented upon.
Fourthly, EU's policy towards the human rights in the North is analyzed. This includes the attention paid to the issue of ‘slave labor’ of the North Korean workers in Europe that is directly related with the EU's emphasis on human rights as part of its own d'être. This issue is also connected with the problem as to whether the products of the Kaesong industrial complex should be included in the EU-ROK Free Trade Agreement, which is presently under negotiation.
As a result of the analyses of the EU's approach to the North, four interrelated problems are identified as problematic:
First, the delay associated with decision-making in the EU. Second the problem emanating from the EU's non-participation at the ‘Six-Way Party Talks’. Third is the continuing lack of a common policy towards the North. Finally the problem incurred by the policies connected with the so called ‘Sunshine Policy’ that originated with South Korean President Kim Dae Jung in 1998.
In conclusion, it can be said that since the present policy of the EU is to support the ‘Sunshine Policy’, it is becoming increasingly incompatible with the ideas and stipulations laid out in the Treaty of the European Union-in particular the terrible human rights conditions in the North. It also leads to a gross under-estimation of the military threat of the North by aligning itself with a pro-north player who has come under fire for granting unconditional aid to the North.

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This paper focuses on the following five problems regarding the governance of the European Union: Firstly, the continual revisions of the EU's founding Treaties and their impact on the political structure of the European governance, hence being the cause of Dutch European law professor, Matijsen's “continual” frustration; secondly, the traps in the arguments of the so-called “sharing of sovereignty”; thirdly, the supremacy of the High Authority in the ECSC; fourthly, the prevailing trend of the European Parlimament over the European Commission; and lastly, the future structure of the European Governance-presidential system or parliamentary system?
Ironically enough, the “democratic deficit” has intensified in accordance with the success of European integration. This affects the long established relationship between the European Commission and the European Parliament. My analysis of the present European integration is that by the continual revisions of the EU's founding Treaties, European integration is now requesting massive surrender of the sovereign rights from their member states, in spite of the remarks by the political leaders and researchers proclaiming “sharing of sovereignty.” The European Union is leaning toward a federal entity in essence, far beyond the Japanese translated phrase of “Oushu Rengo” which has been used to indicate the EU by the Commission delegation to Tokyo, meaning “a mere association or at most confederation”. However, that translated phrase had been asked to suspend its use and to use “Oushu Domei” through the official written question (E-0138/96) by Glyn Ford (PSE), who was in charge of the relationship with Japan in 1996 by the reasons of its inadequacy and faults.
In my conclusion, the original elitism in the way of promoting European integration shown in the Monnet Method has substantially shifted towards a much more parliamentary controlled style. The question on the future European governance will solely depend on how the European people see the way of reducing the “democratic deficit”. There seems to be two alternatives. One is by the shift towards much more parliamentary controlled administration. The other is with a more independent European Commisson which is directly or indirectly elected by the European citizens as was shown in the Benelux Memorandum.
As indicated by the present scandals of the Commission and the resignation of the Santer's Commission in March 1999, the recent trends between the European Parliament and the Commission in European governance seemingly show us that a parliamentary oriented system at the sacrifice of the roles of the European Commission could prevail in the coming future.

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After the Sino-Japanese war, the schism between nationalism and democracy deepened and split into two different directions. The former expanded into Empire-ism, the latter was absorbed into socialism which grew from the beginning of this century. After the Russo-Japanese war, especially, social contradictions became evident, and antagonisms and so-called “social problems” emerged. Under these circumstances, reintegration policies were sought by many leaders. In this period, the main and common concern of political opinion leaders was to build a “strong and rich state” which was not only militarily powerful but strong industrially and commercially. To achieve these ends, they urged the suppression of socialism and the labor movement, and pushed for policies strengthening “constitutionalism (esp. policial parties)”, “social reform (esp. factory legislation)” and “new education”.
To expand markets abroad and enhance international prestige, certain domestic reforms were inevitable. Symbolically speaking, “Empire can exist neither in name nor in reality, if it keeps slums in it”. This was their belief.
And thus gradually “great nation” building and “Empire” formation became their main concern.
Based on certain domestic reforms, arousing the people's loyality to the Tenno-state, they prepared for expansion of Japan's influence abroad, economically. They named their policy “ethical-” and “constitutional-” or “economic-” and “peaceful-” Empire-ism.
Thus the Meiji absolute monarchy was transformed into “Empire-Japan” from the end of the Meiji Era to the beginning of the Taisho Era. Empire-ist Okuma's cabinet and its intervention policy in China symbolized this process.
In this article, I will discuss, at first, “the premature imperialistic practice” and ideology of Meiji state, and then analyse the ideology of “economic-” and “constitutional-” Empire-ism, and then, trace the characteristics of, “the theory of social policy school” and its relation to Empire-ism. Finally I will trace the real process of post-Russo-Japanese war policy, and point out that the ideology of “Empire-ism” became dominant gradually and grew from a ideology to the controlling policy abroad and at home, and at the same time, I will show that this process of reintegration was primarilly against the growth of socialism.

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