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  • 関 邦博
    The Annals of physiological anthropology
    1984年 3 巻 3 号 195-200
    発行日: 1984/07/01
    公開日: 2008/02/08
    ジャーナル フリー
  • 大森 彌
    年報行政研究
    1985年 1985 巻 19 号 105-145
    発行日: 1985/12/05
    公開日: 2012/09/24
    ジャーナル フリー
  • 李 秉哲
    アジア研究
    2022年 68 巻 3 号 1-19
    発行日: 2022/07/31
    公開日: 2022/08/10
    [早期公開] 公開日: 2022/06/20
    ジャーナル フリー

    This article aims to add a new perspective on how the Japanese government conducted Japan-South Korea negotiations on security-economic cooperation during the early 1980s.

    The Zenko Suzuki administration judged that Japan could not meet the U.S. government’s expectations of strengthening its own defense capabilities. For this reason, the administration expressed willingness to cooperate with the U.S. for the economic and social development of strategically important countries. This was intended to work as a means to achieve the ‘comprehensive security’ policy adopted by the Masayoshi Ohira administration and burden-sharing in the U.S.-Japan Alliance. In other words, Japan had an economic cooperation policy that aimed to support developing countries, while recognizing the political impact of foreign aid. Japan had this policy in place before South Korea’s request in 1981 for 10 billion dollars in economic assistance.

    The Suzuki administration had already acknowledged the need to support South Korea to ensure Japan’s cooperative relationship with the U.S. Nevertheless, there was a marked contrast in position between Japan and South Korea during the early stages of the negotiations on the official purpose and contents of economic cooperation. Steady negotiation efforts were necessary to create a situation where the Japanese Prime Minister could make bold political judgments and take action on this issue.

    The Japanese government later decided to negotiate with South Korea based upon its main principles of economic cooperation, such as ‘improving people’s livelihood’ and ‘maintaining a balance among beneficiary countries’, while recognizing the political nature of such cooperation and its indirect contribution to Korea’s security. In other words, the Japanese government intended to maintain its own initiative on economic cooperation while responding flexibly to South Korea’s request for aid.

    During the negotiations, the Japanese side had explicitly stated that it could not agree with Korea’s view that Japan should promote economic cooperation with Korea in order to ease Korea’s military burden. However, Japan did express some understanding of South Korea’s situation and Korea accepted Japan’s assertion that it would contribute to Korea’s economic and social stability. Negotiations then made progress and the two sides agreed on the official purpose for economic cooperation and the amount of assistance from Japan to Korea. Under these circumstances, Prime Minister Suzuki played an important role in deciding the proportion of Japan’s ODA to the total amount of assistance to South Korea. He also explained Japan’s position during the summit talks and dispatched his special envoys to Korea. Consequently, the differences in stance between the two countries on the content of the assistance was narrowed to a considerable extent before the inauguration of the Yasuhiro Nakasone administration.

    However, negotiations between Japan and South Korea were suspended during the Japanese history textbook controversy that surfaced at the end of June 1982. When the textbook issue was settled, Suzuki announced that he would not run in the Liberal Democratic Party leadership election. Therefore, the Nakasone administration assumed responsibility for resolving the remaining issues.

    There is thus room for further consideration of whether the Suzuki administration’s pacifist stance should be regarded as the reason behind the failure of negotiations with South Korea. It is important to bear in mind the necessity of examining various aspects of Japan’s domestic and international situations. Furthermore, Japan-South Korea negotiations on security-economic cooperation revealed a high degree of policy continuity among the Ohira, Suzuki and Nakasone administrations.

