This study explores to examine the organizational changes in Korea public bureaucracy since the Chun Doo Hwan administration. Why do some public organizations grow old and others die young? Is there any particular pattern in reorganizations of government organizations? How the turnover of political power in the presidential election has affected the government reorganizations?
  The decisive factor of government reorganizations is the political power shifting that involved in a wide range of organizational reform. Public organizations are at the greatest risk when the political turnover occurs, and the ruling party and the opposition party conflict with each other after the political turnover with accompanying large-scale reorganizations. And, agencies are more stable than cabinet-level departments.

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In South Korea, the Act on the Establishment and Operation of Teachers' Union (Educational Workers Labor Union Act) was enacted to partially recognize teachers' rights to work and to legalize the Korean Teachers and Educational Workers' Union (KTU).

This paper aims to reveal the reason why the Educational Workers Labor Union Act was enacted as a“special law”of the Labor Union Act, not of the Civil Servants' Law or education-related law. I analyzed the process of enacting the Act, focusing on the internal discussions of KTU and the changes in the view of the teaching profession by the Ministry of Education and the Korean Federation of Teachers' Association (KFTA). The main results of this paper are as follows.

First, the KTU and the KFTA have influenced each other. When the KTU was being formed as an outsider union, the KFTA tried to break away from its image as a “government service association” by reorganizing its internal organization, pushing for collective bargaining with educational administration. The KTU was influenced by KFTA's legislation on the advancement of teachers, and had tried to create a politically favorable situation for legalization.

Secondly, there were not only changes in discussions within the KTU, but also changes in the view of the teaching profession held by the Ministry of Education and the KFTA. The Ministry of Education expressed opposition to the establishment of teachers' unions, emphasizing teachers' law-abiding spirit, but began to recognize a part of teachers' right to work in the late 1990s to meet international standards. The KFTA insisted on obtaining the rights to collective bargaining, while claiming that it is a professional teachers' association.

Third, as mentioned above, the KTU and the KFTA had a similar view of teachers' rights to work, while there was a difference in their perception of rights to collective bargaining. The KTU interpreted the right to bargain collectively as guaranteeing teachers' independent union rights without legal restrictions. They recognized that as long as the education law restricts them, it is not a negotiation held in the equal relationship with the educational administration. This is the reason why the KTU rejected the special law that applies only to teachers and based its establishment on the Labor Union Act.

The KTU regarded teachers in collective bargaining as equivalent to educational administration staff. That differs from the perspective of the KFTA, which emphasizes the duty of political neutrality of teachers as just“government employees”. The“dualization”of collective bargaining, which has been criticized in previous studies, is due to the difference in views of both institutions regarding the teaching profession.

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The purpose of this paper is to describe clearly the Nippon Zaikai (Business Circles) 's role in the normalization of Japan-South Korean diplomatic relations during 1960-1965. In particular, I focused on the Kansai Zaikai which showed their zeal for this long-pending question. There have been few studies about this topic, but I believe this analysis will illustrate the Japanese non-governmental economic diplomacy towards South Korea after the World War II.
The Kansai Zaikai's strong interest in Korea was generated by the Kansai area's geographical proximity to Korea and the traditional trade ties linking the two. This led the Kansai Zaikai to play a major role in the rebirth of economic ties between Japan and South Korea. The large number of Koreans living in the Kansai area led to the formation of the Zainichi Kankoku Shokokai (Korean Chamber of Commerce in Japan). This group took a vested interest in restimulating both cultural and economic exchange between Japan and South Korea. The normalization of Japan-South Korean diplomatic relations was viewed by the Kansai Zaikai as means of revitalizing the Kansai economy in the aftermath of World War II.
When the Ikeda Cabinet appeared in 1960, Kansai Zaikai formed the Japan-Korea Economic Association with the Keizai Dantai Rengokai and Japanese Chamber of Commerce. The Korean Chamber of Commerce in Osaka also took part in this association and played an important role in linking the Japanese and South Korean economic circles.
Subsequently, Michisuke Sugi, ex-president of the Osaka Chamber of Commerce and one of the leaders of the Kansai Zaikai, was appointed as one of the chief-representatives in the Japan-South Korean talks held during 1961-64.
In conclusion, an evaluation of the Zaikai's Activities during 1960-1965 as follows:
(1) One of the most notable changes brought about by the Zaikai's efforts to normalize relations was the improvement in the Zaikai's image of South Korea.
(2) As a result of the Zaikai's efforts, the establishment of a direct channel between the Pak Cabinet and Japan was established.
(3) While the Kansai Zaikai took an interest in the reestablishment of economic and political ties because of its historically close ties with Korea, their interest in restoring economic activity to the Kansai area, and their pronounced rivalry of Tokyo sparked them into taking a leading role in the normalization efforts.

