Previous studies of Okinawa's restoration to Japan have explored Japan-U.S. relations while paying little attention to relations between Japan and Okinawa. However, this approach assumes that Okinawa was simply an object in the negotiating process for its reversion to Japan, and not a subjective actor. Accordingly, this paper is concerned with negotiations between Japan and Okinawa in order to clarify the part played by the latter. I shall focus on visits to Tokyo made by Chobyo Yara, Executive Chief of the Ryukyu Government, to meet with Japanese Government officials including Prime Minister Eisaku Sato and Foreign Minister Kiichi Aichi. In particular, this paper deals with “homeland level status”, a term used in their discussions to define the conditions for Okinawa's reversion.
Japanese officials made frequent mention of their expectation that U.S. military bases would be reduced and consolidated after Okinawa's reversion, just as they had seen the removal of military bases after Japan's independence in 1952. This reveals an evident analogy between the restoration of Japanese sovereignty and the restoration of Okinawan administrative rights. However, the reality that several U.S. military bases were moved from Japan to Okinawa, which came under U.S. direct control, was ignored: a fact which reveals a significant flaw in the Japanese Government's logic.
Throughout their negotiations, the Ryukyu Government made persistent claims for “immediate, unconditional and total” reversion, to which the Japanese Government repeatedly answered that reversion would bring Okinawa to “homeland level status”. These negotiations offered no room for manoeuvre to the Ryukyu Government, who was powerless in decisions regarding the restoration of administrative rights to Okinawa. Yara therefore sought to justify Okinawan peoples' demand for “immediate, unconditional and total” reversion using three key arguments: that politically, as Executive Chief, Yara represented the consensus of Okinawan opinion; that nationally, Okinawa should be reunited with Japan; and, that Okinawa's aspiration for peace would be secured by the “democratic and peaceful” Japanese Constitution.
On the Okinawan side, the reversion movement is said to have developed from resistance to military occupation and its aim was the complete removal of military bases. However, Okinawa had already been positioned as a keystone of the U.S. military within the U.S.-Japan security treaty structure even before its reversion. In this sense, it is logically doubtful that Okinawa's reversion to Japan could have led to the clearance of military bases. Hence, such expectations held by Yara and pro-reversion supporters may be considered contradictory.
To understand the “Okinawan Problem” as it exists today, it is necessary to consider the history of both Japan-U.S. and Japan-Okinawa relations. To that end, it is critical to problematise Japan and Okinawa's historical relationship.

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