  • 照明学会誌
    1993年 77 巻 7 号 plate1-plate8
    発行日: 1993/07/01
    公開日: 2011/07/19
    ジャーナル フリー
  • 経営の継承と変革
    杉岡 直人
    組織学会大会論文集
    2015年 4 巻 1 号 151-157
    発行日: 2015/07/31
    公開日: 2015/07/31
    ジャーナル フリー
    The top managers of Japanese corporations have been questioned about their capability to take necessary actions in dealing with various difficulties the companies experienced since 1990’s. Some empirical studies analyzed the CEO successions of Japanese firms in the era and concluded that the impact of them to their business results was too small and invisible, and that the managers who can realize more sizable short-term changes and improvements in performance would be suitable for the recent period. This study discusses two theoretical types of top succession i.e. the change model and the baton pass model, taken from theoretical literatures in the past (Vancil, 1987; Kagono et al., 1983), and examines the current status of the Japanese corporations in 1990’s and 2000’s by asking which model is more widely adopted and leads to better performance. In order to verify those questions, three empirical studies were conducted. Firstly, the case analysis of the seven notable CEOs of the Japanese corporations in the era identified the traditional baton pass model as main process of the top successions. The division of roles among the planner tops and the implementer tops was found as critical in the relatively long-term oriented passing baton process, which sometimes brought about very impactful “continuous improvement” or “evolutionary change” (Sakano & Lewin, 1999). Secondly, variance components analysis as Crossland & Hambrick (2007) was conducted to the data of the 210 Japanese corporations from five industries. One of the results suggested the baton pass companies were more widely spread in the segment with better business performance. Thirdly, the results from the survey analysis of another data from 108 companies, including correlations, factor analyses and regressions showed the baton pass model of top succession was with wider adoption and better performance than the change model. The results from the three analyses strongly suggest careful reconsideration of the short-term oriented top management and governance models, and reevaluation of the traditional long-term model which are still proved to be effective in the recent era.
  • 真柄 泰基
    水質汚濁研究
    1990年 13 巻 11 号 667-672
    発行日: 1990/11/10
    公開日: 2009/09/10
    ジャーナル フリー
  • 山本 義彦
    社会経済史学
    2004年 69 巻 5 号 610-613
    発行日: 2004/01/25
    公開日: 2017/06/16
    ジャーナル フリー
  • 加藤 寛
    公共選択の研究
    2002年 2002 巻 39 号 1-5
    発行日: 2002/12/15
    公開日: 2010/10/14
    ジャーナル フリー
  • ──陸幼組と中学組という二つの集団──
    武石 典史
    教育社会学研究
    2010年 87 巻 25-45
    発行日: 2010/11/30
    公開日: 2014/07/03
    ジャーナル フリー
     教育社会学的な歴史研究は,官僚群との対立や青年将校運動といった昭和陸軍の動きを,「陸軍将校=農業層」「帝大生・官僚=新中間層」という階層的差異をもとに葛藤モデルから論じてきている。しかし,そこでは陸軍将校の有力構成員たる陸幼組は分析対象から捨象されがちだった。本稿は,陸軍将校を「陸幼組/中学組」という二つの集団に分けつつ,その選抜,学歴キャリア,昇進の諸構造を検討したうえで,昭和陸軍の動向に考察を加えるものである。
     陸軍将校を構成する陸幼組と中学組は社会的背景の重なりは小さかった。また,前者が陸士,陸大の成績が良かったゆえ,昇進でも(農業出身の多い)後者より優勢だった。すなわち,学歴・成績主義を原理に形成される将校集団の構造は,上層において農業色が弱化し都会色が強まるという傾向を帯びていたのである。
     大正後期以降の政治的変化のなかで,陸軍は自己益と国益を,統帥権という威力に拠って重ね合わせていこうとする。統帥権の顕在化,および軍事専門職としての強い自覚を促すという,新たな社会状況のなかで始動した昭和陸軍の主力は,農業出身層ではなく,二・三代目の武官たちであり,官・軍エリートの衝突もこの文脈で把握されるべきだと思われる。
     確かに,農業層出身の陸軍将校は少なくなかった。しかし,彼らは昇進構造において傍流に位置し,影響力をもちえなかったのである。
  • 網中 政機
    法政論叢
    1992年 28 巻 11-21
    発行日: 1992/05/20
    公開日: 2017/11/01
    ジャーナル フリー
    The political reform which the Liberal Democratic Party made, pledged on reflection of the so-called "RECRUIT" scandal, has been shelved less than two weeks after Mr. Miyazawa took over reins of the govenment. Therefore, a drastic revision of the electoral system has been postponed for the time being. This paper refers to the revision of the electoral system from four view-points. 1 What kind of electoral system should be adopted? The 8th Electroral System Council's Report must be respected, because it is sensitive to the will of the people, and makes a change of government with ease. 2 The criterion for deviation. In theory, it is one-to-one. Since equal representation for equal numbers of people is the fundamental goal of the House of Representatives, the "as nearly as practicable" standard requires that Parliament meke a good faith effort to achive mathematical equality. 3 The method of apportionment and distriction. I interpreted as follow:the block system with Expanded Self-Govenment Theory (Federal system, Doushiyuu system) must be adopted for both single-member and proportional constituency. Because by this the deviation of the single-member constituency may be approximately one-to-one. 4 The keyword of an electoral system's reform. There are two keywords;an accurate representation and a change of government, but the latter is primary. Since a change of government serves as the greatest prevention against corruption, and a general election serves as a change for the selection of a new government, they generate tension for an election.
