The purpose of this paper was to clarify the influnce of the activities of German war-prisoners in the Bando P.O.W. (prisoner of war) Camp on the development of sport and physical education in Tokushima where the Camp was located. The historical materials used for this paper were collected mainly from newspapers and "Keibi-Keisatsukan-Hokokusho" which was a report on the German prisoners' life in the Bando P.O.W. Camp written by Japanese police sergeants. The findings of this study were summarized as follows: Students and teachers of some elementary and secondary schools went to see German prisoners, activities such as Turnen, football, tennis, and hockey. And several prisoners visited schools to coach them for Turnen. In "German war-prisoners' variety show", German prisoners introduced their Turnen and sport activities such as gymnastics, wrestling, boxing, weight lifting and dance to students and people in Tokushima. "Japan Martial Arts Association Tokushima Branch" set up "Meeting for the Study of German Martial Arts" and invited eleven German prisoners to perform wrestling, boxing and fencing matches. Then the Association sent two Japanese members to the Camp to do further study of those activities. This friendly communications with people of Tokushima which was brought from the German war-prisoners' Turnen and sport activities gave a significant influence on sports in Tokushima, and this fact should not be neglected in the consideration of the history of sport and physical education in Japan.

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After the Great War broke out, Japan's naval and military assistance was an important concern for the British government. Arthur Balfour was the only politician involved in this matter from the beginning to the end of the war. Until he became Foreign Secretary he had little expectation of Japan's assistance. However, the difficult circumstances of the war forced him to review his opinion about the value of Japan's help, as Britain was suffering badly from a shortage of manpower and munitions. As Foreign Secretary he had high hopes of Japan's assistance and did not hesitate to launch negotiations to secure her aid.
Balfour sought Japan's naval assistance and eventually succeeded in inducing her to despatch her destroyers to the Mediterranean. The price for this, namely guaranteeing Japanese rights in Shantung and the Pacific islands, was regarded as a permissible concession. The Japanese government, however, expressed disapproval at his request that they sell battle-cruisers to Britain. Balfour promptly put forward a new proposal to borrow the battlecruisers instead, based on his assumption that lending them would be more agreeable to Japan than selling them. He could not conceal his disappointment and dissatisfaction with the Japanese government's refusal to fulfil this modified request. He was not convinced by the reasons the Japanese government presented and criticised Japan's reluctance to help Britain.
In seeking Japan's military assistance, Balfour faced two obstacles. One was the difficulty of transporting Japanese troops to the European field. Many troopships would be needed to carry a large number of Japanese soldiers to the western or Salonica front. Britain and the Allied Powers, however, could not afford to allocate so many ships as they had a severe deficit of tonnage. The other obstacle was the need to harmonise the Japanese military campaign with the political interests of Britain and the Allied Powers. Russia did not want to receive Japanese soldiers on the eastern front due to her fear of massive territorial concessions to Japan. Although Balfour considered that Mesopotamia was the most promising theatre from which to deploy Japanese troops, he was obliged to renounce this idea due to strong opposition from the India Office and the Government of India. He continued to seek a location where transportation difficulties could be overcome and which was compatible with the interests of the other powers, and saw Siberia as the most favourable field. Henceforth Japan's military assistance was regarded as the Siberian Intervention, and Balfour continued to tackle this subject.

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This article focuses on Emily Greene Balch (1867–1961), one of the most prominent American figures in the women’s international peace movements in the early twentieth century. Balch was a researcher and educator in economics and sociology at a women’s college as well as an activist in social reform and peace movements. She made suggestions about immigration, U.S. democracy, and foreign policies. During WWI, she helped organize the International Committee of Women for Permanent Peace (later renamed the Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom). The article investigates Balch’s social, academic, and peace activities besides examining her ideas on race, nation, and international peace building in the context of changing U.S. foreign policies and socio-politics.