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The purpose of this paper is to clear up the security relation between Japan and Korea, which was formed through dealing with the “security crisis” of 1968. This became the origin of the Japan-ROK (Republic of Korea) security cooperation later called “economic security cooperation”.
The “security crisis” of 1968 occurred when reunification by all-out war became impossible due to the establishment of the divided-system. North Korea’s purpose was to bring down South Korea from within by armed guerrilla warfare. Therefore, what the ROK and Japan emphasized in dealing with this crisis was not how to respond to all-out war, but rather how to respond to indirect aggression.
South Korea asked Japan for cooperation concerning the enhancement of equipment for ROK’s anti-guerrilla police. They have explained to Japan that the possibility of an all-out war was low, and that even if war happened to occur, they could respond under the mutual defense treaty with the United States. This is why they have requested special assistance from Japan.
The Ministry of foreign affairs of Japan and Prime Minister Sato decided to cooperate with South Korea. They pointed out that the patrol boats ROK asked for does not violate Japan’s regulations which prohibit the export of military arms. “Three principles on arms exports” would not be undermined in this situation. However, South Korea ultimately withdrew its request. This was because the pressing issue of drought damage inside the ROK required immediate attention. Therefore the ROK requested emergency assistance from Japan to deal with this situation.
It is very significant that both countries have discussed and found possible areas of cooperation for the security of the ROK. The characteristics of which are as follows. First, it has clarified the political position of both countries to counter North Korean indirect aggressions. Secondly, in order to ensure the internal security of South Korea, Japan and South Korea have sought to cooperate for the enhancement of equipment used by the police engaged in counter guerrilla operations. South Korea and Japan, while premising on the treaty of alliance with the United States, identified new threats from indirect aggressions and tried to find areas of possible cooperation. Thirdly, is the fact that South Korea has ultimately withdrawn the request for police equipment cooperation and eventually switched to a request for emergency economic assistance to focus on domestic stability. This is how a typical pattern of security cooperation between Japan and South Korea, later called “economic security cooperation” has developed.

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  Under what conditions do the congress members revise the election-related law that might influence their own positions? This paper examined such a general question through the comparison between the fundamental change of party organization such as the abolition of local branch in South Korea in 2004 and its failure in 2000. This paper discovered the following points. First, the electoral system to which parliament member is punished easily by the voters must exist. Second, incumbent members' agreement to law revision depends on what frame interpreting the social phenomenon is offered to the voters. In our case, what made the incumbent members who persisted in their partisan policy package accept non-partisan policy package was the successful presentation by the election administration committee as an independent actor to the voters of the frame which locates the abolition of local branch in non-partisan policy package. However now, such a model is tested only in the cases where many of voters are low in the party identity, and have distrust in the party like South Korea. This model can be applied also in other cases, but the elaboration of the applicable condition is future tasks.

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In today’s Korea, articles on misogyny and misandry are often found in the media. Also, many Koreans consider misogyny and misandry to be a serious problem. In this paper, I will focus on Korean masculinities in order to clarify the cause of misogyny.

Section 1 reviews Korean masculinity studies. Through the review, it becomes clear that Korean masculinity has been analyzed using the concepts of “militarism” and “militarization.”

Section 2 will clarify the change of Korean masculinities from their relation with militarization. Firstly, there have been points in common between the military regime’s masculinities and the prodemocracy masculinities. Secondly, the masculinities called for by the military regime and the IMF Era were similar. Thirdly, since the 2000s, the difference between men and women has been maintained by a way of thinking that men who serve military service are victims of society.

Section 3 examines the reasons why men are hostile to women using the framework of Messner and Ito. Firstly, a general sense of deprivation felt by today’s young men makes it difficult for them to feel superior to women. Secondly, because of the socialization of male-dominated values in the militarized society, young men’s anger is directed at women.

In other words, the reason for the spread of misogyny is recent women’s social advancement despite the fact that a debasing attitude toward women still exists in society. In order to break out of the negative cycle of misogyny and misandry, people should realize the following: Firstly, Korean society is a militarized one. Secondly, there is a possibility that people are being socialized by militarization. And lastly, there are differences and inequalities between men.