  • 武 祐一郎
    紙パ技協誌
    1985年 39 巻 1 号 33-37
    発行日: 1985/01/01
    公開日: 2009/11/16
    ジャーナル フリー
  • 亀井正夫と佐藤誠三郎の関係を中心に1974-1989
    名古屋大学法政論集
    2025年 305 巻 論文ID: 305.6
    発行日: 2025年
    公開日: 2025/03/18
    研究報告書・技術報告書 フリー
  • 平野 賢一
    日本金属学会会報
    1988年 27 巻 1 号 41-50
    発行日: 1988/01/20
    公開日: 2011/08/10
    ジャーナル フリー
  • 日本外交の非正式チャンネル
    西原 正
    国際政治
    1983年 1983 巻 75 号 1-11,L5
    発行日: 1983/10/20
    公開日: 2010/09/01
    ジャーナル フリー
    This issue represents an academic attempt to shed light on the functions of those who work “behind the scenes” in diplomatic negotiations or what is termed here as “informal contact-makers.” Known by various names such as emissaries, secret envoys, secret agents, fixers, intermediaries, diplomatic brokers and back-channel contacts, these informal contac-makers often play significant roles in state-to-state negotiations, particularly when the parties involved are in tense conflict over issues such as war, territory, trade and the like, but are interested in establishing contacts with each other. Informal contact-makers, in such cases, can often play a more effective role than can formal contact-makers who, because of official credentials, find it difficult to compromise in officially-announced conferences.
    The functions of contact-makers are viewed in terms of two dimensions: whether their acts of contacting are under “official” sanction or not (“unofficial”) and whether their contacts are pre-announced to the public or not. The combination of the two dimensions will produce four types of contact-makers: (1) those who have official credentials and meet for pre-announced meetings (although the contents of the proceedings may well be kept secret); and (2) those who have official credentials but meet for unannounced, i. e., secret meetings; (3) those who have no official credentials but meet for pre-announced meetings; and (4) those who have no official credentials and meet for secret contacts.
    The first type, i. e., official=pre-announced contact-makers are also called “formal contact-makers” such as those attending binational top-level meetings. The second type, i. e., “official=unannounced contact-makers, ” refers to emissaries sent by the authorities and the like. The third type, i. e., “unofficial=unannounced contact-makers” are related to self-appointed emissaries, so to speak. The fourth type may be termed “unofficial=pre-announced contact-makers” such as political and business leaders contacting the other party voluntarily. The last three types are together classified as “informal contact-makers.”
    The functions and types of informal contact-makers appear to be affected by various factors including the nature of diplomatic issues, the nature of relations between the governments concerned, the geographical distance between the governments concerned, and the political culture supportive of the role of informal contact-akers. Eight articles, selected here to provide case studies of prewar and postwar Japanese diplomatic negotiations, generally follow this conceptual framework. They suggest that Asian political cultures such as those of China, Korea, the Philippines as well as Japan are more conducive to informal contact-makers than are Western cultures. In Western societies as well, however, a network of personal ties among influentials sometimes plays a significant role.
  • 辻井 清吾
    日本経営倫理学会誌
    2001年 8 巻 173-182
    発行日: 2001/03/31
    公開日: 2017/07/28
    ジャーナル フリー