The social reform movements in the U.S. influenced the development of the women’s peace movement. Some recent studies criticize that such movements were associated with U.S. nationalism, which aimed to achieve a hegemonic position of the nation in international politics and economy. For one reason, mainly white middle-class American women who strongly believed in progressivism and American democracy led these movements. However, other studies claim that feminism unified women of various racial, national, or ethnic backgrounds in the public sphere. Researching Balch may help understand the development of the American women’s peace movement with emerging international networks of women as well as the influence of U.S. politics and national discourses. Nevertheless, studies focusing on Balch have been scarce, especially those on her activities before and during WWI.

The research reveals that Balch’s social and political thoughts reflected progressive social reformative ideas among middle-class women, which emphasized the role of women in protecting society and defending democracy. Balch studied Slavic immigrants in the U.S. and proposed a biological but also socio-cultural concept of “nationality” as a useful framework to categorize people. She did not see “nationality” negatively. Instead, she saw it as a crucial element in the assimilation of immigrants into U.S. society while maintaining their own culture and communities. Balch’s ideas on “race” and “nation” in her early peace movement were also associated with her concept of “nationality”. Balch considered that “peoples” in and from Europe could be unified as one civilized “European” group. She claimed that the U.S. should stabilize the region and maintain international peace, and American women should work for it.

Contrarily, Balch persistently opposed the U.S. entering the war and placed importance on cultural pluralism and the international cooperation of all nations. It was partially attributed to Balch’s political and social activities based on the cooperation with various women activists in North America, Europe, and eventually many other parts of the world. Thus, it can be argued that Balch’s peace movement was influenced by U.S. nationalism but also developed through the growing diversity of women’s netwoks and her ongoing empirical social science research, which enabled her to claim the equality of all nations and nationalities while questioning U.S. democracy and nationalism.

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The First World War (1914-1918), the background to A Farewell to Arms (1929), encompassed most nations and areas of the world. It began as a single and minor conflict between Austria-Hungary and the Republic of Serbia but systematically ballooned into a world-sized war through alliances and the old diplomacy of secret agreements. In the 1920s, a criticism of this faulty system of international relations replaced the Kaiser’s personal responsibility for World War I, and in the midst of the public disclosure of these secret documents, A Farewell to Arms was written and published.

Focusing on these unregulated alliances and secret agreements, this essay attempts to reread A Farewell to Arms from the standpoint of a “joint action.” The narrator of this novel, Frederic, has learned the contradictions of joint military action defined by the Allies and has recognized his own inner patriotism. Regarding these awareness and recognition as his lessons from World War I and relating them to the narrator’s choice of words and scenes such as a “separate peace,” disrespect for Italy and hostility to Japan, the tragic nature of this love story will appear in a context of a “joint action.”

The narrator Frederic calls his own cowardly, yet inevitable departure from the warfront a “separate peace” and associates this personal retreat from the war with Russia’s peace, achieved against the wishes of the Allies. In another case, the narrator Frederic sets twice the scene of Englishperson’s disrespect for the Italian people. English nurses such as Catherine and her head nurse criticize Frederic for joining the Italian army, considering it disgraceful. The nurses’ contemptuous attitude is probably representative of the animosity that an Englishperson might feel when meeting an American enlisting not in the British army but in the Italian army, which only unexpectedly joined the Allies because of a secret agreement with England and France (“The Treaty of London” in 1915). This international politics behind the nurses’ resentment, however, is ignored by Frederic, who was ignorant of the secret agreement and oblivious of his own national identity. As if engaging with this national insensitivity, the narrator Frederic sets out the dialogue between him and an Italian military priest, who tries in vain to make Frederic notice his patriotism as a lesson that each of the Allies had its own expectations.

This dialogue is followed by the scene in which Fredric criticizes Japan and Japan’s partner in the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, England. Frederic gets drunk and tells some Italians that the United States would declare war on Japan as well as on Turkey and Bulgaria, and accuses Japan of wanting Hawaii. This choice of scenes by the narrator Frederic might reflect his knowledge of the US-Japan conflict over the hegemony of Hawaii and the Pacific, evident from the late 19th century, and the secret agreement that Germany attempted to make with Japan, which was suggested in a coded telegram called the “Zimmermann Telegram.” To the narrator Frederic, drunk Frederic’s joking accusation against Japan probably seems to reflect his own patriotism and nationalism and contradicts the cooperative agreement of joint action, which are the lessons the Italian priest wanted Frederic to learn.