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Since the 1990s, there has been U.S.-led globalization leading to development of an “American type of market economy.” The purpose of this paper is to clarify the global influences of such a system transplant by the U.S. In particular, this paper clarifies the economic influences of bureaucracy, the Meiji Restoration, and world political strategy toward other countries of the U.S. in the 1950s. Seemingly these factors are unrelated, but in fact they all had remarkable influence on the establishment of Japanese and Korean corporate governance structures. Assuming the above, this paper advocates the significance of analyzing the “system transplant” by the U.S. to other countries such as Japan and Korea, especially from the viewpoint of political and economic history.

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This article analyses long-term transformation of government-chaebol relationships in South Korea. Since Park Chung-Hee in the 1960s, all presidents Chun Doo-Hwan, Roh Tae-Woo, and Kim Young-Sam repeated cyclical transformation patterns of government-business relationships. Every president immediately after inauguration reinforced the legitimacy by initiating chaebol regulatory policies, which were along with anti-chaebol sentiments of people and economic necessities. Meanwhile, labour policies were liberalized. However, liberalized labour became extremely radical; it affected economic performance negatively. Moreover, as long as the Korean economy is largely based on chaebol, these chaebol reform measures required a certain pain of chaebol and ultimately led to worsening performance of the national economy at least for short-term. Since good economic performance, as well as strict chaebol reform, is one of the important sources of regime legitimacy, deteriorating economic performance negatively affected regime legitimacy and president popularity. Hence, while all regimes initiated chaebol regulations due to legitimacy, they also ironically returned to the conventional priority to economic growth due to legitimacy, too. Although the Kim Dae-Jung administration certainly succeeded in reforming chaebol after regime changes, these cyclical patterns were also emerging.

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The ratification of the December 1965 Japan-South Korea Treaty established formal diplomatic relations between Tokyo and Seoul. In terms of diplomatic negotiation process, on the one hand, it did nothing more than confirm the relationship between Japan and the Korean Peninsula which was already in existence following the Korean War; on the orther hand, it also announced the birth of a new international system among three countries, Japan-US-South Korea. The conclusion of the Japan-South Korea treaty itself, was Japan's first diplomatic initiative since the end of war and the first act of Japan-US burden-sharing. However, it didn't deny the existence of another government in the Korean Peninsula i. e. North Korea nor did it put constraints on future relations with it. The Japanese leaders clearly limited the treaty's scope of application to the southern half of the Peninsula; subsequent relations with North Korea would be entrusted to the international situation in the future.
From that point of view, the 1972 U. S. detente with the Soviet Union and China, and the opening of the North-South Dialogue, brought a new perspective to Japan's relations with the Korean Peninsula. In fact, after Kissinger's July, 1971 China visit, in response to North Korea's invitation, Japanese-North Korean exchanges in the fields of sports, culture, and economy, rapidly developed. Furthermore, not only journalists, but also ruling and opposition Diet members began to visit to Pyongyang and hold discussions with Kim Il Sung. The Japanese government also clarified its policy on enlarging exchanges in nonpolitical fields. However, the North Korean side demanded establishing official diplomatic relations with Japan, which in essence, signified breaking relations with South Korea. In other words, North Korea would accept “coexistence with Japan” but would not permit “coexistence with South Korea.” With North Korea's announcement of suspending the North-South Dialogue, Japanese-North Korean relations took a turn to the worst.
However, with the start of the Roh Tae Woo administration, when South Korea announced abandoning its policy of isolation with North Korea, in July of 1988, an atmosphere of improved relations prevailed once again. Interestingly enough, this time, it was the Japanese side that demanded contact between the two governments. Also, both countries did not, nor do they, seek the establishment of diplomatic relations in the near future. The North Korea side fears setting the spark to the issue of cross-recongnition if it were to establish diplomatic relations with Japan. Nor does the Japanese side believe cross-recongnition is possible. In other words, Tokyo-Pyongyang relations cannot go beyond the level of Moscow-Seoul relations. It is possible however, that after “squaring up” issues from the “unfortunate past, ” “limited coexistence” short of diplomatic recongnition, would comprise no more than cooperative economic relations. The resilience of this relationship i. e. Japan and North Korea, will be tested by whether or not it will be able to withstand the Tokyo-Seoul-Pyongyang “game of diplomacy” with all its complexity.

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