    Today,business ethics issues in Executives are strongly commented and urged in the concerned fields. To remind these issues from the religious view, I would appeal executives may keep it in each mind as one of significant management thought.As case study of it, herewithj would take two excellent executives, lived Meiji, Taisho, and Showa. Mr. Masaya Suzuki promoted the Sumitomo as president for 19years through his worship of Zen,and Mr.Masakazu Echigo promoted Itochu from textile trading firm to present general trading firm as presesint for 13 years through his worship of Jyodo-Shinshu Sect. Both performed splendid achivement not only in each business behavior but cultural one. In this paper, I would take how religious ethics (for both buddhist ethics) was significantly maintained to promote business ethics through both behaviors mainly on living and human environment since both were born,and how both firms have promoted each business environment till present scale.
  • 松下 義弘
    繊維学会誌
    2021年 77 巻 2 号 P-79-P-88
    発行日: 2021/02/15
    公開日: 2021/02/24
    ジャーナル 認証あり
  • 大井 源一郎
    國學院短期大学紀要
    1997年 15 巻 A75-A108
    発行日: 1997/03/23
    公開日: 2018/07/19
    研究報告書・技術報告書 フリー
  • 松下 義弘
    繊維学会誌
    2021年 77 巻 3 号 P-130-P-141
    発行日: 2021/03/15
    公開日: 2021/03/17
    ジャーナル 認証あり
  • 海外ブランドの導入
    松下 義弘
    繊維学会誌
    2020年 76 巻 8 号 P-343-P-354
    発行日: 2020/08/15
    公開日: 2020/08/15
    ジャーナル 認証あり
  • 国際政治研究の先端1
    井手 康仁
    国際政治
    2004年 2004 巻 136 号 18-32,L6
    発行日: 2004/03/29
    公開日: 2010/09/01
    ジャーナル フリー
    Nowadays, foreign policy appears not only to be carried out by governments but also by civilian activists. Nishihara Masashi has developed a profound classification of unofficial contact-makers which includes civilian activists. Upon dividing unofficial contact-makers into the following three groups; (1) Official=unnanounced contact-makers, (2) Unofficial=unnanounced contact-makers, (3) Unofficial=pre-announced contact-makers, Nishihara highlights the limited role of the 3rd type contact makers, indicating that serious negotiations can only progress at unannounced negotiations. There is however a case in Japanese-Soviet relations which is not applicable to his conclusion.
    According to the Japanese history of civilian diplomacy with the Soviet Union, civilian activities carried out by either leftists or pro-Soviet activists had attracted much attention. Matsumae Shigeyoshi who Nishihara refers to as a type 3 activist, acted as the head of the Japan Cultural Association. The Japan Cultural Association was established in 1966 upon accepting the USSR's proposal, having the Japan Socialist Party play its central role. Since Matsumae was personally close to Ivan Kovalenko, the deputy chief of the Central Committee's International Department, the Japanese-Soviet round table conference (Entaku-kaigi) was further established through their efforts in 1979. The round table conference was successful to a certain extent since the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs started attending the round table conference as an observer. The Japanese public, however, considered Matsumae's activities highly influenced by Socialist ideology. For this reason, Matsumae's activities didn't receive sufficient support to have made a significant influence within the country.
    Suetsugu Ichiro, on the other hand, also referred to as a type 3 contact-maker, is said to have had an enormous impact on Japanese-Soviet relations. Upon participating in various social movements, he established a lobbyist status, which was very rare in Japan then. The Soviet Ambassador in Japan suggested Suetsugu to partake in promoting academic exchange with Soviet scholars. Suetsugu thus took and realized this opportunity by bringing the Council of National Security lead by Suetsugu, and scholars from the USSR together, whereby establishing the Japanese-Soviet Joint Symposium.
    So why was Suetsugu, being a type 3 unofficial=pre-announced contactmaker able to act so effectively? In my opinion, one of the reasons was that Suetsugu had strong connections with Japanese political leaders. Another reason is that he was a well-known nationalist within the country. In this way, he was completely different from Matsumae and the other leftists and pro-Soviet activists. As a result, having established close relations with Soviet scholars who in time turned to play leading roles within the Soviet office during Gorbachev's rule, he maintained a trustworthy channel in the center of the Soviet regime. He had managed to act as an activist trusted both by Japanese and Soviet counterparts.
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