By narrating his relationship with Catherine and other characters in the context of “joint actions,” the narrator Frederic creates a new tragic nature, mixed with the war absurdities of World War I, in this love story.

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Japanese warships transported five hundred million yen in gold bullion (about 450 tons) equivalent to about one trillion five or six hundred million yen at current prices, from Russia to Canada in the middle of the First World War. This bullion was the specie which was transferred to the Russian account at the Bank of England in Ottawa to supplement the overseas specie reserves. These reserves were for the purpose of purchasing munitions from America. Japan undertook to take part in this operation for the sake of showing cooperative unity with the Allied Powers. The supreme commander of the operation was the president of the Bank of England who oversaw allied finances. The operation was carried out according to a secret treaty between Russia and Britain which had been concluded at the urging of the American government.
As the First World War developed into a major conflict, the Allied Powers relied heavily on imports of munitions from America which was at the time neutral. Russia had purchased vast amounts of munitions from America with the financial support of Britain. When the limit of this support was reached the trade finance situation between Russia and America reached an impasse. Britain wished to relieve the situation and enable the munitions trade to Russia to continue, as it was strategically vital that Russia maintain the Eastern front. The most effective method would have been for Russia to make one colossal transfer of specie. However, the threat of German U-boats in the sea near Europe had made that idea unfeasible. Therefore, a plan was worked out whereby Japanese warships would transport the gold across the Pacific Ocean to Canada. By taking on the role of transporter, Japan was able to impress upon the Allied Powers her cooperative attitude and turn Allied indebtedness to her advantage at the peace conference and in post-war deplomacy. Further, during the war the Japanese government had had difficulty in repatriating her foreign specie holdings. When Britain offered to sell Japan a part of the specie gold if she agreed to the transport plan, the Japanese government was more than happy to accept. In all, Japan imported a total of about 65 tons (worth about 80million yen)of gold in this way.
During the First World War the center of international finance shifted from London to New York. The colossal specie transfer operation from Russia mentioned above was one of the events which symbolized the change. Japan played an unusual role in this event, a role which helps us to understand both Japan's position and in what ways she coped with international relations during First World War which pivoted on the international financial situation.
In the first chapter, we look at the tight financial situation governing the munitions trade between Britain, Russia and America and consider how this gave rise to the necessity for the Russian specie transfer. In the second chapter, we discuss the process of the Japan-Russia munitions trade and the negotiations regarding the settlement of accounts. The third chapter gives a detailed description of the negotiations between Japan and Britain concerning the transportation of the gold and actual voyages of the Japanese warships.

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The first revision of the "National Defense Plan" in 1918 has not been analyzed sufficiently mainly due to lack of historical materials. This paper intends to make a comparative study of the Army's and the Navy's original plans by using new materials from the HAMAOMOTE Matasuke Papers and TAKESHITA Isamu Papers. First of all, we must understand why the Army and the Navy were able to agree to revise the National Defense Plan that affected their individual basic war plans, despite their sharp opposition on matters regarding the arms budget. Therefore, the first part of this paper examines the process of the dissolution of the arms budget problem in the second OKUMA Shigenobu cabinet that was shocked by the outbreak of the First World War. The First World War made the military even more aware of the importance of Chinese raw materials. At that time, Japan's support for the third Chinese revolution to destroy Yuan Shih-kai's monarchy added momentum to Japanese hopes for a stronger foothold in China. The Army was now joined by the Navy in urging a stronger military policy with respect to China. Therefore, it was the Chinese problem that initiated the first revision of the "National Defense Plan". When the plan was originally made in 1907, the Navy had refused to include provisions for war operations in China, because it feared that the Navy would then be made secondary to the Army. But due to the internal and external changes produced by the First World War, the Navy now accepted the stipulations to for operations in China. Although originally the Army and Navy had different opinions as what nation presented the strongest military threat, Russia or America, now their respective plans offered the possibility of joining together with the China-plan as a bridge. The appearance of this common target together with the internal political structural demands for the banding together of the Army and the Navy, made the first revision of the National Defense Plan possible.

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